Details
Immediate mitigation (users, verified): bound untrusted input length and bracket-nesting depth before calling toml.parse(), e.g. reject payloads whose maximum [/{ nesting exceeds a few hundred. A byte-length limit alone is insufficient (5 KB already crashes).
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Comparison with Related Vulnerabilities
Same CWE-674 class as the recursion-DoS findings in the PyPI toml package (C055) and the YAML parsers (PyYAML GHSA-r9mm-j37c-pjwp, ruamel.yaml). The distinguishing detail here: the parser is generated by Peggy, so the recursion lives in peg$parsevalue/peg$parsearray/peg$parseinline_table and cannot be fixed by editing a hand-written function — the earlier draft of this report incorrectly showed hand-written parseValue(tokens, index) functions that do not exist in the package.