mongoose
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed6.13.12(semver)
Fixed versions
6.13.12
Fix
- Fixed version
6.13.12npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-125117
Mongoose walks into inherited properties when hydrating, setting, and merging, allowing overwrites of built-in functions (denial of service) and shared schema state
Summary
Three Mongoose code paths copy data into objects by property name without checking whether the property is the object's own or inherited from its prototype:
init(), also used by Model.hydrate())$__set, used by new Model(obj), doc.set() and doc.$set())utils.mergeClone, used by findOneAndReplace(), chained update calls and Query.prototype.merge())When a key names an inherited property, such as toString or valueOf, or a document internal such as $__schema, Mongoose writes into the shared object behind that property. The data comes from the attacker.
{ "toString": { "call": 1 } } overwrites Object.prototype.toString.call. Mongoose and most other libraries rely on Object.prototype.toString.call(). After the overwrite, every later query in the process throws TypeError: _toString.call is not a function until the process restarts. This includes queries on unrelated models.strict: false, a path such as profile.$__schema.paths.email.validators reaches the subdocument's schema, which every document shares. Setting it to [] removes the required validator for every document in the process.Mongoose already blocked __proto__, constructor and prototype, so these bugs cannot add properties to Object.prototype itself. They can still overwrite methods and properties of shared built-in functions and of Mongoose's internal objects.
Details
1. Loading documents: init()
if (!schemaType && utils.isPOJO(value)) {
// assume nested object
if (!doc[i]) { doc[i] = {}; ... }
init(self, value, doc[i], opts, path + '.');
}
For a stored field named toString, doc[i] is the inherited Object.prototype.toString. It is truthy, so init() recurses into that function and copies the stored subfields onto it.
This runs for every document Mongoose loads: find(), findOne(), cursors, populated documents and Model.hydrate(). It runs whatever the strict setting, and it applies to top-level and nested paths alike. lean() queries are not affected.
A malicious document can get into the collection in several ways:
strict: false, for example new Model(req.body).save();2. Setting dotted paths: $__set
When it walks a dotted path, $__set read obj[parts[i]] and descended into whatever it found. That included inherited functions, such as Object.prototype.toString on a plain object or Document.prototype.toObject on a subdocument. On subdocuments it also included non-function internals that are prototype getters, such as $__schema, schema, $__middleware and $__schemaTypeOptions. Those point at objects that every document of the model shares.
Attacker-controlled input reaches this path through:
new Model({ "mixed.toString.call": 1 }), or doc.set({ "mixed.toString.call": 1 }). Nothing needs to be saved.doc.set('toString.call', 1).doc.set(path, value): for example doc.set('profile.$__schema.paths.email.validators', []).3. Merging updates: utils.mergeClone
if (typeof to[key] === 'undefined') {
to[key] = clone(fromObj[key]);
} else if (isObject(val)) {
mergeClone(to[key], val); // to[key] may be an inherited built-in
}
to[key] was read without an own-property check, so a key such as toString recursed into Object.prototype.toString. This affects:
Model.updateOne(filter, { $set: {...} }).updateOne({}, untrustedUpdate), the same pattern with findOneAndUpdate(), or middleware that calls this.updateOne(...).Proof of concept
const mongoose = require('mongoose');
const { Schema } = mongoose;
// 2. Setting dotted paths: a Mixed path on a default strict schema, nothing saved
const Item = mongoose.model('Item', new Schema({ name: String, meta: {} }));
new Item(JSON.parse('{"meta.toString.call": 1}')); // e.g. new Item(req.body)
console.log(typeof Object.prototype.toString.call); // 'number'
// From here on, every query in the process fails:
// TypeError: _toString.call is not a function
// 1. Loading documents: a stored field named after an Object.prototype method
const Loose = mongoose.model('Loose', new Schema({ name: String }, { strict: false }));
await new Loose(JSON.parse('{"name":"evil","toString":{"call":1}}')).save();
await Loose.findOne({ name: 'evil' }); // any later read of this document
await OtherModel.findOne(); // TypeError: _toString.call is not a function
// 3. Merging updates: a single findOneAndReplace() call with an untrusted replacement
const Doc = mongoose.model('Doc', new Schema({ name: String }));
Doc.findOneAndReplace({}, JSON.parse('{"toString":{"call":1}}'));
console.log(typeof Object.prototype.toString.call); // 'number'
// 2. Setting dotted paths: changing the shared subdocument schema
const User = mongoose.model('User', new Schema({
profile: new Schema({ email: { type: String, required: true } }, { strict: false })
}));
// e.g. JSON-patch style endpoint: doc.set(req.body.path, req.body.value)
new User({ profile: { email: '[email protected]' } }).set('profile.$__schema.paths.email.validators', []);
await new User({ profile: {} }).validate(); // resolves: `required` removed for every document
Impact
Object.prototype.toString.call. After that, every query in the process fails, and so does much other code, until the process restarts. Ways in:new Model(req.body) on any schema with a Mixed path;findOneAndReplace() with an untrusted replacement;{ "toString": { "call": 1 } }.In the stored-document case, the attacker does not need any write path through Mongoose at the moment of the attack. Any later read of that document triggers the overwrite. If the document is read on startup or by a scheduled job, the application can be kept down.
doc.set(path, value) can change a subdocument schema that every document shares. For example, they can remove validators or change schema options for every later document in the process.Object.prototype.toString, Object.prototype.valueOf and Function.prototype.call. Any other code that reads properties of those functions sees the attacker's values.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 6.13.12 (semver)6.13.12
6.13.12npm install [email protected]7.0.0, fixed 7.8.13 (semver)7.8.13
7.8.13npm install [email protected]8.0.0, fixed 8.24.7 (semver)8.24.7
8.24.7npm install [email protected]9.0.0, fixed 9.11.4 (semver)9.11.4
9.11.4npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0