Advisory

GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5

Also known as: CVE-2026-77366

Summary

obsidian-tc tokens can access arbitrary configured vaults

Details

Impact
Tool dispatch did not check the caller-supplied input.vault against the caller's bound vault (ctx.vaultId); the folder ACL was a single global instance and the JWT carried no vault claim. As a result, any valid token could read, write, or delete any configured vault by passing input.vault, defeating multi-tenant isolation across ~90 tool sites. (resources/read was the only surface that already guarded this.)

Patches
Fixed in 1.3.1 (the fix was developed on the v1.3.0 tag, which never published to npm; 1.3.1 is the first published release with the fix). Upgrade to >= 1.3.1.

Workarounds
Run a single vault per server process, or isolate each tenant on a separate process/credential.

Fix
A central input.vault === ctx.vaultId guard was added in dispatch before the scope check.

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-10-23 17:29 UTC
Modified
2026-10-23 17:45 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

obsidian-tc

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.3.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.3.1

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences