obsidian-tc
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.3.1(semver)
Fixed versions
1.3.1
Fix
- Fixed version
1.3.1npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-77366
obsidian-tc tokens can access arbitrary configured vaults
Impact
Tool dispatch did not check the caller-supplied input.vault against the caller's bound vault (ctx.vaultId); the folder ACL was a single global instance and the JWT carried no vault claim. As a result, any valid token could read, write, or delete any configured vault by passing input.vault, defeating multi-tenant isolation across ~90 tool sites. (resources/read was the only surface that already guarded this.)
Patches
Fixed in 1.3.1 (the fix was developed on the v1.3.0 tag, which never published to npm; 1.3.1 is the first published release with the fix). Upgrade to >= 1.3.1.
Workarounds
Run a single vault per server process, or isolate each tenant on a separate process/credential.
Fix
A central input.vault === ctx.vaultId guard was added in dispatch before the scope check.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 1.3.1 (semver)1.3.1
1.3.1npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0