github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected8.32.0(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45741, GO-2026-5244
Gotenberg has an SSRF deny-list bypass in IsPublicIP via IPv6 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local prefixes
Summary
IsPublicIP in pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go incorrectly classifies IPv6 6to4 / NAT64 / deprecated site-local addresses as public IPs, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to reach internal destinations (e.g., cloud metadata services at 169.254.169.254) via a single crafted DNS AAAA record. This is a variant of CVE-2026-44430 (modelcontextprotocol/registry).
Details
IsPublicIP uses Go stdlib helpers (IsLoopback, IsPrivate, IsLinkLocalUnicast, etc.) to block internal IPs. However, these helpers do not recognize IPv6 prefixes that embed IPv4 addresses:
| Prefix | RFC | Tunnels to |
|--------|-----|-----------|
| 2002::/16 | RFC 3056 (6to4) | IPv4 in bits 16-47 |
| 64:ff9b::/96 | RFC 6052 (NAT64 well-known) | IPv4 in low 32 bits |
| 64:ff9b:1::/48 | RFC 8215 (NAT64 local-use) | IPv4 in low 32 bits |
| fec0::/10 | RFC 3879 (deprecated site-local) | internal routing |
addr.Unmap() only handles ::ffff:0:0/96 (IPv4-mapped) and has no effect on these prefixes. On dual-stack or NAT64-enabled cloud hosts, the OS kernel transparently routes these addresses to their embedded internal IPv4 destinations.
Vulnerable code (pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go L53-69, commit 93d0103):
func IsPublicIP(addr netip.Addr) bool {
addr = addr.Unmap() // only handles ::ffff:x.x.x.x
switch {
case addr.IsLoopback(), addr.IsPrivate(),
addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast(), ...:
return false
}
return true // 6to4/NAT64/site-local incorrectly reaches here
}
PoC
cd poc/
./build.sh # docker build (~30s)
./run.sh # docker run — exits with code 1 (bug detected)
Expected output: IsPublicIP(2002:a9fe:a9fe::) = true — the function returns true for 3 addresses that wrap 169.254.169.254 (AWS IMDS). Full test file available via GHSA private comment on request.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker controlling a DNS AAAA record can tunnel gotenberg's outbound HTTP client to AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS (169.254.169.254), leaking IAM credentials. The Chromium URL convert route returns the full response as a PDF (full-read SSRF). Affects all deployments with WithDenyPrivateIPs(true) on dual-stack or NAT64-enabled hosts.
Suggested Fix
Add explicit prefix checks after addr.Unmap():
var blockedIPv6Prefixes = []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("2002::/16"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b:1::/48"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("fec0::/10"),
}
for _, p := range blockedIPv6Prefixes {
if p.Contains(addr) { return false }
}High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 8.32.0 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0