contao/contao
Affected
- introduced
5.3.35, fixed5.3.48(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
5.3.48
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-57232
Contao: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Unvalidated RSS Feed URL in Feed Reader Module
Summary
The Feed Reader front-end module passes RSS feed URLs from its configuration directly to $this->feedIo->read($url) without any scheme validation or private-IP blocklist. A backend user with module-edit permissions can configure an arbitrary URL pointing to internal network services, cloud-provider metadata endpoints, or loopback addresses, causing the server to fetch those resources unconditionally. Confirmed live: the server successfully reaches the internal MySQL database container and its own loopback Apache instance.
---
Details
In core-bundle/src/Controller/FrontendModule/FeedReaderController.php, the getResponse() function iterates over the configured feed URLs and passes each one directly to the HTTP client with no validation:
// Line 50-55
foreach (StringUtil::trimsplit('[\n\t ]', trim($model->rss_feed)) as $url) {
try {
$feed = $this->cache->get(
'feed_reader_'.$model->id.'_'.md5($url),
function (ItemInterface $item) use ($url, $model) {
$readerResult = $this->feedIo->read($url, new Feed()); // <-- no validation
The DCA field definition for rss_feed in tl_module.php carries no URL scheme or host validation:
'eval' => array('mandatory'=>true, 'decodeEntities'=>true, 'style'=>'height:60px')
The HTTP client is wired as @psr18.http_client (Symfony HttpClient) with no SSRF protection configured (NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient is not used).
---
Impact
This is a CWE-918 (SSRF) vulnerability. A backend user with module-edit access can:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ to obtain IAM role credentials (IMDSv1 has no authentication)Confirmed in live testing: the server successfully connected to the internal MySQL container (172.19.0.3:3306) and retrieved a full HTTP response from its own loopback interface (127.0.0.1:80).
---
Remediation
use Symfony\Component\HttpClient\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient;
$safeClient = new NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient($this->httpClient);
This blocks all RFC-1918, loopback, and link-local addresses at the HTTP client level.
feedIo->read(), parse the URL and reject anything that is not http:// or https:// with a public routable IP or hostname.'rgxp' => 'url' and a custom validation callback to tl_module.rss_feed to reject non-public URLs at save time.Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
5.3.35, fixed 5.3.48 (ecosystem)5.3.48
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
5.4.0, fixed 5.7.9 (ecosystem)5.7.9
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
5.3.35, fixed 5.3.48 (ecosystem)5.3.48
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
5.4.0, fixed 5.7.9 (ecosystem)5.7.9
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0