pyload-ng
Affected
- introduced
0.5.0b3.dev98, last affected0.5.0b3.dev101(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: None
pyLoad: Api.set_user_permission never invalidates the target's session
Summary
An admin who revokes or downgrades a non-admin user's permissions through pyLoad's own documented/api/<func> RPC surface — e.g. POST /api/set_user_permission (or its legacy alias/api/setUserPermission) — updates the target's database row but never invalidates that user's
existing Flask cookie session. The demoted user keeps their pre-revocation role/permission bits
on every subsequent WebUI page load and every subsequent /api/<func> call made with that cookie,
for up to the default session_lifetime of ~31 days, or until they voluntarily log out. No action
by the demoted user is required beyond already being logged in at the time of revocation.
Details
The vulnerable method, verbatim, at src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1652-1656:
@legacy("setUserPermission")
@post
def set_user_permission(self, user: str, permission: int, role: int) -> None:
self.pyload.db.set_permission(user, permission)
self.pyload.db.set_role(user, role)
It carries no @permission(...) decorator and its body never calls clear_all_user_sessions or any
other session-invalidation routine.
The only call site in the entire codebase that pairs a permission/role change withclear_all_user_sessions is the WebUI's update_users() route,src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:442-444:
api.set_user_permission(name, data["permission"], data["role"])
if was_changed:
clear_all_user_sessions(name)
A repo-wide grep for set_user_permission|setUserPermission returns exactly 3 hits: the @legacy
alias registration (core/api/__init__.py:1652), the method definition itself (:1654), and this one
call site (json_blueprint.py:442). No other caller exists.
pyLoad's own public RPC dispatcher reaches Api.set_user_permission directly, bypassingjson_blueprint.py entirely. src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/api_blueprint.py:21-26 registersrpc(func, args="") on /api/<func> and /api/<func>/<args> for GET/POST; line 68 dispatches
with response = jsonify(getattr(api, func)(**json_request_body)) — i.e. it invokes any method on
the Api object by name, including set_user_permission (also reachable via form/multipart bodies
at :72/:77). The only authorization gate before that dispatch, at api_blueprint.py:50, is:
if not api.is_authorized(func, {"role": user_info["role"], "permission": user_info["permission"]}):
is_authorized (core/api/__init__.py:1419-1432) returns True outright when the caller's
role is Role.ADMIN; otherwise it requires func_name in perm_map. set_user_permission has no@permission decorator, so it is absent from perm_map (the module comment at core/api/__init__.py:37
states "unlisted functions are for admins only"). This gate concerns only the caller's own
authorization — it says nothing about, and never touches, the target user's existing session.
The stale session survives
The demoted user's session was populated once, at login, and is never refreshed:
helpers.py:170,179,183-185 — parse_permissions(session) derives the caller's effective admin/permission bits from session.get("role") and session.get("perms").set_session() (helpers.py:223-234), called only from app_blueprint.py:88 (login) and :100 (autologin). A repo-wide grep for before_request inside src/pyload/ returns nothing — no hook anywhere refreshes a live session from the database.is_authenticated(session) (helpers.py:261-266) is exactly: user = session.get("name")
authenticated = session.get("authenticated", False)
return authenticated and api.user_exists(user)
It re-validates only that the username still exists — never that the session's cached role/perms
still match the current database values.
apikey_auth (helpers.py:393-404), when no X-API-Key header is supplied, flask.g.user_info is built as {"id": s["id"], "name": s["name"], "role": s["role"], "permission": s["perms"]} — straight from the same stale, login-time-cached session fields. This is exactly the user_info that api_blueprint.py:50 feeds into is_authorized() for every /api/<func> call made over a cookie session.The exposure window is bounded, not indefinite: default.cfg:47 sets session_lifetime = 44640
(minutes, ≈31 days), wired into PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME at webui/app/__init__.py:130-131, andSESSION_REFRESH_EACH_REQUEST = False at :128 means the window is a hard ~31 days from login, not
extended by continued activity.
Attack Sequence
Starting privilege: an already-authenticated non-admin user, plus an admin who legitimately uses
pyLoad's own documented API instead of the WebUI page.
A) with role/perms reflecting their current (elevated) permissions.POST /api/set_user_permission (or legacy POST /api/setUserPermission) with the victim's username and the new, lower permission/role values — using curl, a script, or any RPC client, rather than the WebUI's "Manage Users" HTML page. Api.set_user_permission updates pyload.db.set_permission / pyload.db.set_role and returns; no session anywhere is touched.A (never invalidated), the victim loads any WebUI admin-gated page, or calls any /api/<func> endpoint gated only on role/permission. apikey_auth's cookie branch rebuilds user_info from the stale session fields (role/perms as of step 1), is_authorized() / parse_permissions() evaluate against those stale values, and the call succeeds as if the revocation never happened.session_lifetime) or until the victim logs out, whichever comes first.This sequence was confirmed against a real, locally-run pyLoad instance, not just traced from source.
See Section 10 for the exact commands, real HTTP status codes and response bodies, and the
precondition that the admin step here used X-API-Key header auth rather than a cookie (explained
there).
Suggested Fix
Move the clear_all_user_sessions(name) call into Api.set_user_permission itself (ideally also
adopting the apikey-cache purge pattern already used in remove_user,core/api/__init__.py:1626-1636), so that every entry point — WebUI and /api/<func> RPC alike —
inherits session invalidation automatically, rather than requiring each caller to remember to invoke
it separately.
PoC
This was executed for real against pyLoad's own code, not merely predicted from reading it. The
verifier pass that produced Sections 1-9 (ghsa/CLAIMS-pyload.md) source-traced every claim but never
ran a PoC; this section closes that gap.
Method and preconditions
pyload/pyload at the pinned commit 31e341fd41d2dac9fffa3683a756edc54bcdeb77 (develop branch), installed editable (pip install -e ".[test]") into a fresh Python 3.12.3 virtualenv. No source files were modified.app.test_client()) against the real pyload.core.Core / pyload.webui.app Flask app object, not a bound TCP server. This is the same bootstrap the project's own tests/integration/conftest.py fixture uses, and it exercises the identical route/view/decorator code (api_blueprint.rpc(), apikey_auth, is_authorized(), parse_permissions(), Flask-WTF CSRF protection) that a real 127.0.0.1:8000-bound server would run. No real network socket was opened and no third-party or public host was touched, only this locally-run copy of the target's own cloned code.pyload/pyload (pyLoad's own automatically-created default admin account) and a freshly created non-admin victim user with the Perms.SETTINGS permission bit.GET /api/get_userdir (core/api/__init__.py:1434-1437, decorated @permission(Perms.SETTINGS) @get), chosen because it is gated on an ordinary non-admin permission bit and because it is a GET request, so it needs no CSRF token (Flask-WTF's WTF_CSRF_METHODS default excludes GET), keeping the reproduction focused on session staleness rather than CSRF plumbing.POST /api/set_user_permission call used X-API-Key header authentication rather than a cookie. This is a precondition, not a simplification of the bug: apikey_auth (helpers.py:335-413) marks the whole /api/<func> route CSRF-exempt at decoration time, then, only in the cookie-session branch (no API key), manually calls csrf.protect() (helpers.py:397) beforeHigh Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0.5.0b3.dev98, last affected 0.5.0b3.dev101 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0