Advisory

GHSA-88f6-4rjv-x774

Also known as: CVE-2026-91982, GO-2026-6722

Summary

Vikunja: TOTP secret is readable after enrollment, no step-up auth

Details

Summary
Once a user has TOTP enabled, the API still hands back the raw shared secret to anyone holding that account's access token. Reading it doesn't ask for the password, even though disabling TOTP does. So a stolen token, an XSS, or a browser left open is enough to copy the second factor into your own authenticator and keep generating valid codes indefinitely.

Details
GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp returns the full TOTP object, including the secret field and the otpauth:// provisioning URL. GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode renders the same secret as a QR image. Neither requires re-authentication, the access token alone is enough.

This is inconsistent with the rest of the flow: POST /api/v1/user/settings/totp/disable calls CheckUserPassword before it will turn TOTP off. So the destructive action is gated behind the password, but reading out the secret that backs the second factor isn't. There's also no reason for the secret to be readable at all once enrollment is finished, the client only needs it during setup.

The fix is to stop returning secret/url/the QR code once enabled is true (only expose them during the enrollment window). Requiring the password on the read, like disable already does, would also be reasonable.

PoC
The attacker needs the victim's access token, from an XSS, a leaked/stolen token, or an unlocked session. TOTP must already be enabled on the account.

  1. With the victim's bearer token, call:
GET /api/v1/user/settings/totp
Authorization: Bearer <victim_token>

The response contains the shared secret and the otpauth:// URL:

{"secret": "<base32 secret>", "enabled": true, "url": "otpauth://totp/..."}
  1. Paste that secret (or scan /api/v1/user/settings/totp/qrcode) into any authenticator app.
  2. It now produces the same 6-digit codes as the victim's device. Nothing is logged and the victim gets no notification.

Impact
This defeats the purpose of the second factor. 2FA is supposed to survive exactly this situation, a compromised password or a hijacked session, but a single read of the account's own settings hands over the shared secret with no step-up check and no trace. Combined with a known or later-recovered password, it's a durable account takeover that TOTP was meant to prevent.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-10-09 20:51 UTC
Modified
2026-10-19 21:41 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

code.vikunja.io/api

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 2.6.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

2.6.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences