Details
The sequential control is the decisive part: 1.00x / 0.99x / 1.03x / 0.99x on every algorithm. The constant-time countermeasure is intact for one-request-at-a-time probing, so the 10x to 15x concurrent separation is attributable to the coalescing and to nothing else. That rules out the alternative explanation that this is just cwfr / 8j2h still unfixed.
Observed, per-algorithm hash cost (test 2)
bcrypt cost10 / short pw -> 60.5919ms per hash
bcrypt cost12 / short pw -> 242.384558ms per hash
apr1 / short pw -> 128.333µs per hash
apr1 / 8000-byte pw -> 42.575816ms per hash
Observed, single HTTP/2 connection (test 3)
Both probes multiplexed as two streams over one TLS connection, which pins them to a single Traefik process even behind an L4 load balancer fronting several replicas:
h2 single-connection: D=63.048ms
h2 round 0: absent=7.931459ms present=65.87375ms ratio=8.3x classify=OK
h2 round 1: absent=4.255667ms present=64.193291ms ratio=15.1x classify=OK
h2 round 2: absent=6.696417ms present=64.695208ms ratio=9.7x classify=OK
Conclusion: REPRODUCED, 9/9 correct classifications on bcrypt, single-shot, no statistics.
Claim-by-claim audit of the finding text:
_(truncated ; full analysis in the linked internal report)_
Documentation grounding
Not working-as-intended. The governing project document puts this class explicitly in scope.
docs/content/security/(header-underscores, request-path, content-length, http2-header-memory, multi-tenant-kubernetes) has no page covering BasicAuth, the timing posture or the singleflight dedup. Grep fortiming|basicauth|basic auth|enumerat|singleflightacross that directory: no match. No governing security doc, hence no WAI signal from there.docs/content/contributing/security-decisions.md, section Authentication Middleware Correctness, is the settled public position and it is directly on point:
> Our position. In scope: credential or identity handling that leaks across requests or users, observable timing differences that disclose whether a principal exists, and credentials forwarded to a destination the operator did not authorise.
>
> Where the line is. Choosing a weak authentication mechanism, or configuring it permissively, is the operator's decision. The middleware failing to deliver what its documentation promises is ours.
_(truncated ; full analysis in the linked internal report)_
Precedent in comparable projects
Corpus refreshed 2026-08-24 for nginx, ingress-nginx, kong, caddy, apisix, nginx-plus; envoy (2026-06-29), envoy-gateway (2026-06-15), haproxy (2026-07-16) and istio (2026-05-12) are staler.
No exact analogue of a request-deduplication timing oracle. Adjacent prior art:
- Envoy, CVE-2026-47775, medium: "OAuth2 Filter: Padding Oracle via AES-256-CBC Cookie Decryption". A side-channel oracle inside an auth filter, published as a medium CVE. Framed on the observability of the discrepancy, not on the difficulty of measuring it.
- Envoy Gateway, CVE-2026-53715 / GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q, medium: "Wasm cache ServeHTTP reads mappingPath2Cache without lock". A concurrency defect in a shared per-process cache in the request path, treated as a real medium CVE and fixed by correcting the shared-state handling.
- APISIX, CVE-2025-62232, high: basic-auth credential exposure. Same component, unrelated mechanism (logging).
Takeaway: the industry treats side-channel oracles in auth filters, and concurrency defects in shared per-process request-path caches, as genuine publishable CVEs of roughly this severity. Nothing in the corpus argues the class is by design. The strongest precedent, however, is not a competitor: it is Traefik's own two published CVEs on this exact guarantee.
Recommended fix
Assign for fix. No fix exists: gh search prs --repo traefik/traefik "singleflight" returns only PR #13572 (the merged 8mrf key-collision fix) and "basic auth timing" only PR #12803 / #12796; git log --all on the checkout shows b5ace8eb5 as the last change to pkg/middlewares/auth/ and master (174e5d811, a merge of v3.7) carries nothing later.
Fix shape: remove the secret from the key and qualify it by username. Something along the lines of
key := strconv.Itoa(len(user)) + ":" + user + ":" + password
with the dummy-hash branch left inside the closure. This is strictly better than the current key on all four counts:
- It closes J15: the key no longer encodes existence, so two absent users no longer share a bucket that a present user is excluded from. Coalescing then happens only for an identical
(user, password)pair, which leaks nothing an attacker did not already supply. - It closes `8mrf` structurally rather than by delimiting: the stored hash never enters the key, so no choice of password can alias a configured user's key. The
lenprefix is still needed, now onuser, to keep("ab", "c")and("a", "bc")apart. - It preserves the purpose of `6f469ee1e`: the case that commit exists for is a burst of concurrent requests carrying the *same* credentials, which is exactly what a username-qualified key still dedupes.
- It keeps the constant-time property: one hash of
notFoundSecretfor absent users, one hash ofsecretfor present ones, unchanged.
Do not fix this by making the dummy branch share the leader's timing envelope; as the finding correctly notes, that only helps if the key stops depending on secret == "".
Secondary, low cost: restore the "Timing attacks" admonition that PR #12803 added to the BasicAuth page. It is the statement of the guarantee, it is the thing security-decisions.md holds the project to, and it is currently absent from the v3.7 docs tree.
If filed: new cluster slug basicauth-singleflight-existence-oracle, sibling of basicauth-singleflight-key-collision, affected range >= v3.6.11 through the current v3.6 / v3.7 heads, v2 unaffected, digest auth unaffected. Correct the 40x claim and the $apr1$ "trivial" claim in the published description per the audit table above.
Provenance
Found by an external automated code scan (CLAUDE-SECURITY-20260824-122205) of pkg/middlewares, pkg/proxy, pkg/server, pkg/muxer and pkg/tls on branch v3.7 at commit d5072ce7b8765c9574246072e05dd81d84950da7, then triaged with the advisory-check process : mechanism-level duplicate check against the existing advisory corpus, CVE-policy gate, security-documentation grounding, comparable-project precedent, and a mandatory reproduction attempt.
Triage outcome : Likely Valid, confidence High, reproduced (yes). Expected publication likelihood at triage time : High.
Scanner finding id : F16. Internal report : findings/scan-20260824/verdicts/J15.md in the security-advisor repository.
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