Details
No X-API-KEY header is required. Replace /tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log with any path writable by the dalfox process: /var/www/html/injected.txt, /etc/cron.d/dalfox, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (appending log lines that won't break key format but pollute the file), etc.
Impact
- Arbitrary file creation: The attacker can create files at any path on the dalfox host filesystem accessible to the dalfox process, including web-serving directories, cron drop-in directories, and application config directories.
- Arbitrary file append/corruption: Existing files can have log-format lines appended, degrading parsers that expect strict formats (sshd_config, crontab, /etc/hosts, application config files).
- Partial content control via URL: The scan target URL appears verbatim in log output; combined with creative path targeting, this may enable injection into certain file formats.
- No authentication required in the default deployment.
- When dalfox runs under a privileged account (e.g., in a CI pipeline or as root in a container), the blast radius extends to system-wide files.
Recommended Remediation
Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)
Nullify all fields that touch the local filesystem before passing options to ScanFromAPI. This is the same remediation recommended for the found-action RCE and custom-payload-file file-read findings and should be applied as a single consolidated patch:
// pkg/server/server.go — in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:
rq.Options.OutputFile = ""
rq.Options.OutputAll = false // safe to leave user value; file write is blocked by OutputFile=""
rq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.FoundAction = ""
rq.Options.FoundActionShell = ""
rq.Options.HarFilePath = ""
Option 2: Guard the file write with IsLibrary in DalLog
Move the OutputFile write block inside the else branch so it only executes in non-library (CLI) mode:
// internal/printing/logger.go — restructure the if-else:
if options.IsLibrary {
options.ScanResult.Logs = append(options.ScanResult.Logs, text)
} else {
// existing stderr printing logic...
// file write belongs here, not after the if-else
if options.OutputFile != "" && ftext != "" {
f, err := os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)
...
}
}
This fix addresses the root structural cause — the file write was intended for CLI mode only, and gating it on !IsLibrary matches that intent. Option 1 is still recommended as the primary fix; Option 2 adds defence-in-depth but requires care to not break legitimate CLI usage.
Option 3: Require --api-key at server startup
As with the other server-mode findings, making authentication mandatory eliminates the unauthenticated attack surface entirely:
// cmd/server.go — in runServerCmd:
if serverType == "rest" && apiKey == "" {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.")
os.Exit(1)
}
All three options should be applied together.
##Credit
Emmanuel David
Github:- https://github.com/drmingler.