Advisory

GHSA-8hf9-3q64-q2qf

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

No X-API-KEY header is required. Replace /tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log with any path writable by the dalfox process: /var/www/html/injected.txt, /etc/cron.d/dalfox, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (appending log lines that won't break key format but pollute the file), etc.

Impact

  • Arbitrary file creation: The attacker can create files at any path on the dalfox host filesystem accessible to the dalfox process, including web-serving directories, cron drop-in directories, and application config directories.
  • Arbitrary file append/corruption: Existing files can have log-format lines appended, degrading parsers that expect strict formats (sshd_config, crontab, /etc/hosts, application config files).
  • Partial content control via URL: The scan target URL appears verbatim in log output; combined with creative path targeting, this may enable injection into certain file formats.
  • No authentication required in the default deployment.
  • When dalfox runs under a privileged account (e.g., in a CI pipeline or as root in a container), the blast radius extends to system-wide files.

Recommended Remediation

Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)

Nullify all fields that touch the local filesystem before passing options to ScanFromAPI. This is the same remediation recommended for the found-action RCE and custom-payload-file file-read findings and should be applied as a single consolidated patch:

// pkg/server/server.go — in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:
rq.Options.OutputFile = ""
rq.Options.OutputAll = false          // safe to leave user value; file write is blocked by OutputFile=""
rq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.FoundAction = ""
rq.Options.FoundActionShell = ""
rq.Options.HarFilePath = ""

Option 2: Guard the file write with IsLibrary in DalLog

Move the OutputFile write block inside the else branch so it only executes in non-library (CLI) mode:

// internal/printing/logger.go — restructure the if-else:
if options.IsLibrary {
    options.ScanResult.Logs = append(options.ScanResult.Logs, text)
} else {
    // existing stderr printing logic...

    // file write belongs here, not after the if-else
    if options.OutputFile != "" && ftext != "" {
        f, err := os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)
        ...
    }
}

This fix addresses the root structural cause — the file write was intended for CLI mode only, and gating it on !IsLibrary matches that intent. Option 1 is still recommended as the primary fix; Option 2 adds defence-in-depth but requires care to not break legitimate CLI usage.

Option 3: Require --api-key at server startup

As with the other server-mode findings, making authentication mandatory eliminates the unauthenticated attack surface entirely:

// cmd/server.go — in runServerCmd:
if serverType == "rest" && apiKey == "" {
    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.")
    os.Exit(1)
}

All three options should be applied together.

##Credit

Emmanuel David

Github:- https://github.com/drmingler.

Sources & licences