Details
Reproduction (validated locally)
Environment: Node 22, @aws-sdk/[email protected], @aws-sdk/[email protected], [email protected]. The harness vendors createMediaHandler byte-for-byte from packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts and runs it against a mocked S3Client. The AWS SDK signs the URL identically whether the bucket exists — the resulting URL is the same one a real S3 deployment would hand back to the editor's browser, so it would PUT against a real bucket without further help.
PoC layout under /Users/admin/joplin_research/tinacms-s3-poc/:
package.json (deps only)
handler-vendored.mjs (verbatim copy of createMediaHandler, types stripped)
poc.mjs (four exhibits exercising the handler)
Handler is configured the way the package's README documents:
const handler = createMediaHandler({
config: { region: 'us-east-1', credentials: { accessKeyId: '…', secretAccessKey: '…' } },
bucket: 'editor-media-bucket',
mediaRoot: 'media', // editors are "scoped to media/"
authorized: async () => true, // typical wiring: TinaCloud verified user
});
Run:
$ cd /Users/admin/tinacms-s3-poc && node poc.mjs
--- Exhibit A: presigned PUT URL for arbitrary bucket key ---
HTTP status : 200
signedUrl : https://editor-media-bucket.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/index.html?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Content-Sha256=UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAFA...
src : https://editor-media-bucket.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/index.html
signed Key : /index.html
RESULT : BYPASS (signed URL writes outside media/)
--- Exhibit B: cross-tenant overwrite via attacker-chosen key ---
signed Key : /tenant-victim/posts/announcement.mdx
RESULT : BYPASS (cross-tenant write primitive granted)
--- Exhibit C: arbitrary-key DELETE via [...media] route ---
HTTP status : 200
S3 Bucket : editor-media-bucket
S3 Key : tenant-victim/posts/announcement.mdx
RESULT : BYPASS (arbitrary-key DELETE granted)
--- Exhibit D: attacker-controlled ?expiresIn ---
X-Amz-Expires: 604800 sec
RESULT : BYPASS (URL valid far longer than the 1h default)
Verification, in detail:
- Exhibit A —
GET /api/s3/media?key=index.html.mediaRoot=media/is configured but never consulted on the write path. The handler hands back a SigV4 URL whose path is/index.html. PUT'ing any body to that URL would create the bucket-root objectindex.htmlagainst the operator's IAM credentials. For a deployment that fronts the bucket with CloudFront / S3-website hosting, this is a one-shot site-defacement primitive (and, for any CSP that trusts the bucket, a one-shot stored-XSS primitive against the published site).
- Exhibit B — same primitive, attacker-chosen key
tenant-victim/posts/announcement.mdx. In the multi-tenant TinaCloud / TinaCMS Cloud deployment shape (one bucket shared across tenants, each tenant assigned amediaRoot/<tenant>/prefix), a Tenant A editor receives a presigned PUT URL for any Tenant B key. Cross-tenant content tampering with no further bug needed.
- Exhibit C —
DELETE /api/s3/media/anything-here-is-ignored/tenant-victim%2Fposts%2Fannouncement.mdx. The handler reads the catch-all asreq.query.media = ['anything-here-is-ignored', 'tenant-victim/posts/announcement.mdx'], destructures toobjectKey = media[1], dispatchesDeleteObjectCommand({ Bucket: 'editor-media-bucket', Key: 'tenant-victim/posts/announcement.mdx' }). The mock confirms the captured command'sKeyis the attacker-supplied string. Real S3 will honour the same call. (The mock-captured call confirms the *handler's* behaviour; the real S3 call requires onlys3:DeleteObjecton the bucket, which the package'sREADMEinstructs operators to grant.)
- Exhibit D —
?expiresIn=604800(7 days, the SigV4 ceiling). The handler accepts it, the resultingX-Amz-Expires=604800. Combined with Exhibit A, an attacker who briefly compromises a CMS session (e.g. via a stolen idle browser session or the dev-server CSRF write described in finding 06) can mint a long-lived offline write primitive — usable for a week with no further interaction with the CMS.
The four exhibits together: cross-mediaRoot write, cross-tenant write, arbitrary-key delete, and long-lived signed-URL minting.
Impact
- Cross-tenant / cross-mediaRoot write. In any deployment where the bucket holds anything other than this one editor's
mediaRoot(multi-tenant TinaCloud, shared corporate bucket, bucket-backed static site), an authorized editor obtains write authority over every key the IAM credential can reach. Concretely: defacement of a static site fronted by the bucket; cross-tenant content tampering; replacement of*.html,*.js,*.jsonassets that downstream consumers trust. (Exhibits A, B;handlers.ts:67-90.) - Stored XSS via uploaded HTML. S3 returns objects with the
Content-Typethe upload supplies. The presignedPutObjectCommandURL carries noContent-Typeconstraint — the attacker'sPUTchooses it. An editor can therefore write an HTML / SVG / JS payload to the bucket-root, and any CDN or origin that serves bucket objects directly to an authenticated SaaS surface inherits stored XSS in that origin. - Arbitrary-key delete (data destruction). Through
[...media]the handler treats the second URL segment as a free-form object key. An editor can wipe any object the IAM key cans3:DeleteObject, including non-media artefacts like deployment manifests, backups, or other tenants' files. (Exhibit C;handlers.ts:199-223.) - Bucket-policy implications. The
README(lines 38-90) tells operators to grant the IAM keys3:PutObject,s3:PutObjectAcl,s3:DeleteObject, ands3:ListBucketon the *whole* bucket. The README implies the application code constrains the editor's actions tomediaRoot. Because the application code does not, every operator who follows the README has — without realising — granted every CMS editor full write/delete on the whole bucket. - Long-lived offline write primitive.
expiresInis attacker-controlled and not capped by the handler. A single GET request mints a URL valid for up to 7 days (AWS SigV4 ceiling). An attacker who briefly compromises a CMS session can stash one such URL and continue writing arbitrary objects long after the session is revoked. (Exhibit D.) - Same-shape exposure on every other first-party media adapter.
next-tinacms-dos(DigitalOcean Spaces, S3-compatible),next-tinacms-azure(Blob Storage), andnext-tinacms-cloudinary(Cloudinary) all duplicate the broken pattern. Azure has *no* mediaRoot config at all, so the boundary thatnext-tinacms-s3advertises but doesn't enforce isn't even nominally present innext-tinacms-azure.