Advisory

GHSA-8p34-64r3-mwg8

Also known as: CVE-2026-47240

Summary

Net::IMAP: Command Injection via non-synchronizing literal in "raw" argument

Details

Several Net::IMAP commands accept a "raw data" argument that is sent verbatim after validation to prevent command injection. However, if a server does not support non-synchronizing literals, it may still be possible to inject arbitrary IMAP commands inside non-synchronizing literals.

Details

Raw data arguments support embedded literal values, both synchronizing and non-synchronizing. Non-synchronizing literals can only be safely sent when the server advertises any of the LITERAL+, LITERAL-, or IMAP4rev2 capabilities. But raw data arguments do not verify server support for non-synchronizing literals prior to sending.

Servers without support for non-synchronizing literals could handle them in several different ways: If a server sees a "}\r\n" byte sequence but can't parse the literal bytesize, it _may_ cautiously decide to close the connection, blocking any command injection attacks. However, a server without support for non-synchronizing literals may instead interpret the "+}\r\n" as the end of a malformed command line and respond with a tagged BAD. In that case, the contents of the literal will be interpreted as one or more new pipelined commands, allowing a CRLF command injection attack to succeed.

This affects the following commands' string arguments:

  • criteria for #search and #uid_search
  • search_keys for #sort, #thread, #uid_sort, and #uid_thread
  • attr for #fetch and #uid_fetch

Prior to net-imap v0.6.4, v0.5.14, and v0.4.24, raw data arguments were not validated in _any_ way, so they were also vulnerable to this attack. See CVE-2026-42257 (GHSA-hm49-wcqc-g2xg).

Impact

Fortunately, LITERAL- is supported by most modern IMAP servers. Even without support for non-synchronizing literals, cautious servers may handle invalid literal bytesize by closing the connection . However, servers which handle a non-synchronizing literal just like any other malformed command will enable this vulnerability.

If a developer passes an unvalidated user-controlled input for one of these method arguments, an attacker can append CRLF sequence followed by a new IMAP command (like DELETE mailbox). Although this does not directly enable data exfiltration, it could be combined with other attack vectors or knowledge of the target system's attributes, e.g.: shared mail folders or the application's installed response handlers.

Mitigation

Update to a version of net-imap which validates server support for non-synchronizing literals before sending them.

If upgrading net-imap is not possible:

  • Explicitly validate user-controlled inputs to prevent embedded non-synchronizing literals unless the server supports them.
  • For a simpler, more cautious approach: all embedded literals can be unconditionally prohibited, by checking that string inputs do not contain any CR or LF bytes.
  • Verify that the server advertises any of the LITERAL+, LITERAL-, or IMAP4rev2 capabilities before using untrusted string inputs for the affected "raw data" arguments.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-06-09 18:36 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:51 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

net-imap

RubyGems · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.6.0, fixed 0.6.4.1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

0.6.4.1

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

net-imap

RubyGems · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.5.15 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

0.5.15

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences