Details
2. Trigger the policy
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply --as=system:serviceaccount:default:policy-admin -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: trigger-cpol
namespace: default
data: {}
EOF
This outputs an error:
Error from server: error when creating "STDIN": admission webhook "validate.kyverno.svc-fail" denied the request:
resource ConfigMap/default/trigger-cpol was blocked due to the following policies
mutation-cpol:
create-malicious-cpol: ""
3. Observe the new cluster policy
kubectl get clusterpolicy malicious-cpol
Outputs:
NAME ADMISSION BACKGROUND READY AGE MESSAGE
malicious-cpol true true True 4m58s Ready
4. Verify that no new pods can be created (even as a cluster admin)
Run:
kubectl run --image=nginx foo
Outputs:
Error from server: admission webhook "validate.kyverno.svc-fail" denied the request:
resource Pod/default/foo was blocked due to the following policies
malicious-cpol:
block-all: Blocked by malicious policy
Impact
- Users with
Policycreation rights in a single namespace can escalate privileges (context of Kyverno admission controller). - Since
apiCallsupportsPOST, attackers can potentially create resources in privileged namespaces (e.g., creating a RoleBinding inkube-systemto grant themselves cluster-admin) if the Kyverno service account has write permissions. - Attackers can disrupt the entire cluster by creating a malicious
ClusterPolicythat blocks critical operations (e.g., preventing Pod scheduling), as demonstrated in PoC #2. - Sensitive data (Secrets, tokens, configuration) can be exfiltrated from any namespace, depending on the RBAC.
- In shared clusters, one tenant can read data belonging to other tenants or the cluster administration.
The following command should be run on a per-environment basis to understand impact:
kubectl auth can-i --as=system:serviceaccount:kyverno:kyverno-admission-controller --list
By default, this does not include Secrets.
Mitigation
The apiCall logic should enforce that Policy resources (namespaced policies) can only access resources within the same namespace. If a Policy attempts to access a resource in a different namespace via urlPath, the request should be blocked. ClusterPolicy resources are unaffected by this restriction as they are intended to operate cluster-wide.
The mitigation logic validates the urlPath for namespaced policies by ensuring:
- The path explicitly contains the
/namespaces/<namespace>/segment. - The namespace in the path matches the policy's namespace.
- Requests missing the namespace segment (targeting cluster-scoped resources) or targeting a different namespace are rejected.
This effectively prevents both the cross-namespace data leak and the creation of cluster-scoped resources (like ClusterPolicy) or resources in other namespaces via the POST method.