github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
Affected
- introduced
3.7.0, fixed3.7.8(semver)
Fixed versions
3.7.8
Fix
- Fixed version
3.7.8go get github.com/traefik/traefik/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-67309, GO-2026-6207
Traefik: Kubernetes Ingress NGINX RewriteTarget Path Traversal Allows Route-Level Authentication Bypass
Summary
There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider. When an Ingress uses the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target annotation with a regular expression that captures attacker-controlled text without requiring a path separator (for example path /api(.*) with rewrite target /$1), the generated RewriteTarget middleware can turn an initially safe request path into a dot-segment traversal path after the router has already been selected.
Patches
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
<details>
<summary>Original Description</summary>
Summary
Traefik's Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider creates an internal RewriteTarget middleware for the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target annotation. When an Ingress path captures attacker-controlled text without requiring a path separator, the middleware can turn an initially safe path into a dot-segment traversal path after Traefik has already selected the router.
For example, with Ingress path /api(.*) and rewrite target /$1, an unauthenticated request to /api../admin follows this flow:
/api../admin unchanged because api.. is one ordinary segment.PathRegexp("(?i)^/api(.*)") rule matches.RewriteTarget captures ../admin and creates /../admin./../admin without checking whether path normalization changes it./../admin to /admin./admin router with BasicAuth, DigestAuth, or ForwardAuth.This is an unpatched sibling of GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv, which added post-replacement normalization validation to ReplacePathRegex. The separate ingress-nginx RewriteTarget implementation did not receive the same validation. The bypass remains exploitable in the patched Traefik v3.7.7 release.
Severity
Proposed severity: Critical
CVSS 3.1: 9.1 — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Primary weakness: CWE-22 — Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal)
Secondary weakness: CWE-288 — Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
The practical impact depends on the protected backend paths. If they are read-only or low sensitivity, environmental severity may be lower.
Exploitation Preconditions
rewrite-target with a regex that can capture .. adjacent to the matched prefix, such as /api(.*) with /$1./admin, and relies on a Traefik authentication or authorization middleware.These are deployment prerequisites; the remote attacker needs no credentials or special timing.
Affected Components
Confirmed versions
master at commit b93f02cd07b79490fb8c8f02e301a7a1ec553195v3.7 branch at 69259c3acc9d4bdc065cb2e3b83336f7de3e7038The vulnerable middleware is present in every stable v3.7 release checked. The v2.11 and v3.6 branches do not contain this ingress-nginx RewriteTarget implementation.
Code locations
pkg/provider/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/middleware.go:257-274rewrite-target annotation directly into dynamic.RewriteTarget configuration.pkg/middlewares/ingressnginx/rewritetarget/rewrite_target.go:85-157pkg/server/middleware/middlewares.go:346-353Root Cause
The provider passes the route regex and annotation replacement into the middleware:
loc.RewriteTarget = &dynamic.RewriteTarget{
Regex: loc.Path,
Replacement: rewrite,
}
RewriteTarget.ServeHTTP then derives a path from attacker-controlled capture groups:
newTarget = rt.regexp.ReplaceAllString(currentPath, rt.replacement)
req.URL.RawPath = newTarget
req.URL.Path, err = url.PathUnescape(req.URL.RawPath)
req.RequestURI = req.URL.RequestURI()
rt.next.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
There is no invariant check between PathUnescape and forwarding to ensure that req.URL.Path equals its normalized form. Because routing happens before middlewares execute, any protected router that would match the normalized result is never reconsidered.
The core ReplacePathRegex middleware now enforces this invariant by calling req.URL.JoinPath() and returning HTTP 400 when normalization changes the replacement. RewriteTarget implements equivalent capture-based behavior but lacks that check.
Default entryPoints.<name>.http.sanitizePath=true does not prevent this issue. Sanitization occurs before routing and before RewriteTarget creates the traversal sequence.
Impact
An unauthenticated network attacker can bypass route-level authentication or authorization and access protected paths on the backend. Depending on the protected API, this can allow:
The middleware is method-agnostic, so the issue is not limited to read-only requests.
Proof of Concept
Validation Environment
5c8ff19144683f862c04e8ac01893e8cd94a3519d3d9ca3e6fbd0a7de73261basanitizePath=trueNo Traefik source files were modified.
1. Create the normalizing backend
Save as backend.js:
const http = require("http");
const path = require("path");
http.createServer((req, res) => {
const rawPath = req.url.split("?", 1)[0];
const normalizedPath = path.posix.normalize(rawPath);
const protectedPath = normalizedPath === "/admin" || normalizedPath.startsWith("/admin/");
const body = JSON.stringify({
rawPath,
normalizedPath,
result: protectedPath ? "ADMIN_SECRET_DATA" : "PUBLIC",
});
res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
res.end(body);
}).listen(19090, "127.0.0.1");High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
3.7.0, fixed 3.7.8 (semver)3.7.8
3.7.8go get github.com/traefik/traefik/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0