Advisory

GHSA-8vm9-f75m-5h2m

Also known as: CVE-2026-69241

Summary

Filament Curator: Stored XSS via unsanitized SVG upload served inline

Details

Summary

SVG files uploaded through the Curator media panel are stored and served inline without any
sanitization. An authenticated user with permission to upload media can upload an SVG
containing embedded JavaScript. When another panel user opens that file via the View
action (which opens the media as a top-level browser document), the embedded script executes
in the origin of the Filament application.

image/svg+xml is included in the default accepted MIME types, so a default installation is
affected unless SVG uploads have been explicitly disabled.

## Impact

Because the SVG is served as a top-level document (not embedded in an <img> tag), any
<script>, event-handler attribute (e.g. onload), or javascript: URI inside it runs with
full script privileges in the application's origin. In a Filament admin context this can be
leveraged to:

  • perform actions as the viewing user (typically a privileged administrator) via authenticated same-origin requests,
  • read same-origin data the victim's session can access,
  • exfiltrate cookies/tokens not protected from script access.

The primary escalation path is a lower-privileged content author planting a payload that is
later triggered when a higher-privileged user clicks View on the file. Panel thumbnails
are not affected — they render through an <img> tag, which does not execute SVG script.

## Proof of concept

  1. As a user who can upload media, upload an SVG file containing:

```xml
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert(document.domain)">
<rect width="100" height="100" fill="#fff"/>
</svg>

  1. In the Curator panel, click the View (eye) action for the uploaded file. The file opens as a standalone document and the script executes in the application origin.

Patches

The fix sanitizes SVG markup at the upload choke point (Uploader), stripping scripts, event
handlers, and remote references before the file is written to storage. Sanitizing at the
source closes every serving path (the direct storage URL and the on-the-fly
Glide/MediaController fallback) without changing the default accepted MIME types.
Sanitization fails closed: if the markup cannot be parsed it is not stored.

A console command is included to re-sanitize SVG files already stored on disk from earlier
uploads:

php artisan curator:sanitize-svgs # sanitize in place
php artisan curator:sanitize-svgs --dry-run # preview only

After upgrading to a patched release, run curator:sanitize-svgs to clean any SVGs uploaded
before the patch.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, either of the following mitigates the issue:

  • Disallow SVG uploads — remove image/svg+xml from the accepted file types (e.g. via acceptedFileTypes(...) on the Curator field/plugin), or
  • Serve untrusted SVGs safely — configure your web server / storage responses to send stored SVGs with Content-Disposition: attachment (or a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script) so they cannot execute as a top-level document.

Credit

Reported via coordinated disclosure by Afsana Alijabarova.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-11-17 20:54 UTC
Modified
2026-11-17 21:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

awcodes/filament-curator

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 5.0.0, fixed 5.1.2 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

5.1.2

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

awcodes/filament-curator

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 4.0.0, fixed 4.1.2 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.1.2

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

awcodes/filament-curator

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 3.0.0, fixed 3.7.9 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

3.7.9

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences