Advisory

GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

forwarded_to_extension = hijacked_msg.get("type") == "start_automation"
action_broadcasted = (
attacker_action.get("type") == "action"
and attacker_action.get("session_id") == session_id
)

print("[+] No-Origin client accepted:", no_origin_client_connected)
print("[+] Session forwarded to extension:", forwarded_to_extension)
print("[+] Action broadcast to attacker:", action_broadcasted)

if no_origin_client_connected and forwarded_to_extension and action_broadcasted:
print("[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - unauthenticated client can hijack browser sessions.")
return 0

print("[-] RESULT: NOT VULNERABLE")
return 1
finally:
uvicorn_server.should_exit = True
try:
await asyncio.wait_for(server_task, timeout=5)
except Exception:
server_task.cancel()
temp_home.cleanup()

if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))


`tmp/pocs/poc.py` starts a temporary local server, stubs the browser agent, opens both websocket roles, and prints the final vulnerability conditions explicitly.

PoC Video:

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/df078542-bbdc-4341-b438-89c86365009e



### Impact
This is an unauthenticated remote-control vulnerability in the browser automation bridge. Any network client that can reach the exposed bridge can impersonate the controller side of the workflow, hijack an available connected extension session, and receive automation output from that hijacked session. In real deployments, this can allow unauthorized browser actions, misuse of model-backed automation, and leakage of sensitive page context or automation results.

Who is impacted:

- Operators who run `praisonai browser start` with the default host binding
- Users with an active connected browser extension session
- Environments where the bridge is reachable from other hosts on the network

### Recommended Fix
Suggested remediations:

1. Require explicit authentication for every websocket client connecting to `/ws`.
2. Reject websocket handshakes that omit `Origin`, unless they are using a separate authenticated localhost-only transport.
3. Bind the browser bridge to `127.0.0.1` by default and require explicit operator opt-in for non-loopback exposure.
4. Do not route `start_session` to “the first other idle connection”; instead, pair authenticated controller and extension clients explicitly.

Sources & licences