Advisory

GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9

Also known as: CVE-2026-35621

Summary

OpenClaw: Gateway operator.write Can Reach Admin-Class Channel Allowlist Persistence via chat.send

Details

> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

Summary

The shared /allowlist command persists channel authorization config through writeConfigFile(...) but does not re-validate gateway client scopes for internal gateway callers. Because chat.send is intentionally reachable to operator.write callers and still creates a generic command-authorized internal context, an authenticated write-scoped gateway client can indirectly mutate channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policy that direct config.patch correctly reserves to operator.admin.

This is not just a generic code smell. The current code already shows the intended boundary by adding sink-side internal admin checks to shared /config and /plugins writes, but /allowlist was left behind.

Details

The gateway's documented scope split is clear:

  • chat.send is a write-scoped action.
  • direct config mutation is an admin-scoped action.

The vulnerable path is:

  1. A gateway client authenticates with operator.write.
  2. The client calls chat.send, which is intentionally allowed for that scope.
  3. chat.send builds an internal message context with CommandAuthorized: true and carries GatewayClientScopes into the reply pipeline.
  4. resolveCommandAuthorization(...) converts that internal message into isAuthorizedSender=true in the common case where no stricter commands.allowFrom override is configured.
  5. /allowlist add|remove accepts that generic command authorization and proceeds into its config-backed edit path.
  6. The handler clones the parsed config, calls plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...), validates the result, and persists it with writeConfigFile(validated.config).
  7. No sink-side check requires operator.admin before the persistent write occurs.

That creates a direct control-plane mismatch:

  • config.patch rejects the same caller with missing scope: operator.admin.
  • /allowlist add dm ... or /allowlist add group ... reached through chat.send can still rewrite channel authorization state.

Impact

  • A gateway client intentionally limited to operator.write can persist first-party channel authorization policy.
  • The caller can widen DM or group allowlists for channels using the shared /allowlist plumbing.
  • This weakens the repo's documented control-plane privilege split between ordinary write actions and admin-only persistent authorization mutation.

Remediation

1) Add the Missing Sink-Side Internal Admin Check to /allowlist

Mirror the existing hardened pattern from /config and /plugins.

Before any config-backed /allowlist add|remove write, require:

  • operator.admin for internal gateway channels

This should happen before plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...) and before writeConfigFile(...).

2) Keep Pairing-Store and Config-Write Policy Checks, but Do Not Treat Them as Scope Enforcement

configWrites policy and pairing-store behavior are useful secondary controls, but they do not replace the missing privilege check between operator.write and operator.admin.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-03-30 18:52 UTC
Modified
2026-04-10 17:42 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

openclaw

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 2026.3.24 (semver)

Fixed versions

2026.3.24

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences