Advisory

GHSA-94v3-77j7-vm48

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Who is impacted: operators who run internal communication over HTTPS to a non-loopback target
(split-host / multi-pod / separate SSH or hook host with LOCAL_ROOT_URL=https://<remote>/) on a
network segment where an attacker can obtain on-path position. With the token, an attacker can:
shut down / restart the server (DoS), authorize SSH keys, execute git serv commands, control
pre/post/proc-receive hooks, change default branches, restore repos, send mail as Gitea, and
generate Actions runner tokens.

NOT practically impacted: default single-host, unix-socket (http+unix), or HTTP-loopback
deployments, where the internal call is loopback and not interceptable without local code execution
(which already exposes INTERNAL_TOKEN from app.ini, making MITM unnecessary).

Sources & licences