Details
Observed vulnerable output in this environment:
=== RUN TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase
--- PASS: TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase (0.01s)
PASS
ok github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/server/handles
Combined final confirmation command used during the audit:
go test ./server/handles -run 'TestPOC(ShareCreateAcceptsSiblingPathOutsideUserBase|BatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase)' -v
Observed combined output:
=== RUN TestPOCShareCreateAcceptsSiblingPathOutsideUserBase
--- PASS: TestPOCShareCreateAcceptsSiblingPathOutsideUserBase (0.01s)
=== RUN TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase
--- PASS: TestPOCBatchRenameSrcNameTraversalEscapesUserBase (0.01s)
PASS
ok github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4/server/handles (cached)
Negative/control cases checked:
src_dirtraversal is rejected byuser.JoinPathbecauseJoinBasePathdetects relative traversal in the original request path.new_nametraversal is rejected bycheckRelativePathbecause it contains/,\\,., or..patterns.- The exploit succeeds because
src_nameis not passed through the same relative filename check before concatenation.
Cleanup:
rm server/handles/security_poc_test.go
Impact
A restricted authenticated user can rename files outside the authorized source directory and outside their configured base path. In a multi-user deployment, a user confined to /team/a can rename a guessed sibling file such as /team/ab/secret.txt to /team/ab/renamed.txt by submitting traversal segments in src_name.
This is an integrity violation against other users' files. It can also cause limited availability impact by moving files away from expected names, and it may reveal whether guessed out-of-base files exist based on success or error responses.
Suggested remediation
Validate renameObject.SrcName with the same relative filename constraints already applied to renameObject.NewName, or derive source objects only from a trusted directory listing of reqPath.
A minimal fix is to call checkRelativePath(renameObject.SrcName) before constructing filePath. Add regression tests covering:
src_name: "file.txt"succeeds;src_name: "../secret.txt"is denied;src_name: "../../ab/secret.txt"is denied when base path is/team/aandsrc_diris/writable;new_nametraversal remains denied.
Credits
- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)