wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected26.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33501
AVideo has Unauthenticated Information Disclosure of User Group Permission Mappings via Permissions Plugin
Summary
The endpoint plugin/Permissions/View/Users_groups_permissions/list.json.php lacks any authentication or authorization check, allowing unauthenticated users to retrieve the complete permission matrix mapping user groups to plugins. All sibling endpoints in the same directory (add.json.php, delete.json.php, index.php) properly require User::isAdmin(), indicating this is an oversight.
Details
The vulnerable file at plugin/Permissions/View/Users_groups_permissions/list.json.php:1-7 contains:
<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Permissions/Objects/Users_groups_permissions.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
$rows = Users_groups_permissions::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}
This calls ObjectYPT::getAll() (defined in objects/Object.php:98-111), which executes:
$sql = "SELECT * FROM " . static::getTableName() . " WHERE 1=1 ";
$sql .= self::getSqlFromPost();
This returns all rows from the users_groups_permissions table as JSON with no access control.
Compare with the sibling add.json.php:10-15 and delete.json.php:9-14, which both enforce:
$plugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled('Permissions');
if(!User::isAdmin()){
$obj->msg = "You cant do this";
die(json_encode($obj));
}
Similarly, index.php:6-8 (the admin page that loads this data via AJAX) checks:
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
forbiddenPage("You can not do this");
exit;
}
No .htaccess or web server configuration restricts direct access to this endpoint.
PoC
# Retrieve complete permission mappings without authentication
curl -s https://target/plugin/Permissions/View/Users_groups_permissions/list.json.php
Expected response (admin-only data):
{"data": [{"id":"1","name":null,"users_groups_id":"2","plugins_id":"5","type":"1","status":"a"}, ...]}
Each row reveals:
users_groups_id — numeric ID of a user groupplugins_id — numeric ID of an installed plugintype — the permission level grantedstatus — whether the permission is active (a) or inactiveThe getSqlFromPost() method also processes $_POST['sort'] and $_GET parameters, allowing an attacker to paginate and sort results to extract all data systematically.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can enumerate the complete authorization model of the AVideo instance:
This information provides a detailed roadmap of the application's authorization architecture, significantly aiding targeted privilege escalation, as an attacker would know exactly which groups have access to which plugins and what permission types are assigned. While not directly exploitable for data modification, it reduces the attacker's effort for follow-up attacks.
Recommended Fix
Add the same admin authorization check used by the sibling endpoints. In plugin/Permissions/View/Users_groups_permissions/list.json.php:
<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Permissions/Objects/Users_groups_permissions.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
$plugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled('Permissions');
if(!User::isAdmin()){
die(json_encode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'You cant do this']));
}
$rows = Users_groups_permissions::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0