github.com/klever-io/klever-go
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.7.20(semver)
Fixed versions
1.7.20
Fix
- Fixed version
1.7.20go get github.com/klever-io/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-82405, GO-2026-6582
Klever-Go Account takeover: kleverUpdateAccountPermission authorizes on attacker-controlled RecipientAddr instead of the authenticated caller
Description
The VM built-in function KleverUpdateAccountPermission (registered always-active, creator.go:381-390 / core/vmconstants.go:234) rewrites an account's entire permission set. Its authorization check uses vmInput.RecipientAddr attacker-controlled instead of the authenticated vmInput.CallerAddr. The sibling handler kleverChangeOwnerAddress.go:86 uses vmInput.CallerAddr correctly, so the safe pattern exists in-repo; this handler deviates. The native transaction path (txProcess.go:833) is safe it uses tx.GetSender().
Mechanism:
CallerAddr is never referenced in the handler; auth is contractHasValidPermission(target.GetPermissions(), RecipientAddr), which returns true if RecipientAddr is a signer with Weight >= Threshold in the *target* account's permissions and the permission grants UpdateAccountPermissionContractType.ExecuteOnDestContextWithTypedArgs (baseOps.go:1967), prepareIndirectContractCallInput (baseOps.go:2485) sets RecipientAddr = destination (contract-chosen) and CallerAddr = the calling contract. The blockchain hook (blockChainHook.go:454/467) dispatches on input.Function and passes the input through unchanged; no guard forces RecipientAddr == CallerAddr and there is no SC-destination validation on this path.createDefaultOwnerPermission (accounts.go:1848) makes an account its own signer (weight 1, threshold 1, Owner type), and CheckPermissionGrantedForContracts returns true for Owner, so contractHasValidPermission(V.perms, V) == true. (More generally, RecipientAddr can be set to *any* of V's signer addresses meeting threshold all public on-chain.) Accounts with no stored permissions have empty GetPermissions() and are immune.UpdatePermission(V, attackerContract) (accounts.go:1863) replaces V's permission set with attacker-supplied signers; if the attacker supplies an Owner-type permission, no default is appended and V's prior control is fully evicted.Code walkthrough
(a) The vulnerable handler — core/kapp/builtInFunctions/kleverUpdateAccountPermission.go:
func (e *kleverUpdateAccountPermission) ProcessBuiltinFunction(vmInput *vmcommon.ContractCallInput) (*vmcommon.VMOutput, error) {
...
address := vmInput.NextArg() // Arguments[0] — attacker-chosen target account V
contract, err := e.getUpdateAccountPermissionContract(vmInput) // Arguments[1] — attacker-chosen new permissions
...
acc, err := e.accountsCacher.LoadUser(address) // loads V
...
// BUG: authorizes against vmInput.RecipientAddr (attacker-controlled), NOT vmInput.CallerAddr
if !e.contractHasValidPermission(acc.GetPermissions(), vmInput.RecipientAddr) { // L91
return nil, errors.New("invalid permission operation")
}
// overwrites V's entire permission set with attacker-supplied signers
resultCode, err := e.kappController.GetAccountsKApp().UpdatePermission(address, contract)
...
}
(b) The check just name-matches `recipientAddr` against V's own signers — same file:
func (e *kleverUpdateAccountPermission) contractHasValidPermission(permissions []*state.Permission, recipientAddr []byte) bool {
for _, permission := range permissions {
for _, signer := range permission.Signers {
if !bytes.Equal(signer.Address, recipientAddr) { // recipientAddr, not the authenticated caller
continue
}
if signer.Weight >= permission.Threshold &&
permission.CheckPermissionGrantedForContracts(transaction.TXContract_UpdateAccountPermissionContractType) {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
(c) The dispatch makes `RecipientAddr` attacker-controlled — kvm/vmhost/vmhooks/baseOps.go:2464 prepareIndirectContractCallInput (invoked when a contract calls the built-in via ExecuteOnDestContext):
contractCallInput := &vmcommon.ContractCallInput{
VMInput: vmcommon.VMInput{
CallerAddr: sender, // the calling contract (authenticated) — NOT used by the handler
Arguments: data, // attacker-chosen: [V, attackerPermissions]
...
},
RecipientAddr: destination, // the contract's chosen `dest` argument — attacker sets this to V
Function: string(function),
}
(d) Every account with configured permissions is its own signer — core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go:1848 createDefaultOwnerPermission (appended by UpdatePermission when no Owner permission is supplied):
return &state.Permission{
Type: state.Permission_Owner, // Owner grants ALL contract types incl. type 22
Threshold: 1,
Signers: []*state.Key{
{ Address: ownerAcc.AddressBytes(), Weight: 1 }, // the account signs for itself
},
}
So contractHasValidPermission(V.perms, RecipientAddr=V) finds V's own address as a Weight 1 >= Threshold 1 Owner signer → returns true.
(e) Contrast — the sibling handler does it correctly — core/kapp/builtInFunctions/kleverChangeOwnerAddress.go:86:
callerAddress := vmInput.CallerAddr // authenticated caller
...
if !bytes.Equal(callerAddress, acc.GetOwnerAddress()) { // checks the CALLER, not RecipientAddr
return nil, ErrOperationNotPermitted
}
Putting it together — the attacker's contract call:
ExecuteOnDestContext(
gas, dest = V, // → RecipientAddr = V
value = 0,
function = "KleverUpdateAccountPermission",
args = [ V, attackerOwnerPermsWithOnlyAttackerKey ], // Arguments[0]=V, Arguments[1]=new perms
)
→ CallerAddr = attackerContract (ignored), RecipientAddr = V, contractHasValidPermission(V.perms, V) == true → V's permissions overwritten with the attacker's key as sole Owner signer. The attacker never held a key of V and provided no signature from V.
POC
put the following poc testcase under /core/kapp/builtInFunctions/
POC Code: https://gist.github.com/mabdullah22/a41f90aa5ba86bbebf121f739bd5f5e9
Run:
cd klever-go
GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go test ./core/kapp/builtInFunctions/ -run TestPoC_PermTakeover -v
Output:
TAKEOVER CONFIRMED: caller="attacker-contract" (attacker SC) rewrote account V="victim-account-V"; new sole owner signer="attacker-key-EVIL"
--- PASS: TestPoC_PermTakeover
--- PASS: TestPoC_PermTakeover_NoStoredPermsIsSafe
The harm asserted is the takeover itself: after the call, V's permission set is a single Owner permission whose sole signer is the attacker's key; V's original owner signer is gone.
Impact
Full takeover of any account that has configured permissions i.e. every multisig / advanced-permission account , by an attacker who deploys a cheap smart contract and supplies only public on-chain addresses (no keys, no signatures from the victim). After takeover the attacker controls all of the victim's operations → theft or permanent lock of all the account's assets. Reachable via a permissionlessly-deployed contract (the plain-tx path is safe, so it is Critical-via-contract, not fully no-contract). No fork flag gates it.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.7.20 (semver)1.7.20
1.7.20go get github.com/klever-io/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0