Advisory

GHSA-98gw-w575-h2ph

Also known as: CVE-2026-32629

Summary

phpMyFAQ is Vulnerable to Stored XSS via Unsanitized Email Field in Admin FAQ Editor

Details

Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can submit a guest FAQ with an email address that is syntactically valid per RFC 5321 (quoted local part) yet contains raw HTML — for example "<script>alert(1)</script>"@evil.com. PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL accepts this email as valid. The email is stored in the database without HTML sanitization and later rendered in the admin FAQ editor template using Twig's |raw filter, which bypasses auto-escaping entirely.

Details

  1. PHP FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL accepts RFC-valid quoted local parts with dangerous characters

phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/FaqController.php:99
$email = trim((string) Filter::filterVar($data->email, FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL));
PHP accepts "<script>alert(1)</script>"@evil.com as a valid email (RFC 5321 allows <, > inside quoted local parts). Confirmed:
"<script>alert(1)</script>"@evil.com => string (valid, not false)

  1. Email stored raw without HTML sanitization

phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php — email retrieved directly as $row->email from the database.

  1. Admin Twig template renders email with |raw

phpmyfaq/assets/templates/admin/content/faq.editor.twig:296
<input type="email" name="email" id="email" value="{{ faqData['email'] | raw }}" class="form-control">

Affected version: 4.2.0-alpha, commit f0dc86c8f

PoC
The reproduction of the vulnerability was implemented with the help of AI while reviewing the source code to generate the proof-of-concept. Please kindly note this for reference. Since the vulnerability has already been confirmed directly in the source code, the proof-of-concept code may be considered as a reference only.

Please extract the attached compressed file and proceed.
poc.zip

  1. (docker compose -f docker-compose.yml down -v)
  2. docker compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d mariadb php-fpm nginx
  3. bash exploit.sh

-----

  1. Access http://localhost:8888/admin/
  2. Log in with admin / Admin1234!
  3. After logging in, check whether the URL remains http://localhost:8888/admin/
  4. Go to Content → FAQ Administration → edit "poc" → alert popup should appear

If it does not appear, you can also access it directly via:
http://localhost:8888/admin/faq/edit/1/en

<img width="1388" height="239" alt="스크린샷 2026-03-12 오후 11 42 52" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b6d5446f-4eba-4cb2-9284-1bca4855142e" />
<img width="1171" height="92" alt="스크린샷 2026-03-12 오후 11 16 17" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3578e429-7106-4616-92ed-4167816d40f0" />

Impact
When an administrator opens /admin/faq/edit/{id}/{lang} to review the pending FAQ, the injected script executes in the admin's browser context. This allows an attacker to:

  • Steal the administrator's session cookie → full admin account takeover
  • Perform arbitrary admin actions (create users, modify content, change configuration)
  • Pivot to further attacks on the server

The attack chain requires no authentication. By default, records.allowNewFaqsForGuests=true allows unauthenticated FAQ submission, and records.defaultActivation=false guarantees the administrator must visit the edit page to review it.

Note on captcha: The built-in captcha is enabled by default when the PHP gd extension is present (spam.enableCaptchaCode=true). This prevents fully automated exploitation but does not prevent a targeted manual attack — an attacker can solve the captcha once and submit the payload.

Credits
wooseokdotkim

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-03-31 22:48 UTC
Modified
2026-04-06 17:38 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

thorsten/phpmyfaq

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 4.1.1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.1.1

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 4.1.1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.1.1

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences