Details
Youngin Won
@amethyst0225
[[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
Siyeon Han
@hanbunny
[[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
Additional notes from the ImageMagick team:
On many modern toolchains and OSes, format‑string exploits using %n are already mitigated or blocked by default (e.g., -Wformat-security, _FORTIFY_SOURCE, hardened libc behavior, ASLR/stack canaries). That can make exploitation impractical in typical builds so you might not be vulnerable but it would still be wise to upgrade to the most recent version. We also already provide the following mitigation:
To prevent unintended interpretation of the filename as a format string, users can explicitly disable format string parsing by defining the filename as a literal. This can be done using the following directive:
- In wrappers:
filename:literal - From the command line:
-define filename:literal=true