getgrav/grav
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.0.16(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.0.16
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-72702
Grav: Origin validation bypass in Uri::referrer() and Pages::referrerRoute() via unanchored prefix match
Summary
Grav\Common\Uri::referrer() and Grav\Common\Page\Pages::referrerRoute() both check whether an incoming request's Referer header "came from our site" using str_starts_with($referrer, $base), where $base is the site's own absolute root URL (for example https://example.com, no trailing slash). Because the comparison has no boundary character after the prefix, any Referer value that merely starts with that string is accepted, including a Referer from a completely different host such as https://example.com.attacker.tld.
This is the same class of bug already fixed once in 2.0.15 for the fast static asset server (GHSA-4v9q-p283-qc2m, "also allowing any neighbouring directory whose name starts with the same letters"). The identical pattern is still present in both places that trust the Referer header, and neither is covered by that fix.
Affected product and version
Product: Grav CMS, getgrav/grav
Confirmed present in: 2.0.15, commit c2b46866857a93a0aa7048e7ed707ed3ed45dbc3
The pattern is not touched by any of the 2.0.15 security fixes, so earlier 2.x releases are likely affected too. I have not checked how far back it goes.
Affected code
system/src/Grav/Common/Uri.php, method referrer():
$referrer = $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] ?? null;
...
$base = $this->rootUrl(true); // e.g. "https://example.com", no trailing slash
// Referrer should always have host set and it should come from the same base address.
if (!is_string($referrer) || !str_starts_with($referrer, $base)) {
$referrer = $default ?: $this->route(true, true);
}
$referrer = substr($referrer, strlen($base));
system/src/Grav/Common/Page/Pages.php, method referrerRoute():
$referrer = $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] ?? null;
$root = $this->grav['base_url_absolute']; // e.g. "https://example.com"
if (!is_string($referrer) || !str_starts_with($referrer, (string) $root)) {
return null;
}
Note that the inner per-language loop later in the same referrerRoute() method does anchor the check correctly (str_starts_with($referrer, "{$base}/")), and system/src/Grav/Common/Themes.php line 300 does the same thing correctly ($current === $base || str_starts_with($current, $base . '/')). So the codebase already has the correct pattern elsewhere. Only the two outer checks quoted above compare against the bare root URL with no trailing delimiter.
Root cause
str_starts_with($referrer, $base) treats $base as a plain string prefix. Since $base has no trailing /, a string is accepted as long as it begins with those exact characters, regardless of what character follows. An attacker fully controls their own domain name, so producing a string that begins with the victim's origin is trivial, for example by registering example.com.attacker.tld or example.com-attacker.tld.
Under the default browser Referrer Policy (strict-origin-when-cross-origin), a cross-origin click or form submission from the attacker's page sends only the origin (scheme://host) as Referer, which is exactly the granularity $base is compared at, so no unusual browser configuration is required.
Proof of concept, verified, real output
This was run directly against the actual, unmodified source file from the repository, not a reimplementation. Steps and exact output below.
Step 1, clone the repo and confirm the commit under test:
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/getgrav/grav.git
$ cd grav && git log -1 --format="%H %ai"
c2b46866857a93a0aa7048e7ed707ed3ed45dbc3 2026-08-03 15:14:50 +0100
Step 2, install PHP to execute the real class:
$ apt-get install -y php-cli
$ php -v
PHP 8.3.6 (cli) (built: Jul 16 2026 18:30:41) (NTS)
Step 3, PoC harness. Full site bootstrap, composer install, database, config, is not required to demonstrate this specific bug, since referrer() only needs the $root property, which init() would normally compute from the site config. The harness sets that one property with PHP Reflection, then calls the real, unmodified referrer() method with a real $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] value, exactly the input path a live server would use:
<?php
// poc.php
spl_autoload_register(function ($class) {
if (strpos($class, 'Grav\\') === 0) {
$rel = str_replace('Grav\\', '', $class);
$path = '/home/claude/grav/system/src/Grav/' . str_replace('\\', '/', $rel) . '.php';
if (file_exists($path)) {
require_once $path;
}
}
});
$env = [
'HTTP_HOST' => 'example.com',
'REQUEST_URI' => '/target-route',
'HTTPS' => 'on',
];
$uri = new \Grav\Common\Uri($env);
$ref = new ReflectionObject($uri);
$prop = $ref->getProperty('root');
$prop->setAccessible(true);
$prop->setValue($uri, 'https://example.com');
function test($label, $refererHeader) {
global $uri;
$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] = $refererHeader;
$result = $uri->referrer('https://example.com/DEFAULT_FALLBACK_USED');
echo "$label\n";
echo " Referer sent : $refererHeader\n";
echo " referrer() returned : $result\n";
echo " Same-origin check : " . ($result === '/DEFAULT_FALLBACK_USED' ? 'REJECTED (fallback used, correct)' : 'ACCEPTED (Referer treated as same-origin)') . "\n\n";
}
echo "=== Grav\\Common\\Uri::referrer() executed against real, unmodified source ===\n";
echo "Site base (\$root, as init() would set it) = https://example.com\n\n";
test('[1] Legitimate same-site referrer', 'https://example.com/some/page');
test('[2] Unrelated attacker site, sanity check, must be rejected', 'https://attacker.tld/phish');
test('[3] Attacker domain string-prefixing victim domain, vulnerable case', 'https://example.com.attacker.tld/phish');
test('[4] Attacker domain, dash variant, vulnerable case', 'https://example.com-attacker.tld/phish');
Step 4, run it:
$ php poc.php
Actual output:
=== Grav\Common\Uri::referrer() executed against real, unmodified source ===
Site base ($root, as init() would set it) = https://example.com
[1] Legitimate same-site referrer
Referer sent : https://example.com/some/page
referrer() returned : /some/page
Same-origin check : ACCEPTED (Referer treated as same-origin)
[2] Unrelated attacker site, sanity check, must be rejected
Referer sent : https://attacker.tld/phish
referrer() returned : /DEFAULT_FALLBACK_USED
Same-origin check : REJECTED (fallback used, correct)
[3] Attacker domain string-prefixing victim domain, vulnerable case
Referer sent : https://example.com.attacker.tld/phish
referrer() returned : .attacker.tld/phish
Same-origin check : ACCEPTED (Referer treated as same-origin)
[4] Attacker domain, dash variant, vulnerable case
Referer sent : https://example.com-attacker.tld/phish
referrer() returned : -attacker.tld/phish
Same-origin check : ACCEPTED (Referer treated as same-origin)
Interpretation: test 2 proves the harness correctly rejects a genuinely unrelated origin, so the acceptance in tests 3 and 4 is not a harness artifact. https://example.com.attacker.tld and https://example.com-attacker.tld, both fully attacker owned and registerable domains, are treated by referrer() as if they were https://example.com itself.
Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
0, fixed 2.0.16 (ecosystem)2.0.16
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0