github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed7.5.0(semver)
Fixed versions
7.5.0
Fix
- Fixed version
7.5.0go get github.com/getaxonflow/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: GO-2026-5290
Axonflow fixed bugs by implementing multi-tenant isolation and access-control hardening
Summary
Eight independently-filed bug fixes in the v7.1.3 → v7.5.0 release window collectively close a set of multi-tenant isolation, access-control, and policy-enforcement defects in the AxonFlow platform. They are filed as a single consolidated advisory because the recommended remediation is a single platform upgrade.
Affected versions
< 7.5.0. Specific items affect different earlier minors; see Impact below.
Patched versions
>= 7.5.0.
Impact
| # | Item | Affected | Patched | CWE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | MAP execution multi-tenant isolation. A body-supplied org_id could override the Basic-auth-derived org for both execution recording and policy evaluation. In multi-tenant deployments with shared agents, this could record one tenant's request under another tenant's audit log and evaluate it under the wrong tenant's policy set. | < 7.4.5 | >= 7.4.5 | CWE-863 |
| 2 | Cross-tenant audit-log leak via evidence/explain handlers. The handlers behind /api/v1/evidence/* and /api/v1/decisions/*/explain failed open when the tenant context was missing, returning data scoped to a different tenant or returning data without scope. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-200, CWE-863 |
| 3 | License-validation bypass on `onboard-customer`. The portal customer-onboard endpoint lacked authentication and license-key validation, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke the onboard flow. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-862 |
| 4 | Tenant-scope fail-open on evidence/explain. Distinct from item 2: when tenant headers were absent, the handler defaulted to a permissive read scope rather than refusing the request. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-862 |
| 5 | Internal-service auth fallback bypass in non-Community modes. Evaluation/Enterprise builds carried an auth fallback path that, under specific request shapes, could be exploited to bypass apiAuthMiddleware. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-863 |
| 6 | Login timing / org-existence disclosure on the portal. The login handler returned different timing and response bodies for invalid-org vs invalid-password, allowing org enumeration. | < 7.1.3 | >= 7.1.3 | CWE-208 |
| 7 | Portal DoS via unbounded request body. The portal accepted unbounded request bodies, allowing memory-exhaustion attacks. Capped at 1 MiB. | < 7.1.5 | >= 7.1.5 | CWE-770 |
| 8 | SQL-injection enforcement regression on `try.getaxonflow.com`. The Community SaaS hosted endpoint inherited the warn SQLi default introduced in v6.2.0, allowing SQL-injection-shaped requests to pass governance to the LLM. Self-hosted deployments were unaffected unless they manually changed the default. | < 7.5.0 (try.getaxonflow.com only) | >= 7.5.0 | CWE-89 |
Remediation
Upgrade to AxonFlow platform v7.5.0 or later. No configuration changes required — the platform is purely additive and existing API/SDK callers continue to work.
For users who can't upgrade immediately, item-specific mitigations:
X-Org-ID / X-Tenant-ID from authenticated identity at the ingress, never accepting body-supplied identity.SQLI_ACTION=block can be set explicitly via the agent task definition; v7.5.0 makes this the default.Resources
Credit
Identified by AxonFlow internal security review during the April 2026 quality-freeze epic.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 7.5.0 (semver)7.5.0
7.5.0go get github.com/getaxonflow/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0