github.com/nuts-foundation/nuts-node
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected1.1.0(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-41164, GO-2026-5291
nuts-node has JWT type confusion in v1 access token introspection that allows VP replay as access token
Summary
The v1 access token introspection endpoint (/auth/v1/introspect_access_token) accepts any JWT signed by a key present on the node, without validating the JWT type, issuer-to-key binding, or required claims. This allows a Verifiable Presentation (VP) JWT to be replayed as an access token and receive an active: true introspection response.
Background
In the v1 auth flow (Nuts RFC003), access tokens are JWTs signed by the authorizer's key with:
iss = authorizer organization DIDsub = requester organization DIDservice = purpose of use (e.g. "eOverdracht")typ header = "JWT" (default, not explicitly set)Verifiable Presentations are also JWTs with typ: "JWT" (per W3C VC Data Model 1.1). The W3C VC Data Model 2.0 changed this to vp+jwt specifically to prevent this class of confusion attack (See Securing Verifiable Credentials using JOSE and COSE 3.1.1).
Vulnerability details
The introspection endpoint performs only standard JWT checks. It does not perform the following Nuts-specific access token checks:
"JWT"iss claim matches the DID extracted from the kidservice can be empty; vp claim is silently ignored by FromMap() which uses lenient JSON unmarshalingAttack scenario
Prerequisites: Attacker (Org B) has received a VP JWT from the victim (Org A) during a normal access token request flow.
privateKeyStore.Exists(kid), which passes, because Org A's key is on Org A's nodevp claim is silently ignoredactive: true with service: "", iss: "", sub: <Org A's DID>Mitigating factors
service field may reject the request at the application leveliss, so resource servers checking this field would see an empty valueSeverity rationale
While the introspection endpoint incorrectly returns active: true for a replayed VP, we consider this not practically exploitable in the current deployment landscape. Resource servers require valid service, iss and aud values to route requests to the correct databases. A replayed VP returns empty service, empty iss, and wrong sub (Org A instead of B), making it unusable for meaningful access. The attack also requires the victim to first present a VP to the attacker through a legitimate protocol flow, and VPs are short-lived.
The severity reflects that the protection against exploitation is accidental (resource servers need service for routing, not for security) and we cannot guarantee how all resource server implementations handle the active: true response with missing fields.
The fix
Affected versions: all v5.x releases prior to v5.4.31, and all v6.x releases prior to v6.2.3. From v5.4.31 and v6.2.3 onward, the following checks have been added to IntrospectAccessToken:
kid header and verify it matches the iss claimservice is emptytyp: "at+jwt"Additionally, the access token creation code has been updated to use typ: "at+jwt" per RFC 9068.
Patch
Patches are available at https://github.com/nuts-foundation/nuts-node/releases/tag/v5.4.31 and https://github.com/nuts-foundation/nuts-node/releases/tag/v6.2.3.
Workaround
If users are unable to update their nuts-node, resource servers can mitigate this risk by explicitly validating the introspection response: reject responses where service is empty, where iss is empty or does not match the expected authorizer DID, or where sub does not match the expected requester DID (Org B instead of A).
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 1.1.0 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0