github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected1.18.1(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45626, GO-2026-5292
Arcane Backend: OS Command Injection in Volume Browser ListDirectory via path query parameter
Summary
GET /environments/{id}/volumes/{volumeName}/browse accepts a path query parameter that is passed to a shell command (sh -c "find … | while …") inside an Arcane helper container. The path sanitiser blocks ../ traversal but does not strip Bourne-shell metacharacters such as $() or backticks, and strconv.Quote only escapes Go string metacharacters, not shell substitution sequences. Any authenticated user with access to a browseable volume can execute arbitrary commands inside the helper container; command output is reflected back in the 500 error body.
Details
The execution flow is:
BrowseDirectoryInput.Path (query: path) — backend/internal/huma/handlers/volumes.go:148VolumeHandler.BrowseDirectory calls volumeService.ListDirectory(ctx, volumeName, input.Path) — backend/internal/huma/handlers/volumes.go:858-865. Note the route registration at line 412–419 only declares BearerAuth/ApiKeyAuth; there is no checkAdmin(ctx) call (compare with customize.go, system.go, swarm.go, etc., which do enforce admin).VolumeService.ListDirectory runs the user-supplied path through sanitizeBrowsePathInternal, then joins it under /volume, quotes it with strconv.Quote, and embeds it into a sh -c command:// backend/internal/services/volume_service.go:286-300
sanitizedPath, err := s.sanitizeBrowsePathInternal(dirPath)
...
targetPath := path.Join("/volume", sanitizedPath)
quotedPath := strconv.Quote(targetPath)
cmd := []string{"sh", "-c", fmt.Sprintf(
"find %s -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 | while IFS= read -r f; do out=$(stat -c \"%%s %%Y %%f %%A\" -- \"$f\" 2>/dev/null) || continue; printf \"%%s\\0%%s\\0\" \"$f\" \"$out\"; done",
quotedPath)}
stdout, _, err := s.execInContainerInternal(ctx, containerID, cmd)
The sanitiser is insufficient (backend/internal/services/volume_service.go:1448-1467):
func (s *VolumeService) sanitizeBrowsePathInternal(input string) (string, error) {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(input)
if trimmed == "" || trimmed == "/" { return "/", nil }
cleaned := path.Clean(trimmed)
if !path.IsAbs(cleaned) { cleaned = "/" + cleaned }
if strings.Contains(cleaned, "/../") || strings.HasSuffix(cleaned, "/..") || cleaned == "/.." {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid path: path traversal not allowed")
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(cleaned, "/") { return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid path: must be absolute") }
return cleaned, nil
}
Only ../ patterns are filtered. $(...), backticks, ;, &, |, >, etc. all pass through unchanged. strconv.Quote then wraps the path in Go-style double quotes, which sh -c interprets as a regular double-quoted string — and bash performs $(...) command substitution inside double quotes.
For the input /$( id):
sanitizeBrowsePathInternal returns /$( id) (no ../ present).path.Join("/volume", "/$( id)") → /volume/$( id).strconv.Quote(...) → "/volume/$( id)".find "/volume/$( id)" …, which expands to find "/volume/uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)" …. find fails because that path does not exist; the stderr containing the substituted command output is propagated by execInContainerInternal (volume_service.go:910-918) into a command exited with code N: … error, then re-wrapped by ListDirectory and returned to the client as a 500 response body.Errors from the handler at volumes.go:863-864 are returned via huma.Error500InternalServerError(err.Error()), so the substituted output is reflected in plaintext.
Blast radius / mitigations actually present:
createTempContainerInternal with NetworkDisabled: true, no privileged mode, no Docker socket mount, only the target Docker volume bind-mounted (:ro for browse). It is auto-removed.volume_service.go:336-356, read past size limits, etc.).docker exec.Secondary issue (same sanitiser): DeleteFile (volume_service.go:924-963) defends against deleting volume root with if sanitizedPath == "/". Input path=. yields path.Clean(".") == "." → prefixed to /., which fails the == "/" check, then path.Join("/volume", "/.") == "/volume", so the executed command is rm -rf /volume, recursively deleting all volume contents. This is a separate logic flaw worth fixing alongside the sanitiser hardening but is reported here only for completeness.
Impact
volume_service.go:336-356, bypass per-file byte limits, enumerate the helper image, mount-time inspection, etc.NetworkDisabled: true, no privileged flag, no Docker socket; the volume is bind-mounted read-only for browse. Confidentiality/integrity/availability impact is therefore limited (CVSS C:L / I:L / A:L) but real.rm -rf /volume by sending path=. to DELETE /environments/{id}/volumes/{volumeName}/browse, which any authenticated user can also reach.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 1.18.1 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0