Advisory

GHSA-9qw7-j9xw-fv9c

Also known as: CVE-2026-63395

Summary

isomorphic-git: Arbitrary file write outside of working tree via directory symlink during checkout (potential RCE)

Details

Summary
git.checkout writes working-tree files through a directory symlink without checking the leading path, so a malicious repository can write outside the intended working directory. The defect is in isomorphic-git's checkout logic itself and is therefore independent of the `fs` provider. The *impact* depends on the configured filesystem; worst case is arbitrary file write on the host, e.g. injecting an attacker key into ~/.ssh/authorized_keys → remote login / code execution.

Details
A single git tree can't hold a name as both a symlink and a directory, so the attack uses two states:

Commit N:    config            (mode 120000, symlink → ../.ssh)
Commit N+1:  config/           (mode 040000, tree)
               authorized_keys (mode 100644, attacker public key)

Checking out commit N writes config as a directory symlink. Checking out commit N+1 sees config/authorized_keys as a new path: isomorphic-git mkdirs the parent (config, already a symlink → EEXIST, ignored) then writeFiles the file, which the OS resolves through the symlink to outside the working directory. A *file*-level symlink swap is caught (the 120000→100644 mode change triggers an rm), but the directory-level variant is not — the payload is always a new child path, a plain create, so the parent symlink is never removed.

The symlink target is attacker-chosen. Besides ~/.ssh, pointing it at the repo's own control directory — hooks → .git/hooks then hooks/pre-commit, or x → .git then overwriting .git/config (core.hooksPath / alias / core.fsmonitor) — yields RCE on the next native git command without depending on ~/.ssh existing, since .git/ is always present in a fresh clone.

Canonical git behavior (divergence)
git refuses to do this: has_symlink_leading_path() (symlinks.c) checks each leading path component during checkout and will not follow a symlink — the hardening behind CVE-2021-21300 and CVE-2024-32002. isomorphic-git has no equivalent check.

PoC
https://github.com/spiceoverflow/av1-symlink-hook-rce — open in a Codespace; it builds the malicious repo, serves it locally, and runs a victim. Output on Linux:

[AV-1] Directory symlink on disk: …/config → ../.ssh  (→ /home/node/.ssh)
[AV-1] *** SSH KEY INJECTION CONFIRMED ***

Trigger: minimal realistic path is clone (commit N) + a later pull (commit N+1) — ordinary sync of an already-trusted repo. It also collapses to a single clone when the consuming app reads or writes into the cloned tree, or when a symlink already exists on disk.

Impact

isomorphic-git is filesystem-agnostic, so exploitability and blast radius depend on the active fs provider — specifically whether it creates a symlink and follows it on a later write:

  • Node `fs` on Linux/macOS (servers, CI, CLIs, Electron/desktop tooling — the common server-side use): real OS symlinks → the write lands anywhere the process can reach → arbitrary file write on the host → RCE (the PoC above). Highest impact.
  • Node `fs` on Windows: fs.symlink typically requires privilege and throws EPERM, so the symlink-plant step usually fails — not exploitable by default. (A property of the OS/provider, not of isomorphic-git.)
  • In-memory / browser providers (memfs, ZenFS, lightning-fs, custom fs): there is no host filesystem to escape to, so the worst case is writing outside the intended clone directory but within that virtual filesystem — i.e. corrupting other repos/app data the same provider holds. Bounded by the sandbox, and only if the provider implements symlink creation + following.

The CVSS above reflects the worst-case (Node fs on a POSIX host). Browser/in-memory-only deployments are lower severity (sandboxed integrity impact).

Suggested fix
Before each working-tree write, lstat every leading path component and refuse to traverse a
symlink (mirrors git's has_symlink_leading_path()); optionally honor core.symlinks=false.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-11-09 19:53 UTC
Modified
2026-11-09 20:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

isomorphic-git

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.38.6 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.38.6

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences