Advisory

GHSA-9r4w-jg96-92mv

Also known as: CVE-2026-12681, GO-2026-5298

Summary

Go-Attestation: Hash injection into trusted measurement list via unskipped SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes in parseEfiSignatureList()

Details

Summary

parseEfiSignatureList() in attest/internal/events.go does not skip
SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes before reading EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
signature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1.

Impact

For hashSHA256SigGUID lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate — breaking the core integrity guarantee of remote attestation.

Root Cause

After binary.Read(&signatures.Header) reads 28 bytes, buf points to the start of the SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes. Both entry loops start at sigOffset := 0 instead of sigOffset := SignatureHeaderSize, causing vendor bytes to be read as signature entries.

Affected versions

All versions through commit f877374 (2026-05-15).

Fix

Pull request: https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502

  • Add bound check: SignatureHeaderSize must not exceed remaining list space
  • Skip SignatureHeaderSize bytes before both entry loops
  • Regression test: TestParseEfiSignatureListNonZeroSignatureHeaderSize

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-06-12 15:04 UTC
Modified
2026-09-12 05:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/google/go-attestation

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.6.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.6.1

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences