github.com/google/go-attestation
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.6.1(semver)
Fixed versions
0.6.1
Fix
- Fixed version
0.6.1go get github.com/google/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-12681, GO-2026-5298
Go-Attestation: Hash injection into trusted measurement list via unskipped SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes in parseEfiSignatureList()
Summary
parseEfiSignatureList() in attest/internal/events.go does not skipSignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes before reading EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
signature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1.
Impact
For hashSHA256SigGUID lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate — breaking the core integrity guarantee of remote attestation.
Root Cause
After binary.Read(&signatures.Header) reads 28 bytes, buf points to the start of the SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes. Both entry loops start at sigOffset := 0 instead of sigOffset := SignatureHeaderSize, causing vendor bytes to be read as signature entries.
Affected versions
All versions through commit f877374 (2026-05-15).
Fix
Pull request: https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502
SignatureHeaderSize must not exceed remaining list spaceSignatureHeaderSize bytes before both entry loopsTestParseEfiSignatureListNonZeroSignatureHeaderSizeHigh Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.6.1 (semver)0.6.1
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0