github.com/nezhahq/nezha
Affected
- introduced
1.0.0, fixed2.2.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.2.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.2.0go get github.com/nezhahq/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-53523, GO-2026-5829
Nezha Monitoring: OAuth2 Redirect URL — Host Header Injection
1. Description
The getRedirectURL function in oauth2.go:22-29 constructs the OAuth2 callback URL by concatenating the request's Host header with a fixed path, with zero validation of the Host header:
func getRedirectURL(c *gin.Context) string {
scheme := "http://"
referer := c.Request.Referer()
if forwardedProto := c.Request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"); forwardedProto == "https" || strings.HasPrefix(referer, "https://") {
scheme = "https://"
}
return scheme + c.Request.Host + "/api/v1/oauth2/callback"
}
File: cmd/dashboard/controller/oauth2.go:22-29
This function is called from oauth2redirect() at line 53:
func oauth2redirect(c *gin.Context) (*model.Oauth2LoginResponse, error) {
// ...
redirectURL := getRedirectURL(c)
o2conf := o2confRaw.Setup(redirectURL)
// ...
url := o2conf.AuthCodeURL(state, oauth2.AccessTypeOnline)
return &model.Oauth2LoginResponse{Redirect: url}, nil
}
The redirectURL is passed into o2confRaw.Setup(redirectURL) which configures the OAuth2 Config.RedirectURL field (oauth2config.go:22-33). This RedirectURL is sent to the OAuth2 provider (e.g., GitHub, Google, Microsoft) as the callback endpoint. The OAuth2 provider will redirect the user's browser — along with the authorization code — to this URL after the user authenticates.
The security issue is that c.Request.Host is directly user-controllable via the HTTP Host header. An attacker who can control which Host header reaches the oauth2redirect handler can:
Host: evil.comgetRedirectURL returns https://evil.com/api/v1/oauth2/callbackevil.comevil.com captures the auth codeThe scheme detection (lines 24-27) uses X-Forwarded-Proto and the Referer header, both of which are also user-controllable in certain configurations, so the attacker can force https:// scheme in the redirect URL.
The oauth2callback handler at line 129 later uses state.RedirectURL (which is stored in singleton.Cache at line 65) when calling exchangeOpenId at line 152. The cached redirectURL was set during the initial oauth2redirect call, tying the attack flow together.
2. PoC
A conceptual attack (no Docker needed):
Scenario: OAuth2 provider has loose redirect URI validation
(e.g., allows wildcard subdomain matching)
1. Attacker crafts a URL to the dashboard's OAuth2 login endpoint
with a modified Host header:
GET /api/v1/oauth2/github HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker-controlled.com
X-Forwarded-Proto: https
2. The dashboard responds with a redirect to:
https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=...&redirect_uri=https://attacker-controlled.com/api/v1/oauth2/callback&state=...
3. Victim clicks the attacker's link → authenticates with GitHub
→ GitHub redirects to https://attacker-controlled.com/api/v1/oauth2/callback?code=AUTH_CODE&state=...
4. Attacker captures the AUTH_CODE from their server logs
5. Attacker exchanges the code at the real dashboard's
/api/v1/oauth2/callback endpoint (using the real Host header
this time), binding the victim's OAuth identity to their
dashboard account
Prerequisites for full exploit:
https://*/* or allow wildcards; others are strict)3. Impact
The attack complexity is higher than typical Host header injection scenarios because it requires:
Host header to reach the dashboard's handler unmodified (bypassing reverse proxy normalization)However, the code-level vulnerability is unambiguous: the application trusts attacker-controlled input (Host header) for a security-critical URL that participates in the OAuth2 authorization code flow.
4. Remediation
func getRedirectURL(c *gin.Context) string {
host := c.Request.Host
if !singleton.Conf.IsAllowedHost(host) {
host = singleton.Conf.DashboardBaseURL // fallback
}
// ...
}
singleton.Conf instead of deriving it from the request Host header: func getRedirectURL(c *gin.Context) string {
return singleton.Conf.DashboardBaseURL + "/api/v1/oauth2/callback"
}
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
1.0.0, fixed 2.2.0 (semver)2.2.0
2.2.0go get github.com/nezhahq/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0